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INTRODUCTION

The New Deal marked the consolidation of a novel and, in some
ways, enduring set of interrelations among courts, legislatures, and
progressive politics. At the intellectual level, it saw the ascendance of
two ideas. First, the market was not free, natural, or neutral, but instead
entailed coercion and political contingency.' Second, judicial decisions
were not determined by scientific principles but instead required policy
choices, meaning that the judge's function had a legislative aspect, even
though the judge lacked the legislator's accountability to the people.' In
light of these ideas, the common law baselines of the market no longer
deserved special reverence.3 At the institutional level, the New Deal
embodied the triumph of an electoral coalition that demanded a
systematic alteration of economic outcomes across society -something
that only legislatures and administrative agencies could provide. In light
of all these changes, courts needed to stand aside and allow legislatures
I.

See generally BARBARA H. FRIED,

AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS

THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE: ROBERT HALE

MOVEMENT

(1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION

BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 147-93 (993);
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-i960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 33-63, 145-67, 194-98 (1992); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 40-42, 45-62
(1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR's UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE
NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 17-34 (2004).
2. See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 167-236 (2000)
(covering the common law and constitutional law). For additional background on the increasing
recognition of judicial policymaking in the early twentieth century, see generally NEIL DUXBURY,
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 9-159 (I995); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U.

Prrr. L. REV. i, 39-50 (1983); Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, IO6 YALE L.J. 493,

497-502 (1996) (reviewing DUXBURY, supra).
3. See SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note I, at 40-42, 45-62.
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and agencies to take the lead in governing, at least in economic matters.
The New Deal was the nation's most decisive leap into the "Age of
Statutes," inseparable from the welfare state.'
The federal courts, in particular, were subject to new restraints. In
constitutional review of economic legislation, the Supreme Court
abdicated its roles as guardian against "class legislation" and as enforcer
of states' rights.6 Demonstrating how much narrower the possibility of
neutral and principled judging had come to seem, Justice Robert H.
Jackson declared that the boundaries of congressional power to regulate
interstate commerce were "not a matter of legal principle, but of
personal opinion; not one of constitutional law, but one of economic
policy." 7 And whereas the federal courts had once asserted the right to
engage in their own independent "search" for the common law in cases
of diversity jurisdiction, the SuFreme Court now abolished that practice
in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins. The result was cheered by many New
Dealers.9 It fit nicely with their positivist understanding of law." That is,
the "search" for the common law was really policymaking in disguise,
and policymaking was better left to actors more democratically
accountable than the federal courts."
4. HoRwrrz,supra note x, at 213-30 (analyzing the New Deal battle over administrative power);
A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSITrUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER,
AND THE POLmCS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 201 (2000) (stating that
one of the "primary goals" of Roosevelt's appointees to the Supreme Court was to "constrain the
power of the federal courts"); RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE
NEW DEAL 99-105 (1995) (describing New Deal lawyers' self-conscious effort to transfer power from
courts to legislatures and agencies); William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE
L.J. 165, 197 (2001) (stating that, in the eyes of New Deal advocates for workers' rights, "[t]he only
important contribution the courts could make to this essentially political and legislative task was to
allow the process to go forward").
5. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 44 (I982).
The statutorification of American Law can in one sense be dated from the New Deal.
Although the process had long since begun and was to continue long after, the particular
needs of the Great Depression, the desire to fashion a democratic welfare state in response
to the influences of European fascism and Russian communism, and the frustrating
slowness of the courts in accepting change, all made legislative lawmaking seem the
appropriate solution.
Id. On the relationship of statutorification to the welfare state, see id. at 72-80. For a revisionist
account emphasizing the long-run increase in legislation originating in the late 18oos that culminated
in the 1930s, see William J. Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern American State, in LOOKING BACK
AT LAW'S CENTURY 249, 268-70 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002).
6. See generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998); GILLMAN, SUPra
EDWARD

note I, at 175-93; WHITE, supra note 2, at 198-236. On the litigation strategies leading to this

revolution, see generally PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982).
7. WHITE, supra note 2, at 230 (citation omitted).
8. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9. This was in spite of their oft-expressed belief that the Constitution was not the proper basis
for it. Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 6o9, 614, 644 (1938);
PURCELL, supra note 4, at 195-97, 201-03.
10. PURCELL, supra note 4, at 214; see also Jackson, supra note 9, at 612.
is. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 9, at 614 ("The most serious objection [to the pre-Erieregime] is
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But even in this firmly established "Age of Statutes," the common
law did not disappear altogether. It continued to play a role not only in
state courts but also in federal ones, for the Supreme Court quickly made
clear that federal common law would survive in certain areas where it
was necessary to protect national interests.' 2 Given that judges still
needed to decide some cases by way of common law, how should they go
about the task? On this matter, the newly ascendant progressive
principles could be read in contradictory ways. They might suggest that
the common law was suspect, since it called upon judges to exercise
policy discretion even though they lacked the legislature's democratic
accountability and its capacity to make comprehensive and prospective
rules. One might argue that legal change therefore should happen only
through the legislature. In other words, a legislature that did not alter the
common law presumably wanted it to remain the same. But one could
also make the opposite argument: if courts could not avoid making policy
choices, let them embrace the task, especially now that the old-fashioned
reverence for market rules had diminished. As to the question of what
values should guide courts, let them follow the legislature. In a common
law case, let the judge treat statutes in related areas of the law as if they
were precedents, discerning the policies expressed in them and
expanding those policies to cover new situations. 3 This latter approach
was the one more commonly endorsed by progressive jurists in the New
Deal era. 4 It allowed judges to exercise their talents while ostensibly
honoring legislative supremacy. In a political sense, it was very
convenient, since legislatures up to the late 1930s frequently expressed
the kind of progressive economic values that New Deal jurists wanted
judges to implement anyway. In fact, progressive jurists of the midtwentieth century often lionized the common law and advocated judicial
lawmaking to further their preferred policies even when the legislature

that the national legislature was powerless to alter rules of law after they were declared by the Federal
courts in such matters as ordinary commercial law and torts."). On the undemocratic nature of the preErie regime, see PURCELL, supra note 4, at 141-91.
12. On the emergence and potential of specialized federal common law, see Henry J. Friendly, In
Praiseof Erie-andof the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383,405-22 (1964).
13. For a theoretical treatment of these competing approaches to the common law in a statutory
age, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in
the Age of the New Public Law,89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 888-905 (I99I). The first of the two approaches
has, interestingly, come to be associated with the judicial conservatism of the i97os and i98os.
14. See, e.g., James M. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law,inHARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213,
217-24, 230-31 (1934); Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, Address Before the
Conference on the Future of the Common Law (Aug. 19-21, 1936), 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12-15 (1936);
Walter Gellhorn, Principles of Legislation, 21 IOWA L. REV. 167, 170 (935) (reviewing HARVEY
WALKER, LAWMAKING IN THE UNITED STATES (1934)). For a general treatment of this approach from the
early progressives onward, see Robert F. Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in
Common Law Cases, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 558-63 (1982).
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did not actively prompt them.'5 This occurred in fields where courts
historically exercised de facto common law power in spite of statutes,

such as corporate
law and antitrust, as well as true common law fields
6
like torts.
The question of what role the common law should play in the New
Deal state arose in yet another area: defense contracting. Scholars have
overlooked the common law's place in this field, which is unfortunate,

since it had potentially far-reaching consequences and sparked an intense
and illuminating controversy. At the moment when President Franklin
D. Roosevelt was trying to secure his legacy, Nazi Germany and imperial
Japan forced the United States into total war. Although the war helped
to render permanent the federal government's role in the economy, it
also threatened to alter the balance of power within the governmentbusiness partnership.'7 Despite the arrival of the "Age of Statutes," the
administrative capacities of the state remained weak, particularly in the
area of industrial management and planning.

It was simply impossible

for the United States to fight a total war without massive aid from large
private corporations, who would quite naturally demand favorable
treatment in exchange for their participation, just as they had in the First
World War. The terms of the new bargain between government and big
business were embodied, to a large extent, in the huge defense contracts
that now took up much of the GDP, redistributing wealth and

influencing the nation's industrial organization. When the nation entered
the Second World War, defense contracts were still governed largely by
common law. (Judges and lawyers seem to have assumed that, despite
15. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-196o, at 20-21 (1986) (noting that legal
realists admired equity doctrines and summary judgment, precisely because they provided for broader
judicial discretion, allowing judges to make the law fairer and more efficient); Karl N. Llewellyn,
American Common Law Tradition, and American Democracy, I J. LEGIS. & POL. SOC. 14, 36-40 (1942)
(praising a "grand style" in common law-making, characterized by the use of broad judicial discretion

to meet the changing needs of society).
16. See ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR

1O6-36 (1995) (describing New Deal lawyer Thurman Arnold's campaign to convince the federal
courts to use antitrust law to implement his agenda of consumer protection); Adolph A. Berle, Jr.,
CorporatePowers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1932) (advocating an interpretation of
corporate law to protect shareholders); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 461, 472, 483, 501-02 (1985) (describing how strict liability advocate Fleming James
demanded legislation unsuccessfully in the I93OS before moving in the late 1940S to a strategy of
treatise-writing to influence judges in common law cases, which proved highly successful).
17. The legal history of the Second World War is underexplored, particularly outside the area of
constitutional law. A notable exception is TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW: THE AMERICAN HOME FRONT IN
WORLD WAR II 121-207 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., 2002) (containing essays on taxation,
regulation, and administrative law, as well as constitutional law).
18. Problems of state administrative capacity deserve more attention in the legal history of the
New Deal and of progressivism more generally. For a model, see THOMAS K. McCRAw, PROPHETS OF
REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Louis

D.

BRANDEIS, JAMES

M.

LANDIS, AND ALFRED E. KAHN

i60-203 (1984) (emphasizing the attention paid by the early Securities and Exchange Commission to
problems of enforcement).
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Erie, it would be federal common law, as the Supreme Court confirmed
without dissent in I943-I944.' 9) Traditional common law doctrines
would, of course, accord rock-solid security to the sometimes exploitative
bargains that large contractors struck with a government in desperate
need. Congress, once the friend and client of the New Deal lawyers,
shifted rightward in 1938 and, during the period of rearmament that
lasted from summer 1940 through the attack on Pearl Harbor in
December 1941, legislated only weakly to rein in the contractors. The
federal courts, now dominated by Roosevelt appointees and wielding
common law power over defense contracts, stood in a position to
influence the degree to which the Second World War would attenuate
the legacy of the New Deal."0 The progressive maxim that common law
judges should follow the legislature gave them little help, as Congress
seemed at best indifferent.
This did not stop the New Deal lawyers. Two days after Pearl
Harbor and one day after the United States declared war on Japan and
Germany, attorneys for the Roosevelt administration went before the
Supreme Court to argue the final appeal in a bitter dispute against the
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, the nation's largest defense contractor."
i9. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (stating that federal common
law governs the rights of the United States in recovering commercial paper); see also United States v.
Allegheny County, Pa., 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944) (stating, without dissent on the point, that the
"validity and construction" of federal contracts "present questions of federal law not controlled by the
law of any state"). This rule was apparently generally assumed even before Clearfield,as demonstrated
by the major federal contract case United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942), which
will be the subject of this Article. The lower courts, both of which decided the case after Erie was
handed down, failed to mention Erie. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 113 F.2d 301 (3d Cit.
1940); 23 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1938). When discussing the validity and construction of federal
contracts, they cited no cases except federal and English ones. See Bethlehem, 113 F.2d at 306-08; 23 F.
Supp. at 68o-8i. Before the Supreme Court, neither party mentioned Erie in its brief. See Briefs for
Petitioners and Respondents, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9). The contractor cited only federal
and English cases; the government cited cases from many jurisdictions but did not suggest that the law
of any state controlled. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that it need not decide whether the case was
governed by federal common law or state law, since the result would be the same regardless; the
decision cited only federal law. Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 299-300. The dissents neither cited Erie nor
suggested that state law controlled. Id. at 312-37 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), 338-42 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Although the opinion of the Court stated that the lower courts held the contracts to be
governed by state law, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 295-96, 299 n.9, this was apparently mistaken. The lower
courts mentioned state law only when discussing the award of interest on the judgment, apparently
drawing upon a rule unrelated to Erie. Bethlehem, 113 F.2d at 308 (conditioning application of the rule
on the contracts' "place of performance," which was irrelevant to Erie); Bethlehem, 23 F. Supp. at 68182 (referring to a statement of state law by the Special Master, who submitted his report before Erie
was even handed down).
2o. The mediation of public governance through the structures of government contracting in the
present day has been analyzed at length in Jody Freeman, The ContractingState, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
155 (2000); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance,75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (2000).
21. Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 289. On Bethlehem's status, see Robert Higgs, Private Profit. Public
Risk: Institutional Antecedents of the Modern Military Procurement System in the Rearmament
Program, 194o-41, in THE SINEWS OF WAR: ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMic HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II, at
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They tried to convince the Court that federal judges ought to rein in the
prices of defense contracts, using the doctrine of economic duress. In
time of war, so the argument went, the nation depends on defense
contractors for its very life, and these private firms should not be
permitted to exploit public necessity for inordinate gain. This argument,
had it succeeded, would have constituted perhaps the largest expansion
of judges' common law power over big business during the twentieth
century. However, the Court rejected the argument. The newly
appointed Justice Jackson, in his previous post as Attorney General, had
embraced the duress theory and adopted the case as a personal mission.
Recused from taking part in the decision, he blasted it as "the dirtiest
day's work the Court has ever done and a defeat for the Government
worse than Pearl Harbor."" Jackson's lone consolation was an
impassioned dissent from Justice Felix Frankfurter, who argued that the
government's "dependent position" in wartime meant that courts should
treat defense contractors like public trustees. Thus did Jackson and
Frankfurter-two men strongly associated with the New Deal tradition
of judicial restraint -advocate a radical innovation in the common law to
govern the nascent military-industrial complex. One contemporary
dubbed Bethlehem a "crossroads decision," on a par with McCulloch and
Lochner, in terms of its consequences for judicial power.23 Surprisingly,
scholars have given2 4this remarkable case no serious attention since the
Second World War.
This Article tells the forgotten story of United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corporation.The tale is a mixture of epic and farce. Although the
final decision came down just as the United States was beginning to fight
the Second World War in 1942, the dispute arose from a transaction that
took place during the First World War, in 1917-1918. Back then, the
government had been desperate for tankers and cargo vessels to
transport men and supplies across the Atlantic to save Britain and
France from imminent collapse. Bethlehem, the largest shipbuilding
company in the world, contracted with the government to build a big
171, 186 (Geofrey T. Mills & Hugh Rockoff eds., 1993).
22. Letter from Justice Robert H. Jackson to Justice William 0. Douglas (Feb. 9, 1942) (Folder
labeled "Legal File-Supreme Court O.T. I94i-Cases Nos. 8, 9-U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel
Corporation," Box 122, Robert H. Jackson Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.) [The Robert H. Jackson Papers at the Library of Congress are hereinafter referred
to as RHJ-LC].
23. Walter B. Kennedy, The Bethlehem Steel Case-A Test of the New ConstitutionalismI, ii
FORDHAM L. REV. 133, 139 & n.23 (1942).
24. The only piece since World War 11 to treat the Bethlehem case at any length is John W.
Whelan & Steven B. Mains, "Cost Plus" or "I May Be a Robber But I'm Not a Thief," 8 PuB. CONT.
L.J. 2io (1976). This twelve-page essay presents no sources on the case aside from the opinions
themselves, never citing the parties' briefs or the Master's Report. Id. It is generally devoid of
historical context, though it briefly touches on one point analyzed in much more depth in this Article:
the problem of how to distribute the high risk of war production. Id. at 21 1-3.
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chunk of this new fleet; the contract exceeded one billion dollars in
today's currency. Bethlehem demanded complete protection from the
risk of loss, plus a very favorable price formula. Government negotiators
acquiesced. When the accounts were settled, the riskless contract yielded
a profit of a quarter billion dollars in today's currency, or twenty-two
percent on cost. Government officials denounced the profit as
unconscionable and resolved that Bethlehem should not be paid in full.
Toward this end, attorneys handling the case in the lower courts invoked
a wide variety of legal theories, all doomed to failure. Meanwhile, a
combination of bad luck and incompetence delayed the litigation for
many years. This proved fortuitous, for when the case reached the stage
of final appeal in 1940, Jackson and his New Deal colleagues seized upon
it as an instrument to limit the power of the rapidly expanding defense
industry. Dropping or deemphasizing the previous, unsuccessful theories,
they adopted the novel theory of duress and made it their main
argument.
To our ears, it may sound bizarre and even absurd that the
government claimed to be the victim of duress at the hands of a private
company. This puzzle is the subject of Part I of this Article, which
recreates the economic context of total war. In wartime, the state was
legally authorized to seize any company it wished. At first glance, it
seems reasonable to assume that such power placed the government in a
strong bargaining position. As a matter of fact, however, that assumption
is wrong (at least in the case of large firms). To win a total war, the state
had to maximize production. Because the U.S. government lacked an
industrial management bureaucracy of its own, it had to rely on the one
that already existed in the nation's private firms. Seizing a company and
replacing its management with government personnel reduced efficiency
and undermined the war effort. Hence, when the government did use the
power of eminent domain, it was almost exclusively in cases where the
existing private managers, for whatever reason, were producing so little
that a seizure, with all its disadvantages, would still help production. Such
was not the case for large, well-run firms like Bethlehem. Therefore,
these contractors were able to drive hard bargains and extract rents.
What is more, total war created extreme cost uncertainty, meaning that
the government either had to pay its contractors huge risk premiums or
protect them against losses, which in turn encouraged them to run up
costs.

Taken together, these factors resulted in a waste of public money
that hampered efficient procurement and sapped national morale. To
meet the challenge, Congress-in April 1942, two months after the
government's defeat in Bethlehem-finally settled on a second-best
solution known as the Renegotiation Act, giving the government
unilateral power to re-price war contracts during or after performance,
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once better cost information was available and the government's
bargaining position was stronger. However, this solution was politically
precarious. Before the Act's passage, especially in the pro-business
climate of rearmament during 1940-1941, New Deal lawyers had been

terrified that Congress would allow the defense industry to rob the
government blind. The theory of duress in Bethlehem was their fallback
amid fear that Congress would never act.
After setting forth this context, this Article then unfolds the story of
the case itself. Part II considers the facts, particularly the government's
desperate scramble for merchant vessels during World War I, its abject
dependence on Bethlehem's mighty organization, and the ultimate
question of whether the transaction really left the government worse off
than other alternatives. Next, Part III examines the government's hapless
efforts in the lower courts during the 192os and 1930S to bend and stretch

the common law -particularly
the doctrines of consideration,
misrepresentation, and fiduciary duty-to redress the pathologies of
defense contracting.
These weak theories faded to the background once Jackson and his
colleagues plucked the case from obscurity amid the maelstrom of
rearmament and adopted a theory of relief-duress-that fit their aim to
prevent corporate rent-seeking. The duress theory and its far-reaching
implications are the subject of Part IV. At the outset, Part IV.A explains
that the Justice Department was attempting to set a major new
precedent. Next, Part IV.B notes that the Supreme Court almost refused
to hear the case, since so many of the Justices had participated in it
during their prior careers in government service.
Part IV.C explains the role of the case in the national controversy
over government-business cooperation. By accusing a big corporation of
coercing the government, New Deal lawyers struck a major blow in that
controversy. Advocates of corporatism had long urged that oligopoly and
collusion were good. By their reasoning, high profits encouraged
investment, and the control of markets by rational administration
prevented waste, lowered risk, and softened the business cycle. In light of
this, corporatists believed that the government should accept the power
of big business and cooperate with it to manage the economy. From the
corporatist perspective, total war was a golden opportunity, for the
necessity of centrally managed mobilization gave corporate leaders the
chance to prove that close business-government cooperation was an
effective way to meet public goals. Opponents of this vision-Jackson
foremost among them-argued that governmental bureaucratic capacity
was so weak in comparison to that of corporations that the state could
never be an equal partner in cooperation with big business. Such
"cooperation" would merely allow business to leverage its superior
administrative capacity in order to extract favors from the state.
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Although Jackson and his allies were deeply committed to the struggle
against Germany and Japan, they wanted to ensure that this necessary
war would not become an excuse for corporatists to impose their agenda.
The Bethlehem case was the perfect example of a corporation's ability to
extort favors when the government stood in need of its administrative
capacity. This helps explain why Jackson took up the litigation as a
personal mission.
The Justice Department's purpose was to alter economic policy, yet
its means were the common law. As noted above, New Deal jurists,
particularly Robert L. Hale, sought to overturn the traditional view of
the market as a domain of freedom. This meant the Justice Department
had to grapple with the doctrine of duress at a time when the very
notions of contract, consent, and coercion were in flux. Indeed, as Part
IV.D explains, the Justice Department's duress theory reflected a major
doctrinal innovation. At the time, there were two traditional common
law formulations of duress, neither of which helped the Justice
Department much. In the first version, the doctrine required that the
duressor's threat overcome the will of the victim. But this happened by
definition in any bargain, so the formulation was incoherent and
unhelpful. In the second version, duress required that the threat be
wrongful, that is, criminal, tortious, or immoral. But the only threat that
Bethlehem had made was to refrain from entering the contract. In a free
market, that could not be wrongful. Clearly, the Justice Department
needed to find some other strategy. It found it in a series of cases for
which the requirement of a wrongful threat offered no explanation: cases
in which courts found duress simply because one party took advantage of
the other's dire need. In light of this, the Justice Departmentapparently inspired by the scholarship of Hale and his disciple John P.
Dawson-defined duress as the substantive unfairness of an exchange
amid conditions of extreme necessity. Courts ordinarily evaluated the
fairness of an exchange by measuring it against the market price, but
since no working market existed in total war, the Justice Department
effectively asked judges to become regulators, re-pricing contracts so as
to incentivize cost reduction, optimize investment, and enforce standards
of distributive justice that were intuitively acceptable to the community.
As their model, attorneys focused upon an ancient and well-established
area of judicial regulation of price: contracts in admiralty for the rescue
of ships in distress.
Part IV.E explains how the duress theory posed a dilemma for the
tradition of judicial restraint. While the duress theory harmonized with
the New Deal mission to control the power of big business, it clashed
with the New Deal's equally important mission to limit the power of the
courts, since the adoption of the theory would have required judges to
play a big role in economic regulation. Granted, the clash was not quite
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as severe as it might seem. Judicial re-pricing of defense contracts would
take place only with the tacit permission of Congress (since the power
originated from the common law rather than the Constitution) and with
the authorization of the executive (which would decide whether to make
the claim in the first place). Still, considering how much Jackson and
Frankfurter lambasted judicial meddling in the years up to 1940, their
passionate devotion to the duress theory is rather shocking, especially
considering that Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority,
emphasized that Congress had chosen to buy war materiel on the free
market and that judges would overstep their bounds if they tried to
rescue Congress from the consequences of its policy choice. Jackson's
support for the duress theory reminds us that his commitment to judicial
restraint was always a pragmatic means toward a larger end of
distributive justice. As to Frankfurter, his argument in favor of the
theory reflected his admiration for common law creativity -shared by
many progressives -tempered by his desire to present the theory as a
logical application of historically recognizable principles. In response to
Black's unrealistic hope that a defeat in the Bethlehem case would force
the government to take over the defense industry, Frankfurter insisted
that acceptance of the duress theory represented its own kind of judicial
restraint: it was practically impossible for the government to seize and
operate industry during wartime, and if Congress chose not to attempt
such a radical and futile solution, the courts had to respect the political
branches' assessment of their own limitations, not punish them by
refusing to enforce the limits on market exploitation that were
historically grounded in the common law.
I. THE CONTEXT: CONTRACTING IN TOTAL WAR

Imagine the consequences if the Supreme Court had accepted the
government's theory of duress in the Bethlehem case. Every wartime
agreement between the government and a contractor with significant
market power would have been subject to judicial re-pricing after
performance. At first glance, this kind of assault on the security of
contracts may seem crazy, with repercussions too radical even for New
Deal lawyers. But while the theory was unprecedented, the problems it
aimed to solve were equally so, arising as they did from the novel
catastrophe of total war. This Part therefore seeks to place the theory
within the larger context of the time, with a particular focus on the way
national mobilization in both the First and Second World Wars
redistributed bargaining power, created extreme cost uncertainty, and
made it harder to devise efficient incentives. Against this background, it
becomes clear that re-pricing after performance represented a plausible
second-best solution. Congress' eventual formulation of that solution,
from a functional standpoint, differed somewhat, though not
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fundamentally, from the duress theory, as the final Section of this Part
will show.
A.

THE CONTRACTOR'S ADVANTAGE IN BARGAINING POWER

During total war, it was common for the government and a
contractor to find themselves in a bilateral monopoly. On the one hand,
the government frequently required all or nearly all the output of an
entire industry, so that "each individual firm [in that industry] tended to
become a monopoly or 'sole source' for additional.., items of required
procurement."25 On the other hand, the government in wartime
controlled the allocation of supplies, meaning that if a firm refused to
accept its orders, the government could shut down that firm completely.26
This made the government a monopolist from the firm's point of view.
Within this bilateral monopoly, the contractor generally stood to get
an excellent deal.27 First, procurement officers placed a tremendously
high value on victory and the means to achieve it. Bernard Baruch, who
became the nation's "economic czar" during World War I as chairman of
the War Industries Board (WIB), stated the matter simply: "You could
be forgiven if you paid too much to get the stuff, but you could never be
forgiven if you did not get it, and lost the war."' ' s In the early phase of

World War II, this "sense of overriding urgency" gave rise to
"production 'at any price. '29 Senator Harry S. Truman described the
Army's procurement chief in this way: "I will say this for General
Somervell, he will get the stuff, but it is going to be hell on the
taxpayer."3°
A second factor also favored the contractor: the passage of time
during which the parties failed to reach an agreement cost the
government more than it did the contactor. Days lost before the start of
production meant ordinary monetary losses for the firm, but for the
military they meant fighting the enemy at less than full strength.
Procurement officers could expect their superiors to overlook a high
R. ELBERTON SMITH, THE ARMY AND ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION 313 (1959).
26. STUART D. BRANDES, WARHOGS: A HISTORY OF WAR PROFITS IN AMERICA 171 (1997); J.
FRANKLIN CROWELL, GOVERNMENT WAR CONTRACTS 47 (12o).On the priorities system more generally,
25.

see BERNARD BARUCH, AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR 47-60 (1941).

27. The following discussion draws on Abhinay Muthoo, A Non-Technical Introduction to
BargainingTheory, I WORLD ECONOMICS 145, 146-48, 150-52 (2000).
28. MELVIN

I.

UROFSKY, BIG STEEL AND THE WILSON ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN BUSINESS-

GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 234 (1969) (citation omitted). See also Urofsky's discussion, leading up to this
quotation, of the willingness of the government in wartime to pay disproportionate prices for relatively

small increases in output. Id. at 233-34; see also H. Struve Hensel & Richard D. McClung, Profit
Limitation Controls Priorto the Present War, IO LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 212 (1943) (quoting the

Undersecretary of War in 1942 that "the armed forces 'are more interested in getting the goods than
anything else"').
29. SMrH, supra note 25, at 275.

30. Id. at 276 n.64 (citation omitted).
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price, but they knew they would be flayed if they let down the troops by
failing to deliver on time."
A third and final factor relevant to bargaining was the government's
legal authority to order the firm to accept a certain price, backed up by
the power to seize and operate the firm itself. At first glance, this may
seem like a huge advantage for the government. In World War I, noted
Baruch, "the power to commandeer" served "as the effective persuasive
force which vitalized the whole program of regulation," though it
"remained in the background" and was "very rarely used."3 Likewise in
World War II, asserted an official Army historian, the "compulsory
pricing powers of the War Department... exerted a substantial
influence in obtaining contractor co-operation," even though they "were
seldom specifically invoked."33
However, when one checks these generalizations against the
available evidence (including some of Baruch's other statements), it
becomes clear that their sanguine view of the power to commandeer is
exaggerated. As a practical matter, the government under most
circumstances could not seize and operate a large firm like U.S. Steel or
Bethlehem Steel (nor even, probably, a large number of lesser firms). To
understand why, we must first examine some larger issues in the history
of the American state.
i.
The Government's Wartime Dependence on Private
Administrative Capacity
A public policy means nothing if the government does not have
access to personnel sufficiently knowledgeable and organized to
implement it. Finding, training, and assembling these kinds of personnel
into an effective bureaucracy often takes years. Thus, the prior historical
development of administrative capacities limits the realm of feasible
government action.34
This fact had serious consequences for the United States during both
wars. At the declaration of war in spring 1917 and again at the start of
rearmament in summer 1940, the nation emerged from a period of
relative isolationism and of production far below the demands of total
war. Hence, the government had precious little time to effect the increase
in volume and the conversion and expansion of plant necessary for
military supply. And in total war, time is everything. The longer it takes
to win the war, the greater the number of people who die. And the
31. BRANDES, supra note 26, at 147 (World War I); BRIAN WADDELL, THE WAR AGAINST THE NEW
DEAL: WORLD WAR II AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 96 (2001) (World War II); see also Transcript of
Record
32.
33.
34.

at I6i6-I8, 1620, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (No. 8) (1942).
BARUCH, supra note 26, at 390.
SMITH, supra note 25, at 279.
See Theda Skocpol & Kenneth Finegold, State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the

Early New Deal, 97 POL. SCI. Q. 255, 275-78 (1982).
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longer the delay in obtaining supplies, the greater the risk of defeat. In
spring 1918, for instance, Germany bet everything in an all-out attempt
to smash the French and British before sufficient American
reinforcements could get across the Atlantic. 35 To maximize production
as fast as possible, the United States government would have to take
advantage of whatever industrial management capacity already existed.
At the advent of both World Wars, that particular type of administrative
capacity was concentrated largely in private corporations.
The origins of this concentration lay deep in U.S. history. When
Europeans colonized North America, they did not bring with them a
cohesive administrative elite. 6 In this vacuum, electoral democracy
developed in the early i8oos, creating a national bureaucracy in the form
of the political parties and the local patronage networks they sponsored.
As the economy rapidly developed, the goal of these patronage networks
was to distribute development opportunities to private parties in order to
win their political loyalties, not to manage production themselves.37 Once
established, the patronage system made it hard for the government to
acquire administrative capacities that required expertise or independent
professional judgment, since the parties (and the different branches of
government) would compete for control of any bureaucratic additions
and interfere with their design. With governmental modernization so
constrained, private firms, encouraged by legislative grants of power and
a friendly judiciary, recruited and trained a class of salaried executives to
make the specialized, coordinated, moment-to-moment decisions of
manufacturing, transportation, and resource extraction.39 Though the
federal government did acquire effective administration in a few areas by
the i9ios,4" the ability to manage industrial production was to be found
35.

MEIRION HARRIES & SUSIE HARRIES, THE LAST DAYS OF INNOCENCE: AMERICA AT WAR, 1917-

1918, at 208-09 (1997); see also EDWARD N. HURLEY, THE BRIDGE TO FRANCE 119 (1927) (quoting the

British Prime Minister).
36. See generally Thomas K. McCraw, Business & Government: The Origins of the Adversary
Relationship, 26 CAL. MGMT. REV. 33,42-43 (1984).
37. See generally RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, THE PARTY PERIOD AND PUBLIC POLICY: AMERICAN
POLITICS FROM THE AGE OF JACKSON TO THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 197-227 (1986).
38. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES (1982).

39. On the development of business bureaucracies, see ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE
HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). On the role of the judiciary in
fostering the rise of corporate capital, see RICHARD BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION,

1877-19oo,

at 321-49 (2000); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN

LAW, 1836-1937 (1991). On the role of state legislatures in the rise of corporations, see WILLIAM G.
RoY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA 41-97, 144-

75

997).

40. See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS,
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001) (comparing the success

of the U.S. Post Office and U.S. Department of Agriculture with the failure of the U.S. Department of
the Interior); Skocpol & Finegold, supra note 34, at 271-75 (chronicling the success of the U.S.
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overwhelmingly among the employees of private firms and in those
firms' preexisting patterns of organization.' President Woodrow Wilson,
having won the White House on an anti-corporate platform, soberly
recognized this fact. "If we enter this war," he privately conceded, "the
great interests which control steel, oil, shipping, munitions factories,
mines, will of necessity become dominant factors.' 42
The situation was substantially similar on the eve of World War II.
While the New Deal increased the number of federal personnel by sixty
percent, fighting the Axis would require an expansion of approximately
three hundred percent.43 Besides, little of the bureaucratic expansion of
the New Deal came in the area of industrial management.' President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's efforts to improve the government's deficient
capacity for economic planning had foundered in Congress in 1937I939. 4" As a leading historian of the period concludes, "there existed no
administrative mechanisms within the government capable of handling
the enormous new tasks the war had imposed on it.' '4 6 To maximize
production on short notice, reliance on private business was by far the
surest option.47 At the very least, the most immediate, on-the-ground
tasks of industrial management would have to be performed primarily by
corporations themselves.
The government's grave need for administrative personnel was also
evident in the staffing of wartime agencies. War required the government
Department of Agriculture).
41. On the dependence of government on much better developed private bureaucracies
specifically on the eve of World War I, see ROBERT D. CUFF, THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD: BUSINESSGOVERNMENT RELATIONS DURING WORLD WAR I, at 9, 41, 269 (1973). For an overview of the

disgraceful state of government organization for war in 1917, see HARRIES & HARRIES, supra note 35, at
193-204. For more general statements on the superior development of private over public organization
in the early twentieth century, see McCraw, supra note 36, at 44-45; Skocpol & Finegold, supra note
34, at 261-68. On the separateness of industrial and government bureaucracies, see Alfred D.
Chandler, Jr., Business Versus Government: An American Phenomenon, in BUSINESS AND PUBLIC
POLICY I (John T. Dunlop ed., 198o).
42. UROFSKY, supra note 28, at 150-51 (citation omitted).
43. Kim McQuaid, Corporate Liberalism in the American Business Community, 1920-1940, 52
Bus. HIST. REV. 342,364 (1978).
44. BRINKLEY, supra note 16, at 177.
45. See RICHARD POLENBERG, REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT'S GOVERNMENT: THE CONTROVERSY OVER
EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, 1936-1939, at 28, 162-66, (1966); Otis L. Graham, Jr., The Intended New
Deal, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS 75 (Michael R. Beschloss & Thomas E.
Cronin eds., 1989). On the general resistance to the creation of a cohesive and effective bureaucracy
throughout the New Deal, see Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal State and the Anti-Bureaucratic
Tradition,in THE NEW DEAL AND ITS LEGACY: CRITIQUE AND REAPPRAISAL 77 (Robert Eden ed., 1989).
46. BRINKLEY, supra note 16, at 177.
47. Robert D. Cuff, Comment on Paul A.C. Koistinen, Warfare and Power Relations in America:
Mobilizing the World War II Economy, in THE HOME FRONT AND WAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, at III, 115-17 (James Titus ed., 1984)
(noting that the government's lack of a permanent higher civil service necessitated dependence on
private bureaucracies during World War II).
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to make rapid and complex purchasing decisions. The existing civil and
military services had neither the number nor the quality of people to do
this. When the nation entered World War I, the Army Ordnance Corps
(its primary procurement mechanism) had a staff of only ninety-six. The
war, as soon became clear, would require about five thousand' s The
lessons of this desperate scramble appear to have been forgotten by the
next war, for in 1940, the Ordnance Corps' successor agencies were
considered "mere skeleton organizations" and dumping grounds for
stalled military careers. Even after Pearl Harbor, several of the
"statisticians" in the office of the Army's Chief of Statistics were former
cavalry men who needed to be placed somewhere now that their skills
were obsolete. 49 To fill these procurement posts in 1917 and 1940,
particularly the more challenging high-level ones, the most ready
candidates were people with business backgrounds, whom the
government retained in large numbers."
Nor was procurement the only void within the government. Total
war required a level of central economic planning never seen before or
since in U.S. history. Governmental machinery suited to this particular
task simply did not exist in 1917. The classic treatment of World War I
planning characterizes the initial setting as an "organizational vacuum." 5'
Granted, some of the higher-level planning posts, in contrast to those in
direct production management and procurement, required less
specialized knowledge of a particular industry, so these posts could be
filled by academics and others without business backgrounds." However,
the sheer number of personnel required and the need for highly
specialized knowledge in the case of industry-specific planning meant the
government could not avoid recruiting businessmen. 3
To induce highly experienced or influential executives to enter
public service, the government frequently agreed to pay them one dollar
per year with the understanding that they would continue to receive
large salaries from their private employers during their public service.
The retention of these "dollar-a-year men" sparked congressional
criticism. The vehemence with which top executive officials (even those
who were not pro-business) proclaimed their need for the dollar-a-year
men underlined the government's lack of short-run alternatives. In
48. BRANDES, supra note 26, at 144; see also CROWELL, supra note 26, at 151 (stating that the navy

procurement staff grew fourteen-fold).
49. WADDELL, supra note 31, at 97-98.
50. See generally DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY
(World War I); WADDELL, supra note 31, at 97 (World War II).

126-29 (198o)

51. CUFF, supra note 41, at 43.
52. The best example is the economist Leon Henderson. See BRINKLEY, supra note 16, at 146-48.
53. For example, the Office of Production Management, which handled civilian production
during rearmament before World War II, drew only seven percent of its top officials from universities,
foundations, and labor unions. WADDELL, supra note 31, at 76.
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response to complaints from a populist Senator, Wilson wrote privately
that "I should find myself hampered in a degree which I think you cannot
realize if I were deprived of the opportunity to use these gentlemen as
they are willing to be used."54 During World War II, Donald M. Nelson,
chairman of the War Production Board and a supporter of the New Deal,
vigorously defended his employment of hundreds of dollar-a-year men.
"In order to get maximum results from American industry," he told a
Senate committee, "we must have in government men who understand
and can deal with its intricate structure and operation.... Such men must
be drawn in large measure from industry itself."55
None of this is to say that the U.S. government was inherently
incapable of acquiring the capacity to manage industry or even to create
public enterprises. It is only to say that such projects took years to come
to fruition, in contrast to the short time-frame of war. Consider the Navy
yards, whose job was to construct and equip warships. Rendered
ineffective by pork-barrel inefficiency through the early I88os, these
facilities benefited over the next four decades from a series of
incremental management reforms, which Navy officials often had to
wrest from a reluctant Congress. 56 By World War I, the yards were able
to make a valuable contribution. But the government usually did not
have the luxury of such a long incubation period for its projects. For
instance, before World War I the government had never attempted to
produce armor plate, a key input for warships. Congress in summer 1916
authorized the Navy to build its own plant for that purpose." Though one
official touted this project as the harbinger of a "new national policy in
the making of weapons," the Navy lacked the expertise for fast
construction, and the government preferred to allocate resources not to
the building of the plant, but to the construction of ships, for which its
need was far more desperate.: Ultimately, experienced private firms
fulfilled the government's need for armor plate throughout the war.
Meanwhile, the Navy plant "never produced sizable quantities" and,
after peace returned, rusted into oblivion.
This debacle typified the irony of military production in the era
before 1945. In peace, there was little political will to build up state warmaking capacity. The exceptional case of the Navy yards stems largely

54. UROFSKY, supra note 28, at 169 (citation omitted).
55. DONALD

M.

NELSON, ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY: THE STORY OF AMERICAN WAR PRODUCTION 333

(Da Capo Press, 1973) (1946).
56. PAUL A. C. KOISTINEN, MOBILIZING FOR MODERN WAR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
WARFARE, 1865-I919, at 20-21, 28-30,33, 36, 44-46 (I997).
57. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN COOLING, GRAY STEEL AND BLUE WATER NAVY: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF
AMERICA'S MILrARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, 188I-1917, at 203-04 (1979).
58. Id. at 210-I1 (citation omitted).

59. Id. at 211-12.
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from the fact that the fleet had a larger peacetime role than any other
military unit.6' When the possibility of a broader conflict became serious,
as in 1916-1917 or 1940-1941, the emergency imposed a timetable
measured in months rather than decades, leaving the government no
time to restructure its relation to industry.
2. Eminent Domain as an Empty Weapon
In wartime, the government's overriding goal with respect to most
products and services was to reach maximum production as fast as
possible and stay there. This was the key to winning the war and halting
the death and suffering. Speed came first, far ahead of monetary cost. 6' In
light of the paramount goal of maximum production in most industries, it
was rational for the government to take over a plant in such an industry
only when doing so was expected to result in greater production. A
government takeover would be counterproductive where the firm
already operated as efficiently as possible, because seizure invariably
caused certain inefficiencies. The substitution of new management,
however qualified, entailed a period of adjustment. If good managers
were to be substituted, they had to be taken away from other posts where
they were needed, since qualified managers in many industries were fully
employed in total war. If qualified managers could not be spared
anywhere else, novices had to be substituted, causing obvious
inefficiency. One could, of course, conscript a plant's existing managers
to continue operations after seizure under threat of criminal penalties,
62
but this was outside the realm of political possibility in both wars.
In the case of a big firm with complex facilities that runs relatively
well, management by any group besides the current staff will delay
maximum production for quite some time. Consider the impasse between
the WIB and the steel industry over prices in 1918. Amid heated

60. On naval requirements, see GEORGE T. DAVIS, A NAVY SECOND TO NONE: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF MODERN AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY (1940). Isolationists argued in the 1930S that the munitions

industry should be nationalized, but they did so on the assumption that such an industry would remain
small and little-used. MATrHEW WARE COULTER, THE SENATE MUNmONS INQUIRY OF THE 1930s:
BEYOND THE MERCHANTS OF DEATH 132-33 (1997).
61. Special Comm. on Investigation of the Munitions Industry, PreliminaryReport on Wartime
Taxation and Price Control, S. REP. No. 74-944, pt. 2, at 4 (1935) [hereinafter Nye Comm. Report];
CROWELL, supra note 26, at 36.
62. In wartime, the government and the public put their faith in voluntarism in dealing with
business. See CUFF, supra note 41, (World War I); DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945, at 622-23 (World War II). The reluctance of
U.S. officials to use imprisonment as an ordinary means of wartime business regulation is evident from
the weak enforcement of criminal penalties for businessmen's widespread violations of price
regulations during World War II. MARSHALL B. CLINARD, THE BLACK MARKET: A STUDY OF WHITE
COLLAR CRIME 238-46, 293-97 (Patterson Smith 1969) (1952). Note that proposals to "draft
industry" -which received political attention in the interwar period, when no actual war was
contemplated-were usually coupled with proposals to draft labor. Labor therefore opposed them
vehemently. BRANDES, supranote 26, at 191, 206, 230.
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negotiations, Baruch threatened to seize the U.S. Steel Corporation. Its
president, Elbert Gary, replied sharply, "You haven't got anybody to run
the Steel Corporation." Baruch dodged this challenge with a dismissive
joke: "[W]e'll get some second lieutenant or somebody to run it."63 But

after the war, Baruch-despite the vague generalizations that he made
elsewhere touting the power to commandeer-admitted that he had been
bluffing. "If your bluff had been called," a Senate investigator asked him,
"what would you have been able to do?' ".Iwould have been in a devil of
a fix," Baruch conceded. He would have tried to get one of the
executives to stay on and run the plant, but if that did not work, "I do not
know how we would have worked it [the seizure]. It was not very clear in
my own mind." Whenever the WIB had considered seizing a major plant,
Baruch explained, it ran into difficult questions: "Who will run it?...
Would you replace a proved expert manager by a problematical
mediocrity?" In light of these difficulties, Baruch concluded that, even if
government management "could prove adequate to the task (which it
could never do) the mere process of change would destroy efficiency at
the outset." 6' Baruch's conclusion was accepted even at the other end of
the political spectrum, among the anti-business and isolationist Senators
who made up the committee that interrogated him. The committee
of commandeering industry is
concluded that the "apparent alternative
6
in fact not an available alternative." 5
When the government did take the unusual step of seizing a firm, it
did so almost exclusively in cases where the current private management,
for whatever reason, was operating with such egregious inefficiency that
a government takeover, despite all its drawbacks, would still be better for
production. Even in these cases, the government's usual policy was to
rely as much as it could on the managers already in place.
The chief example is the seizure of the railroad industry in World
War I. The Wilson administration took this drastic approach because of
the railroads' total inability to meet wartime demand. The problem
began about ten years before the war started when shippers had
pressured regulators to keep rates very low. Consequently, the railroads
made too little money to attract capital, and so they underinvested in
cars, resulting in a shortage when the war started. Ideally, the railroads

63.

UROFSKY,

supra note 28, at 214 (citation omitted).

64. Nye Comm. Report, supra note 61, at 113-14, reprinted in BARUCH, supra note 26, at 406.

Edward N. Hurley, who ran one of the government's largest wartime operations as chair of the
Shipping Board, agreed. At a war cabinet meeting, somebody suggested a takeover of the steel
industry, but Hurley spoke up against it. The "subject was passed over with very little further
discussion, and never again was it seriously considered." If the government had taken over the steel
plants, said Hurley in retrospect, the industry's "efficiency would be reduced 50 per cent. within six
months." HURLEY, supra note 35, at 178.
65. Nye Comm. Report, supra note 61, at 4.
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were to transport war materiel to the Atlantic ports to be loaded on
ships, along with coal to fuel the ships. However, because there were so
few cars, the re-fueling of ships slowed down. With fewer ships departing,
cars in the Atlantic ports piled up in the terminals because they could not
be unloaded. This congestion, in turn, prevented new cars from reaching
the ports to re-fuel the ships, creating a vicious cycle. By Christmas 1917,
the back-up threatened to cut off coal to a large chunk of the Northeast
and shut down the war plants there. Untangling this mess would require
a massive coordinated effort, and if managers worried about getting
favorable treatment for the cars that belonged to their firms, it would
never work.66

With private ownership standing in the way of efficient service, the
government took over. Even then, actual government administrators
were confined to a single coordinating office in Washington; except in a
few cases, the day-to-day operation of each line remained in the hands of
the respective current manaFers, who acted on behalf of the government
for purposes of the seizure.' The government had sufficient bargaining
power to get the managers to fill this role because the railroads were in
extreme financial distress and would require generous government
support if they were ever to become profitable again. 68 Hence, the
conditions that made seizure desirable and workable for the government
would have been completely absent in the case of a prosperous firm, such
as Bethlehem, whose
69 managers were better suited than anybody else to
conduct operations.
The two other industry-wide seizures of the war taught similar
lessons. In the case of ocean shipping, government control permitted the
high coordination necessary to transport and supply an army, but which
the market could not provide." Like the railroads, shipping firms
remained under the immediate control of their existing management.7 '
66. The foregoing discussion is from AARON AUSTIN GODFREY, GOVERNMENT OPERATION OF THE
RAILROADS, 1918-1920: ITS NECESSITY, SUCCESS, AND CONSEQUENCES 1918-I920, at 3-46 (974).

67. Id. at 48-51.
68. Id. at 35, 65 (describing the railroads' dire need for government favors).
69. Admittedly, Bethlehem took on more contracts than it could handle during World War I.
HARRIES, supra note 35, at 286. But there is no suggestion that any other management could have
accomplished the firm's work better.
70. HURLEY, supra note 35, at 98, 1Ot, 104-05; see also Edmund E. Day, The American Merchant
Fleet: A War Achievement, a Peace Problem, 34 0. J. EcON. 567, 594 (1920) (stating that two-thirds of
all requisitioned ships were in direct service of the Army and Navy). Crowell says that one purpose of
the takeover was to prevent profiteering and that another was to promote necessary coordination.
CROWELL, supra note 26, at 199. My hypothesis is: if the takeover would not have promoted
coordination, the government would not have conducted the seizure solely to prevent profiteering.
71. HURLEY, supra note 35, at 43 (stating that owners of requisitioned ships became operators on
behalf of the government; adding, without elaboration, that the government had to "provide for" the
possibility of taking over a ship directly); CROWELL, supra note 26, at 199-200 (stating that original
owners continued to handle ships' operations).
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As to the seizure of the telecommunications industry, ideology rather
than efficiency was the motivation. Yet this means little for our inquiry,
since the companies gladly acceded to the seizure, lured by subsidies and
other economic advantages.72 Again, existing management remained in
charge.73 Aside from these cases, seizures during World War I were very
rare. For the entire nineteen months of hostilities, Baruch admitted he
' 74
could not recall the seizure of "a single important industrial enterprise.
The War Department, for example, seized only four minor enterprises,
each owning just one plant. In one of these cases, the War Department
took over to prevent a labor dispute from shutting down production
entirely, and Army officers ran the plant. In another case, the
government took over the plant due to insolvency. In the last two cases,
the government, breaking with the general pattern, took over for the sole
reason that the firms were unwilling to produce at reasonable prices. In
both these cases, however, the government simply hired another private
firm to run the facility.75
In World War II, the government followed the same principle that
seizure was primarily an instrument to prevent stoppages or extreme
downturns in production. The government used the seizure weapon
rarely at first, taking over its first four firms in 1941 and another six in
1942.76 Starting in 1943, however, labor relations worsened. In response,

government personnel, with a few years of practice under their belts,
apparently sharpened their emergency management techniques,
conducting another fifty-four takeovers by the war's end. 77 Of the sixtyfour total takeovers, fifty-seven were to prevent shutdowns due to labor
disputes, five were to improve on incompetent management, and only
one was the result of a price dispute. 7s The War Department, which
72. CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR POWERS SINCE

1918, at 32-33 (1989).
73. POST OFFICE

DEPT., GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND OPERATION OF TELEGRAPH, TELEPHONE AND

31, i919, at 8-12 (097).
74. Nye Comm. Report, supra note 61, atI14, reprintedin BARUCH, supra note 26, at 406.
75. JOHN H. OHLY, INDUSTRIALISTS IN OLIVE DRAB: THE EMERGENCY OPERATION OF PRIVATE
INDUSTRIES DURING WORLD WAR II, at 10-12, 17 (2000) (This book is the edited version of a
governmental report authored by one of the War Department attorneys in charge of plant seizures
during World War II. Id. at xiv.). Crowell, in addition to citing several examples of the seizure of
goods already in the stream of commerce, supra note 26, at 42-51, gives a few examples of firm
seizures and of mandatory production orders, though none seems to involve a large firm. CROWELL,
supra note 26, at 47, 156-57. Only one is clearly the result of a price dispute. Id. at 156-57. Crowell
believes that seizures were scarce precisely because the threat of their use was effective in bringing
contractors to terms. Id. at 46-47. In fact, however, the infrequency of seizures (at least in the case of
large plants) is equally consistent with the notion that the government was afraid to carry them out.
Indeed, Crowell admits that commandeering undermined government/contractor cooperation and
lowered a firm's morale. Id. at 40.
76. OHLY, supra note 75, app. C.
77. Id. apps. B & C.
78. Id. apps. B & C.
MARINE CABLE SYSTEMS, AUGUST I, 1918, TO JULY

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:93

conducted twice as many seizures as any other agency (all of them labor
disputes), established a general policy of relying on current management
to run a seized plant whenever possible, with the corporation legally
acting as the agent of the government.79 The War Department's official
report on seizures stated that it was "very unusual" for management to
refuse to cooperate or to force "direct government operations.""
Besides, even when corporate officers did refuse to cooperate, this did
not necessarily require long-term government management. During one
takeover in 1941, management violated federal labor law and thereby
forced the Army to put its own officers in charge of the plant as a stopgap measure. However, since the company was in financial trouble, the
War Department used the lure of government aid to get the board of
directors to hire new management, who took over the plant after eight
weeks of Army control." Overall, plant seizure in World War II proved a
successful technique for the limited purpose of averting shutdowns and
sub-par production.
To understand Bethlehem, however, we must appreciate that, early
in the war, the government did not realize that seizure would prove
successful even for this limited purpose. The War Department began
planning its first seizure of the war in summer 1941. At that time, as one
of its officials recalled, "[n]obody... had any clear idea about the
technique of plant seizure or its feasibility." The people in charge were
"only vaguely familiar" with World War I seizures. And worst of all,
8
"Army organization for such a mission was wholly nonexistent. 1
In sum, the seizure power proved useless to the government in many
crucial bargains. 83 In light of this, and of the high value that the
government placed on victory and on lost time, many contractors stood
to receive highly profitable deals.
B.

RISK, INCENTIVES, AND CONTRACT STRUCTURE

The contractor's advantage did much to shape the outcome of
79. Id. at
8o. Id. at
8i. Id. at
82. Id. at

34.
282.

40-53.
21.

83. There were two additional bargaining weapons unique to the government, besides seizure.
However, without the ability to seize and operate firms, neither was effective. First, the government
controlled the allocation of supplies. If a contractor demanded too high a price, it could threaten to cut
off the firm's inputs. See supra text accompanying note 26. But if the government could not operate
the firm itself, such action merely deprived the public of the contractor's output, undermining the chief
goal of maximum production. It would "work against the primary need of wartime." Nye Comm.
Report, supra note 61, at 116; see also BRANDES, supra note 26, at 171. Second, the government could
order a firm to accept and perform a contract at whatever price the government chose. This power was
backed up only by the seizure power (not, for example, by a criminal penalty). Hence, "compulsory
[production] orders... could have been of no greater effect than the commandeering power," which
was no power at all. Nye Comm. Report, supra note 61, at 114.
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wartime bargaining, but it was not the only factor. To fully understand
the policy problem, we must also consider the enormity of wartime risk,
the need for protection against it, and the way such protection interfered
with efficient incentives.
In both conflicts, the government wanted to induce its contractors to
fulfill several different goals. These included good product quality,
minimization of monetary cost and of supplies used, and, in some cases,
technological innovation."4 For our purpose, the most important of the
government's requirements was cost minimization. The government had
to figure out a way to reward a contractor in proportion to the degree
that it reduced cost. In an ordinary market, this was easy. Firms
competed against each other to win a fixed-price contract. The
government identified the lowest-cost firm through competitive bidding.
The fixed price then held the firm to its promise.
In wartime, this did not work. As discussed above, competition was
the first casualty of total war. 5 The next casualty was the fixed price,
because war rendered cost extremely uncertain. Time and again, a firm
found itself making a product that had never been made before.86 Even if
the product itself was not new, the firm producing it might have no
experience with it. 7 Uncertainty compounded when specifications,
suddenly overtaken by advancing technology or new priorities, changed
in the middle of performance. s Even if the firm knew the product well, it
often had to produce it at a volume"9 and speed never before attempted. 9°
To do this, it might need to hire and train new workers in unprecedented
numbers." Though their wages might be fixed or incorporated into an
escalator clause, 9' nobody could predict their level of efficiency or
aggregate learning curve. 3 The prices of physical inputs likewise might
be fixed or incorporated into an escalator clause, yet the amount of
84. The factors are taken from the Renegotiation Act of 1943. SMITH, supra note 25, at 380.
85. See supra text accompanying note 25.
86. JOHN PERRY MILLER,

PRICING

OF MILITARY

PROCUREMENTS

134 (1949)

(discussing

new

products); SMITH, supra note 25, at 281, 352 (quoting the Army procurement chief on new products).
87. MILLER, supra note 86, at 134; SMITH, supra note 25, at 353 (quoting Army procurement chief).
88. CROWELL, supra note 26, at 165-66; MILLER, supra note 86, at 128, 134; SMITH, supra note 25,
at 281, 385.
89. SMITH, supra note 25, at 40, 353 (quoting Army procurement chief).
90. MILLER, supra note 86, at 134.
91. BRANDES, supra note 26, at 152.
92. On the use of escalator clauses for labor and supplies, see CROWELL, supra note 26, at 161-62;
MILLER, supra note 86, at 135-37; SMITH, supra note 25, at 325-27. Miller and Smith note that the
clauses were rendered partly or wholly obsolete by price controls and newer forms of contracting.
MILLER, supra note 86, at 135-36; SMITH, supra note 25, at 327.
93. Transcript of Record at 1346, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942)
(Nos. 8 & 9) (stating that labor efficiency in Bethlehem war plants, which was entirely unpredictable,
would have a greater effect on cost than the wage rate); see BRANDES, supra note 26, at 152 (describing
predominance of novice craftsmen on giant construction projects); SMITH, supra note 25, at 353
(quoting Army procurement chief on the training of new workers).
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inputs wasted was hard to predict, since it depended on the firm's
operations.' Transportation problems, such as the railroad crisis
described above, added to the uncertainty. 9 What is more, firms went to
all this effort to supply a military campaign that could end at any
moment. War planners compiled a poor record of predicting when
hostilities would cease. 96 And before 1945, peacetime demand for
military products was very low. 97 In these circumstances, if peace came
without warning, the firm, having converted its plant and given up its
peacetime customer networks to make munitions
that the government no
98
longer wanted to buy, might well face ruin.
The uncertainty of war contracting exceeded anything imaginable in
peacetime. The risks came in large numbers; each portended an
enormous potential loss; and each turned on contingencies so arbitrary
that probabilities could barely be assigned to them. If not set high
enough to account for these risks, the price of a fixed-price contract
could potentially bankrupt the firm. 99 Bankruptcy would harm not only
the firm but also the government, which needed to keep its contractors in
smooth operating condition throughout the conflict. Thus, when a
contractor and the government entered a fixed-price contract, the price
had to be high enough to account for these harrowing contingencies."
To avoid paying this huge risk premium, the government often
assumed the risks of war itself, taking advantage of its unique ability to
spread risk through taxation. In the words of the leading contracts
scholar Friedrich Kessler, the "risk and uncertainty [of war] are so great
that they can be borne only by government .....
94. Transcript of Record at 1345-46, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (stating that the value
of spoiled material was unpredictable); BRANDES, supra note 26, at 153 (discussing waste of material
due to inconsistent transportation, poor infrastructure, and lack of high-quality material supplied).
95. See supra text accompanying note 66.
96. BRANDES, supra note 26, at 164, 179 (World War I); WADDELL, supra note 31, at 83 (World
War II).
97. BRANDES, supra note 26, at 214, 222 (stating that, in interwar years, less than two percent of
Du Pont's gunpowder sales went to the military and less than one percent of Bethlehem's total sales
did); Robert Higgs, Introduction to ARMS, POLITICS, AND THE ECONOMY: HISTORICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES xv, xv-xvi (Robert Higgs ed., i99o) (citing the spike in military demand
from the late 1930s to 1940-1941).
98. On various business drawbacks to conversion during World War I, see BRANDES, supra note
26, at 222. On the steel industry's fear about overcapacity during World War I, see UROFSKY, supra
note 28, at 185-86. On business drawbacks to conversion during World War II, see WADDELL, supra
note 31, at 92 (quoting New Deal economist Robert Nathan). On firms' fears about overcapacity prior
to World War II, see BRANDES, supra note 26, at 234; BRUCE CATION,THE WAR LORDS OF WASHINGTON
46, 62 (1948); Higgs, supra note 21, at 172-77; Nathan W. Robertson, Bottlenecks in Defense, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, I94O, at 780, 780.
99. See SMITH, supranote 25, at 281.
soo. Id. ("Fixed prices too low to cover costs would cripple war production.
.
ioi. FRIEDRICH KESSLER
(953).

&

MALCOLM PITMAN SHARP, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 275 n.2

The government in World War II did use traditional fixed-price contracts, but only in very
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In both wars, the most familiar way for the government to shoulder
risk was to promise to pay the contractor's entire cost for the job. This
led to the question of how to compensate the firm's owners. The
government might have based the owners' compensation on the portion
of invested capital or shareholder equity allocable to the contract.
However, because these allocations were difficult to figure out,' 2 the
government followed the more crude method of basing the owners'
compensation on the cost expended on the job.
The contract might determine compensation as a percentage of that
cost. This was a cost-plus-percentage-of-cost (CPPC) contract. To
counteract the obvious incentive to raise cost, the compensation ratio
might decrease as the cost increased." But if the owners' investment
remained fixed, this did not help: since the ratio usually did not fall to
zero, the return on investment still rose as the cost increased ad
infinitum. Because this contract unavoidably led to waste, Congress
banned it after the First World War and never allowed it again." 4
Alternately, the contract might compensate the owners with a
percentage of the initial estimated cost, regardless of the actual cost. This
was a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract." Under this scheme, if the
owners' investment remained fixed, an increase or decrease in cost had
no effect on the return. This feature improved on the CPPC contract,
since it created no automatic incentive to raise cost. However, the
contractor still might have some incentive to raise cost, for the actual cost6
often served as the basis for the estimate and fee in a future contract.
And, of course, the CPFF contract provided no incentive to lower cost.
Yet another disadvantage was that cost uncertainty ex ante might give
rise to an inflated estimate and fee."
Ultimately, both the CPPC and CPFF contracts (collectively known
as cost-plus contracts) acquired reputations for waste and fraudulent cost
reporting."" Despite this, the cost-plus contract (and in World War II, the
limited circumstances. MILLER, supra note 86, at 134.
102. MILLER, supra note 86, at 133 (describing a failed proposal to base rate of return on capital
investment); SMITH, supra note 25, 386-88 (describing the difficulty of determining a contractor's net
worth and allocating it by contract).
103. CROWELL, supra note 26, at 85, 184.
104. MILLER, supra note 86, at 124; CROWELL, supra note 26, at 32.
105. On this type of contract, see generally SMITH, supra note 25, at 28o-3Io. The fee might also be
calculated on estimated cost per unit of output. Id. at 289.
io6. MILLER, supra note 86, at 129-30.
107. CROWELL, supra note 26, at 239-42; MILLER, supra note 86, at t32.
io8. On waste, see BRANDES, supra note 26, at 150; CROWELL, supra note 26, at 39-40; SMITH, supra
note 25, at 284-85; Charles E. Hughes, Report to the Attorney General on the Aircraft Inquiry 134
(Oct. 31, 1918) (unpublished report on file with the U.S. Naval Academy), quoted in United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 306 (1942). On fraudulent and questionable cost reporting, see
Nye Comm. Report, supra note 61, at 85, 9o; BRANDES, supra note 26, at 153-54, 169-70. The
government had statutory power to inspect all records related to war contracts. This was necessary not
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CPFF contract specifically) remained the only workable option for the
many projects whose costs were extremely uncertain."° Therefore,
suppressing "grave misgivings, ....
the government allowed this contract
to play a major role in mobilization. In World War II, for example, CPFF
contracts accounted for forty-six percent of the value of military supply
contracts over $iomillion in 1940-1941 and forty percent of that same
category in 1944."'
Ideally, the government wanted to combine the cost-plus contract's
shield against risk with the fixed-price contract's incentive to reduce cost.
This desire gave rise to several hybrid contracts in which the price
formula depended partly on one or more fixed benchmarks. The most
common version was a variation on the CPFF contract. There was a
benchmark estimate. If the actual cost fell below the estimate, the
contractor received some fraction of the savings as a bonus. If the actual
cost exceeded the estimate, the contractor gave up some fraction of the
excess, as a penalty. The ratio might vary depending on the size of the
savings or excess." 2 Limiting the bonus or penalty to a mere fraction of
the savings or excess gave the parties a cushion of risk protection.
Ceilings or floors on bonuses and penalties served the same purpose."
Alternately, the amount of savings or excess could be plugged into a
formula that would increase or decrease the fixed fee by some ratio." '
However, due to the enormous cost uncertainty of wartime, basing
prices on fixed benchmarks, even with the various cushions described
above, could still impose grave risk on one or both parties. The
government in World War I made such contracts shortly after the start of
mobilization, before good cost data was available. This resulted in
scandals involving erroneous estimates and eye-popping profits, not the
least of which was the Bethlehem case. " ' By World War II, prudence set
in. The armed services realized that such incentive contracts proved
useful only when "sufficient prior experience" with the product at issue
allowed for an estimate that was better than a wild guess."6 In light of
this, the Navy did not use this type of contract with any frequency until
only to police cost reporting in cost-plus contracts, but also for the administration of other types of
contracts, discussed in the remainder of this section. SMITH, supra note 25, at 312.
109. MILLER, supra note 86, at 126-28.
iio. Id. at 129.
111. See id. at 127 tbl.I.
The government's effort to rid itself of the CPFF contract did not gain
traction until the very end of the war, when it began converting CPFF contracts to contracts with midperformance price-adjustment clauses. SMITH, supra note 25, at 302-10, 331-32. On those contracts, see
infra text accompanying notes 119-25.
112. MILLER, supra note 86, at 145.
113. E.g., id.
114. E.g., id.at 131.
115. For cases besides that of Bethlehem,see BRANDES, supra note 26, at 162, 186; CROWELL, supra
note 26, at 244.
116. MILLER, supra note 86, at 146.
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three and one-half years
after the beginning of mobilization."' The Army
8
waited even longer."
This last point exemplifies a larger principle: cost uncertainty usually
decreased over time. It decreased generally over the course of the war,
for various reasons. " ' And it decreased over the life of a given contract,
by definition. Thus, if the determination of benchmarks-or even of an
actual fixed price-could be pushed forward in time, to a point after
performance got underway, the determination could be made with better
information. Such information might come from the performance itself,
from other jobs completed by the same firm or other firms, or from the
known outcome of contingencies that had been shrouded in uncertainty
when performance began.'2 ° Also, if the parties knew that a more
accurate price could be chosen at some later time, they would not need
to commit to a high price at the outset to account for contingencies. 2 '
Further, if the eventual cost differed from what was expected, one could
distinguish between a difference that resulted from factors within the
contractor's control and one that did not, allowing a higher or lower
price in the case of the latter but not the former.' In this way, the
contractor received a reward for reducing cost, a penalty for letting cost
increase, and protection from any change it could not control.
This strategy of mid-performance price adjustment played almost no
role in the First World War.' 3 In the Second World War, however, the
I7. Id. at 144.
118. Id.; SMrri, supra note 25, at 337-38.
I19. See MILLER, supra note 86, at 134 (stating that early in World War II more products were new
or unfamiliar to their makers and that specifications changed more); SMITH, supra note 25, at 279
(stating that cost and price analysis improved as World War II progressed), 314 (noting that "required
cost breakdowns" of contractors became "increasingly specific"), 384 (noting that risk lessened from
the rearmament period to the actual war, since conversion was completed and novel products became
more familiar).
i2o. For a treatment of price and cost analysis applicable to price-adjustment clause contracts and
other contracts, see generally SMrrTH, supra note 25, at 3 13-25.
121. Id. at 332 (stating that in price adjustment contracts, "contingency allowances in price to cover
external cost changes were to be substantially eliminated").
122. MILLER, supra note 86, at 140; SMITH, supra note 25, at 277-78.
123. CROWELL, supra note 26, at 36 (stating that the great majority of World War I contracts were
CPPC, CPFF, or fixed-price); Memorandum on Behalf of Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Ltd.,
Regarding the Claim that Its Contracts with United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corporation on the Cost Plus Fixed Fee Plus Percentage of Savings Basis Were Invalid at 7-8 (Apr.
23, 1924) [hereinafter Memorandum on Behalf of Bethlehem] (on file under Enclosures, Straight
Numerical Files 226416, General Records of the Department of Justice, Record Group 6o, National
Archives, College Park, MD) [Files relating to the Bethlehem case are collected under Number 226416
in the Straight Numerical Files of the General Records of the Department of Justice. That case file is
hereinafter cited as DOJ-NA. It is divided into eight numbered sections, plus another section called
"Enclosures." Those sections will be indicated throughout.] (listing contract types in World War I as
CPPC, CPFF, fixed-price, and savings). Note that Crowell, in his entire survey of World War I
contracts, mentions price-adjustment schemes only twice, once in an actual contract, CROWELL, supra
note 26, at 245, and again in the case of prices revised ex post in an improvised way, under political
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government made extensive use of voluntary price-adjustment
provisions.'24 The details of the arrangement varied according to the
situation: there could be any number of adjustments; they might occur on
a fixed schedule or ad hoc; they might cover the entire contract or only
the remainder of performance; they might be limited as to amount or
direction; and the factors to be used in deciding adjustments might be
defined at varying levels of specificity.'25
While the armed services frequently provided for the voluntary
adjustment of price during performance, Congress went further. In April
1942, five months after Pearl Harbor and two years after the beginning of
rearmament, it passed the landmark Renegotiation Act, granting to the
services unilateral power to change the price of any contract after
performance, whenever they considered the profits "excessive. ' ' 26 When
administering the Renegotiation Act, the services used, and Congress
later enumerated, several factors to decide what profit a contractor
deserved. The factors included product quality, the contractor's
conversion of plant, its shareholder equity, technological innovation,
assumption of risk, and-most important-cost reduction."7 The
"theory" of the statute "was that allowable profits should be determined
in such a way as to reward the contractor who in the light of all
circumstances controlled his costs well and sought to use labor and
''
materials efficiently.J2s
Hence, every judgment under the Renegotiation Act had to be made
relative to the contractor's unique constraints and capabilities.'29 For
example, if one contractor produced a certain level of output with a more
advanced plant and another produced the same level with a less
advanced one, the latter deserved a higher profit, other things being
equal.'30 One could never know the exact constraints and capabilities of
every contractor, and the task, if taken literally, "called for
omniscience.".'3 ' Renegotiators did their best with fragmentary evidence
and made somewhat intuitive determinations. 32 The enormity of their
workload and the scarcity of time and facilities added to the challenge.'33

pressure, id. at 237-42.
124. On voluntariness, see SHTm, supra note 25, at 330, 332. The government had various methods,

including compulsory orders, by which to persuade contractors to agree. On their effectiveness, see
supra Part I.A.
125. MILLER, supranote 86, at 139-40, I41-44 tbl.II; see SMTrr,
126. SMITH, supra note 25, at 354.
127. Id. at 357, 38o.
128. MILLER, supranote 86, at 18i.
i29. Id. at 182: see SMITh, supra note 25, at 381.
130. MILLER, supranote 86, at 181-82.
131. SMITH,supra note 25, at 380.
132. MILLER, supra note 86, at 183.
133. SMITH, supra ncte 25, at 384.

supra note 25, at 328-37.
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Given that the Renegotiation Act was a second-best solution, how
well did it work? The critics' main complaint was that renegotiation
officials failed to recognize improved efficiency when they saw it.'34
Instead, the critics alleged, officials relied unconsciously on two crutches.
First, they sometimes tended to reduce all contractors' pre-adjustment
profits on a single graduated basis, failing to sort out the efficient
contractors from the inefficient ones.'35 Second, officials had a narrow
range of profit-to-cost ratios that they considered appropriate, and they
tended to set profit levels to fit that range, regardless of contractor
efficiency. This last crutch, lamented the critics, effectively duplicated the
infamous CPPC contract, discouraging cost reduction., 6 (Similar dangers
cast a shadow over the administration of mid-performance priceadjustment provisions.'37 )
Defenders of renegotiation responded that these charges were
exaggerated or mistaken. Although contractors' profits when measured
as a percentage of cost did indeed fall in a relatively narrow range, those
same profits when measured in proportion to shareholder equity
exhibited much wider variation."" As for the charge that officials simply
reduced initial profits on a single graduated basis, defenders of
renegotiation noted that initial profits themselves fell dramatically as the
renegotiation program matured. This reduction in initial profits, they
argued, occurred in large part because the looming presence of
renegotiation at the end of performance meant that officers were more
aggressive in proposing, and contractors were more willing to accept,
lower initial prices and downward mid-performance price adjustments
that eliminated charges for contingencies. The timing of these
adjustments early in the life of the contract gave the contractor a more
immediate and better-defined incentive to cut cost. Further, the more the
contractor was willing to assume downside risk in this pricing process, the
stronger its incentive to reduce cost: the official therefore gave
contractors bigger rewards the more downside risk they took on. In light
of all this, not only did the Renegotiation Act directly expropriate profits
ex post, but the Act's very existence indirectly reduced profits and costs
ex ante.'39 Renegotiation was meant to simulate an ordinary market, in
134. MILLER, supranote 86, at 181-82.
135. SMrrt, supra note 25, at 384-85.

136.

MILLER,

supra note 86, at 181-82.

137. See id. at 140 (stating that any failure to distinguish between causes of cost changes that are

within or not within the contractor's control causes the price-adjustment contract to operate like a
CPPC contract).
138. SMrrH, supranote 25, at 387.
139. On the relation between renegotiation and advance close pricing, see id. at 393-94 (stating
that the "existence of the renegotiation statute was probably the most compelling single influence

behind the close-pricing efforts of the procuring agencies" and that "renegotiation was a perpetual
reminder to contracting officers [and] contractors of the importance and necessity of close pricing").
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which cutting one's costs and risking one's investment led, on average, to
bigger profits.
C.

RE-PRICING AFTER PERFORMANCE AS A CHECK ON THE CONTRACTOR'S
BARGAINING POWER

Let us now return to the issue of bargaining power. Considering the
government's voracious and relatively sudden demand and the favorable
bargaining position of numerous contractors, the latter certainly
extracted substantial pure rents, i.e., profits greater than necessary to
induce the contractor, in the long run, to keep its assets in their current
employment at their current efficiency. 4 These rents could come in any
number of forms, including inflated prices in fixed-price contracts; fees or
bonuses based on inflated estimates in CPFF contracts; or fraudulently
reported costs in cost-plus contracts. Such rents posed many dangers. By
definition, they contributed less to the war than if spent elsewhere. They
caused prices to go out of phase with the actual resources necessary to
production, undermining efficient allocation.'41 They gave a contractor
the financial freedom to engage in certain practices-such as hoarding
supplies or enticing away the workers of other contractors-that helped
the firm individually while hurting the war effort as a whole.' 2 Perhaps
most important, windfall profits poisoned national morale. It was galling
for millions of draftees to endure hardship and risk their lives for low
wages while businessmen safe at home grew fat on money they did not
earn. Such resentment exemplified a larger issue: total war entailed
massive economic disruption and redistribution, and under such
conditions, if too many people sensed that others were benefiting
unfairly, effective prosecution of war became politically impossible.
Roosevelt and his advisers understood the problem, and they thought it
crucial to convince all social groups that the sacrifices of war were being
distributed fairly. "'

On the importance of advance close pricing to cost-cutting, see id. at 330-36 (stating that advance
close pricing was the "cornerstone of the Army's matured pricing philosophy"). Critics complained
that the safety net of renegotiation gave an official less incentive to set the initial contract price as
accurately as possible given all available information. MILLER, supra note 86, at 181. On the
contractor's assumption of risk and the rewards for it, see SmrrH, supra note 25, at 382-86.
140. Some high profits represented reasonable risk premiums, even if the government was
improvident in how it allocated risk. See MILLER, supra note 86, at 179 (stating that war profits may
arise from simple uncertainty). Some, if earned after mid-194o and before Pearl Harbor, served the
legitimate purpose of inducing firms to convert to military production before the government had
wartime power to force them to. SMrrH, supra note 25, at 275-76.
141. See SMrrH, supranote 25, at 324.
142. Id. at 276; see also BRANDES, supra note 26, at 153 (giving an example of labor hoarding).
143. For the concerns of the Roosevelt administration, see Mark H. Leff, The Politicsof Sacrifice
on the American Home Front in World War 11, 77 J. Am. HIST. 1296, 1299-302 (i99i). For a general
treatment of war profits and public attitudes toward them during the World Wars, see BRANDEs, supra
note 26, at 141-265. On resentment of inequality of sacrifice, see Hearings Before the Special
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The government in World War I made no attempt to reform the law
of contracts to redress the evil of wartime rents.'" The inaction stemmed
partly from reliance on the tax system to solve the problem, when in fact
taxation was structurally incapable of doing this very effectively.'45 The
failure did serious damage. While the inefficiencies cannot be measured,
there is every reason to think they were widespread. On the political
side, the perception of windfall gains from the war-reputed to have
created 23,000 new millionaires -contributed powerfully to the bitter
and paranoid isolationism of the interwar years, which left the United
States dangerously unprepared to meet the rising threat of the Axis."46
During rearmament in 1940-1941, Congress acted just as
permissively as it had during the previous war,'47 but after Pearl Harbor,
it became more proactive. First, it capped the profit on every CPFF
contract at seven percent of estimated cost, with the cap including both
the fee and bonuses.' 48 Second, it passed the Renegotiation Act.
Although, as noted in the preceding discussion, the Act was largely a
measure to protect against risk while encouraging cost reduction, it also
Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, United States Senate, 74th Cong. 5734 (1936) (dialogue
between Sen. Clark and Eugene Grace) [hereinafter Nye Hearings];John T. Flynn, Why Should Youth
Pay the War Bill?, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 23, 1940, at 416; Editorial, Mr. Morgenthau's Bombshell, NEW
REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 1941, at 423, 424. On war profits and morale, see Hensel & McClung, supra note 28,
at 188-89. On low Army wages in World War I, see BRANDES, supra note 26, at 152.
144. See generally CROWELL, supra note 26; R. PRESTON SHEALEY, THE LAW OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1927) [hereinafter SHEALEY 2d ed.]; R. PRESTON SHEALEY, THE LAW OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS (1919) [hereinafter SHEALEY 1st ed.]. For the general rule that the federal government was
bound by the common law, see Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 396 (1875).
145. "The Government in World War I ultimately relied almost entirely upon the excess-profits
tax to eliminate excessive profits." Hensel & McClung, supra note 28, at 196. Also, contracting officers
frequently assumed that tax would be sufficient to recover any excess profits. Transcript of Record at
1346, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942) (No. 8 & 9) (Testimony of
Radford); PAUL MAXWELL ZEIS, AMERICAN SHIPPING POLICY 104 (938). The tax reached a certain
percent of all profit above a certain rate of return on invested capital. Hensel & McClung, supra note
28, at 196-98. This gave rise to several perverse results. Because the tax rate never reached one
hundred percent, it spurred contractors to demand even higher profit margins than they would have
without the tax, defeating the purpose of profit limitation and worsening inflation. BARUCH, supra note
26, at 415; Hensel & McClung, supra note 28, at 198; SMITH, supra note 25, at 393. It also led
contractors to make self-dealing payments that were classified as cost, rather than profit, to avoid the
tax. BRANDES, supra note 26, at 172. It could not be used to reduce prices charged to the government,
since its rigidity precluded any reward for efficiency. Hensel & McClung, supra note 28, at 214-17.
According to a wide array of Congressional investigations and executive officials, taxation could not
be relied upon to hold down the profits from defense contracts and their cost to the government. Id. at
192, 197, 198-99, 215; SMITH, supra note 25, at 393. The tax succeeded, however, as a producer of
revenue. Hensel & McClung, supra note 28, at 198, 215.
146. SMITH, supra note 25, at 351 (recounting the widespread notion that World War I created
23,000 millionaires), 394-96 (stating that World War I "yielded widespread exorbitant profits and
resulted in a protracted era of resentment and controversy throughout the interwar period,"
facilitating "the short-sighted policy of disarmament which left the United States woefully
unprepared" for World War II). For a general narrative, see BRANDES, supra note 26, at 141-225.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 433-45.
148. MILLER, supra note 86, at 129, 144; SMITH, supra note 25, at 367 n.43.
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had important implications for bargaining power.
One way to prevent wartime rent extraction was for the legal system
to mandate that the government could not bind itself to a particular price
until some later time, when the moment of necessity had passed. The
duress theory in the Bethlehem case would have done exactly this,
conferring on the government an inalienable right to seek re-pricing of
every important war contract after performance. The Renegotiation Act
did not go quite as far in limiting the government's freedom of contract,
for it granted the armed services discretion to exempt all or part of a
contract from renegotiation whenever "the provisions of the contract"
were "otherwise adequate to prevent excessive profits."'49 This condition
seems to have kept officials from signing away the right to renegotiate.
The Army imposed "substantial restrictions" on granting exemptions for
most of the war and "never widely" made such grants. The Navy almost
never made them.'50 According to one leading study of wartime
procurement, the Renegotiation Act limited the "unconscionable
profits" that arose when a "willful minority" of contractors tried to take
advantage of the government. 5 '
When the law limits a party's freedom of contract, as the
Renegotiation Act effectively did, critics object that such a limitation
makes other parties reluctant to deal with the party so restrained. But in
total war, this objection lacks force, since, as noted above, the
government could shut down any firm that refused to deal with it. The
expected return from shutdown would typically be less than the expected
return from contracting
at a renegotiable price, so most contractors
52
would still deal.'
Hence, the Renegotiation Act helped lower the threat that wartime
rents posed to national morale and possibly their threat to efficient
mobilization, as well.'53 At the time, however, renegotiation was
149. Renegotiation Act, ch. 619,56 Stat. 982, § 8ox(c)(i)(2)(iii) (942).
150. MILLER, supra note 86, at 185 & n.49; SMrrH, supra note 25, at 333, 336-37. In fact, experts
believed that prudent granting of more exemptions would have raised efficiency.

MILLER,

supra note

86, at 185-86; SMITH, supra note 25, at 333-34.

15. MILLER, supra note 86, at 187. Miller presents the Act as a response to the Truman
Committee's call for "some form of substantial review" to keep contractors "from taking advantage of
the Government." Id. at 170.
152. During peacetime rearmament, as in 1940-1941, when the government did not have the

power to shut down firms, high profits might fulfill the legitimate purpose of encouraging conversion.
SMITH, supra note 25, at 275-76. Hence, a policy of renegotiation (or, for that matter, adoption of the
government's duress theory in Bethlehem) had much greater disadvantage for the government during
peacetime rearmament than during actual war.
153. On renegotiation's benefit to morale, see MILLER, supra note 86, at 179; SMrrH, supra note 25,
at 357, 396. On efficiency, see supra text accompanying notes I19-22, 138-39. Of course, World War II
was still quite profitable to U.S. industry compared to peacetime. SmIH, supra note 25, at 396. For a
general argument that the U.S. government in World War II failed to prevent "profiteering" (but with
no specific treatment of renegotiation), see BRANDES, supra note 26, at 262-65.
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precarious from a political standpoint. The government had not
considered anything like it in World War I. During rearmament in 19401941, the business lobby gutted even the relatively ineffective taxes
imposed on defense contracts;'5 4 more thorough reforms like
renegotiation did not even appear on the horizon. And even while the
Renegotiation Act was in force, business lobbied hard for its repeal,
which seemed quite possible in early 1944."'

This explains the importance of the government's theory of duress in
the Bethlehem case. It served as the Roosevelt administration's fallback
at a time when Congress seemed unlikely to pass reform of its own. '
Had the duress theory been adopted, it would have entailed some of the
same dangers as renegotiation, particularly if the courts simply chose a
"normal" profit-to-cost ratio without due consideration of the
contractor's efficiency, its assumption of risk, and other factors. To its
credit, the administration acknowledged that courts needed to consider
such factors in deciding the profit level.'57 Even so, the expensive,
piecemeal process of adversary litigation could not possibly decide fair
and efficient prices with the precision or speed of the expert bureaucracy
that administered the Renegotiation Act."58 Still, the prospect of duress

litigation would mean that prices were to become final only when the
government was in a better bargaining position. Like renegotiation, this
prospect might persuade contractors to accept, in the first place, prices
that eliminated charges for contingencies and were therefore more
accurate. That, in turn, might promote efficiency. All in all, litigation
under the Bethlehem theory would have been an imperfect imitation of
renegotiation, which was itself an imperfect cure for the pathologies of
war contracting. Though not ideal, it was likely better than nothing. For
New Dealers, it seemed the only hope.
II.
A.

THE BARGAIN WITH BETHLEHEM

THE GOVERNMENT'S DESPERATE SITUATION

On the eve of World War I, U.S. merchant shipping was a disaster
waiting to happen. The nation's shipbuilding industry had endured
several decades of poor management and high labor costs, with none of
the subsidies that European governments lavished on their respective
154. See infra text accompanying notes 431-43.
155. SmiTH, supra note 25, at 334, 354,357.
156. See infra Part IV.C, especially text accompanying notes 430-55, and Part IV.E, especially text
accompanying notes 569-75.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 389-91.
158. Many renegotiation officials were drawn from industry and finance, sometimes the elite
thereof. MILLER, supra note 86, at i8o; Hult Lawrence Wilson, Renegotiation: Pro and Con, IOLAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 376, 378 (1944). On the large nationwide bureaucracy and its procedures, see SMrrH,
supra note 25, at 358-61.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:93

fleets. As a result, less than one-tenth of American exports traveled
under U.S. flag in I913.' 9 The wartime disruption of European shipping
cut off U.S. exporters. In response, Congress in September 1916 created
a Shipping Board and authorized it to charter public corporations to buy
new merchant vessels. But the Board did not assemble until March
1917.

Within weeks, Congress declared war. A fleet so small that it could
not handle the nation's ordinary peacetime commerce suddenly needed
to transport and supply an army of two million men. It would take timesomething the Allies did not have. That winter, the Bolsheviks took
Russia out of the war, allowing Germany to transfer its troops to the
Western front. I 6' They now outnumbered the French and British, who
literally had no young men left to conscript. 6,The Allies could not hang
on much longer without American help.' 6 U.S. troops were coming
ashore with dangerously low supplies; if this continued, warned a top
general, catastrophe loomed.' 6 By the following summer, the Army had
so few horses and motors that one of its divisions literally could not
move.' 65 It had so little ammunition that generals told their subordinates
to "economize" when firing at the enemy.'6
Shipping was the bottleneck, one made narrower by German
submarines, which were sinking Allied vessels as fast as they could be
churned out. 6' The U.S. government contemplated with horror that "the
war might be lost for lack of cargo-ships." '6s The Shipping Board made a
frenzied effort to increase the nation's tonnage. It chartered neutral
vessels, borrowed British ones, and sent coastal ships on ocean
159. Gail Radford, William Gibbs McAdoo, the Emergency Fleet Corporation,and the Origins of
the Public-Authority Model of Government Action, 1I J.POL'Y HIST.59, 64 (1999).
I6o. DARRELL HEVENOR SMITH &

PAUL V.

BETrERS, THE UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD: ITS

HISTORY, ACTIVrnEs, AND ORGANIZATION 1-8 (1931).
161. HARRIES, supra note 35, at 208.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. See CUFF, supra note 41, at 135.
165. HARRIES, supranote 35, at 392.
166. Id.at 393.
167. P.H. Douglas & F.E. Wolfe, Labor Administration in the Shipbuilding Industry During War
Time (pts. I & 2), 27 J. POL. ECON. 145, 362, 145 n.I(1919).
168. HURLEY, supra note 35, at 132. Kennedy notes that the United States had ships on Latin
American trade routes which it refused to divert to the Atlantic, all in an effort to improve the U.S.
commercial position vis-A-vis Britain. KENNEDY, supra note 50, at 326-29. One might argue that this
refusal undercuts the notion that the United States was truly desperate for merchant ships to avoid
military defeat. However, the United States' objective in entering the war was not merely to defeat
Germany, but to win a liberal peace against the imperialist victors Britain and France. Wilson said:
"At the peace conference the economic power of the United States must be entirely unrestricted, as
this force in our hands may be of powerful assistance in enabling us to secure the acceptance of our
views." Id. at 336. For a sense of what Wilson was up against, consider the hardball tactics used by
Britain and France against the United States. See HARRIES, supra note 35, at 408-14, 426-29.
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voyages.'* Luxury liners were converted to transports.'70
Most important, the Board created the Emergency Fleet
Corporation (EFC) to contract for the construction of new ships. The
EFC spent $2.6 billion of public money in i9I7-i9i8. 7 ' This budget
placed it on a par with the Army and Navy. 72 Its first big purchase
occurred in August 1917, when it requisitioned all major ships then under
construction in what few private shipyards the nation had, signing
contracts with the yards to finish the ships for the government.' 73 Further,
the EFC made additional contracts with these yards that took up their
remaining
capacity, with the exception of Navy orders, for the indefinite
74
future.
Still unable to meet the demand, the EFC contracted with private
firms to construct and operate new shipyards.' 75 Many of the contracting
firms were "mushrooms," either new companies altogether, or new to
shipbuilding. 76 Although the new yards sprang up with unprecedented
169. Day, supra note 70, at 587 (neutral ships); ZEIS, supra note 145, at io8 (British and coastal
ships).
170. BRANDES, supra note 26, at 167.
171. Day, supra note 70, at 583 n.i.
172. UROFSKY, supra note 28, at 203 (calling the EFC, Army, and Navy the "three great agencies"

from the perspective of the steel industry).
173. See Day, supra note 70, at 581-82 (describing the requisition); A.B. Wolfe, Intensive Industrial
Training Under Government Auspices in Wartime, 27 J. POL. ECON. 725, 726 (i959) (stating that the
nation had "but a handful of well-equipped yards" and "few experienced managers"). On the
formation of new agreements after requisition, see Bill of Complaint at 1950, United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (942) (Nos. 8 & 9); Memorandum on Behalf of Bethlehem,
supranote 123, at 2.

174. Brief for Respondents at 59, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9); Report of Special Master
and Referee at 526-27, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) [hereinafter Master's Report].
175. ZEIS, supra note 145, at io6 (referring to the "construction companies" that built the
shipyards), 113-14 (stating that only private firms, not the government, built ships).
176. Id. at 102, 104-o5; HURLEY, supra note 35, at 61-62, 186. Zeis argues that the EFC had no less
experience and administrative capacity than the "mushroom" firms, meaning that the agency itself
could have taken over the construction of new yards and of ships therein. ZEIS, supra note 145, at 104.
(The failure to do so, says Zeis, suggests that the EFC was captured by the industry. Id. at 114.) This
analysis may be right. But it does not apply to old line firms like Bethlehem, whose organization at the
outset was far better established than that of the EFC and the mushrooms. Indeed, Zeis concedes that
the government was, to some extent, "forced... to rely on private shipping officials who might
reasonably be expected to look after their own interests[.]" Id. at 114. On a related point, it should be
noted that the EFC itself, while it never directly built or ran the yards, did acquire more administrative
capacity than most wartime agencies. HURLEY, supra note 35, at 143. Its executive and clerical staff in
spring 1918 totalled approximately 2,400. Id. It designed and inspected ships. Bernard Mergen, The
Government as Manager: Emergency Fleet Shipbuilding, 1917-1919, in BUSINESS AND ITS
ENVIRONMENT: ESSAYS FOR THOMAS C. COCHRAN 49, 54-55 (Harold Issadore Sharlin ed., 1983). It acted
as a central purchasing unit for the yards. HURLEY, supra note 35, at I54; Douglas & Wolfe, supra note
167, pt. 2 at 376. It established a training program in which experienced workers learned to be
instructors. Id. at 378. It also sought to govern the allocation of workers between yards, though this
operation was only begun when the war ended. Id. at 376. Further, the EFC trained sixty employment
managers, though it placed only seventeen of them in the yards. Mergen, supra, at 73. The EFC likely
found it more worthwhile to take on these functions than did other agencies precisely because so many
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speed,7 they were "on the whole hastily and poorly constructed" and
operated inefficiently in comparison to the old line yards that had been
in business since before I917.'

Ts

Of the record-breaking tonnage

delivered to the EFC during wartime,'7 9 about three-quarters came from
contracts arising from requisitions in the old line yards, even though the
construction of most of these ships had not even begun at the time of
requisition.' The remaining one-qIuarter came in part from additional
contracts with the old line yards.'' The portion delivered by the new
yards, then, did not exceed one-fourth of wartime output. The giant new
yards at Hog Island, Bristol, and Newark-touted for their incredible
size and innovative methods-delivered no more than a paltry total of
three ships before the Armistice. 82 Granted, these and other yards
became productive in i919 and would have massively increased wartime

output had the conflict lasted longer,'83 though even then, the program as
a whole could not have met the Army's requirements on schedule.' 8
Regardless, the few old line firms proved to be the EFC's most reliable
source under time pressure. Further, only these firms could reliably build
more complex designs, such as tankers and troop ships.'8 5

of the firms with which it dealt were new and lacked preexisting administrative capacities. This did not
mean that the EFC was a model of good organization. Its accounting system, for instance, was utterly
disorganized; it took thousands of employees to straighten it out after the war. The Shipping Board
Scandal,N.Y. TIlES, Nov. 13, 192o, at io.
177. The number of ways for steel ships in American yards rose from 143 to 398 during the war.
Day, supra note 7o, at 583.
178. Douglas & Wolfe, supra note 167, pt. I at 149, 148.
179. For example, compare the 2.3 million tons delivered in nineteen months of war, Day, supra
note 70, at 581-82, with the annual national average of 375,000 in the period igoo-I9i 5 , Douglas &
Wolfe, supra note 167, pt. I at 147.
I8o. Day, supra note 7o, at 581.
I81. Apart from the requisitioned vessels, Bethlehem delivered three such contract ships to the
EFC before the Armistice. Untitled Draft of Government District Court Brief at 127-28, enclosed
with Letter from South Trimble, Jr., Solicitor, Dept. of Commerce, to the Attorney General (Sept. 8,
1936) (Section 4, DOJ-NA, supra note 123). At the time, much of the firm's capacity was surely taken
up with Navy orders. See Brief Submitted on Behalf of Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Ltd., et
al. at 4, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (Nos. 3315 & 11970)
(Enclosures, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) (stating that the firm built fifty percent of the Navy's tonnage
under war program).
182. By January 2, i919, Bristol had delivered none, while Hog Island and Newark combined to
deliver four. Few Ships Completed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, I919, at 8. One of theses was delivered by Hog
Island in January i9i9. Id. Between all three yards, therefore, no more than three ships could have
been produced before the Armistice. For official boasting about these yards, see HURLEY, supra note
35, at 77.
183. Total output nationwide doubled from 1918 to 19i9 as new yards became more productive,
even though I919 did not see the all-out effort of wartime. HURLEY, supranote 35, at 147-48.
184. Id. at 131.
185. Master's Report, supra note 174, at 530 (quoting a letter from two experts stating that only
"real shipbuilders" can build such ships "satisfactorily").
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NEGOTIATIONS WITH BETHLEHEM

The grand-daddy of the old line firms was Bethlehem, the largest
shipbuilder in the world' and the bright spot in an otherwise bleak
industry. In the years leading up to 1917, the company, under the superb
leadership of Charles M. Schwab, had massively expanded its business in
shipbuilding and elsewhere, proving itself a life-saver to the Allies. 8,
During the nationwide requisition of August 1917, the EFC requisitioned
all fifty ships then under construction in Bethlehem's yards and
contracted with the firm to finish them.' 8 In early December, the Navy
signed a contract with Bethlehem for eighty-five destroyers. All told,
Bethlehem would build half of the tonnage purchased by the Navy
during the war."" Meanwhile, the EFC began negotiations to take up the
rest of the firm's capacity with the construction of tankers and troop
ships (both specialties of old line firms), as well as cargo vessels.'"
Between the requisitions and additional contracts, Bethlehem would
build twenty percent of EFC tonnage. 9' As if to underline the company's
essential role, Schwab himself, at the personal urging of President
Wilson, served as Director General of the EFC for the last seven months
of the war (never, of course, dealing with his own firm).'92

Pricing presented a challenge. In peacetime, estimating the cost of a
ship was a detailed technical process, but in total war, costs became
unpredictable.'93 Granted, not every cause of wartime cost uncertainty
applied in Bethlehem's case. Though the troop ships were novel, the
tankers and cargo vessels followed familiar designs.'94 As for wages, the
EFC had power to fix them, and the contract price could be escalated to
186. Id. at 526.
187. In the years leading up to the war, Schwab turned around the previously "defunct"
Bethlehem by investing in innovative technologies and taking advantage of untried suppliers to lower
transportation costs. UROFSKY, supra note 28, at 88-89. As war began in 1914, the Allies offered
Bethlehem enormous contracts early and often. Id. at 9o-9. These were so profitable that the firm
could pay for a new plant largely out of earnings rather than debt. Id. at 185. The pay-off was
immense: even after covering increased capacity, Bethlehem still paid dividends of thirty percent in
1916 and of two hundred percent in 1917. Id. at 92. By the time the United States entered the war,
Bethlehem had produced $246 million in war materiel for the European Allies, more than any
American firm but one. Id. at 92.
188. On the number of ships and the "agreements" made to finish them, see Memorandum on
Behalf of Bethlehem, supra note 123, at 2.
189. Brief Submitted on Behalf of Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Ltd., et al. at 4, United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (Nos. 3315 & ii97o) (Enclosures,
DOJ-NA, supra note 123).
s9o. Brief for Respondents at 59, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9).
191. Brief Submitted on Behalf of Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Ltd., et al. at 4,
Bethlehem, 23 F. Supp. 676 (Nos. 3315 & 1197o) (Enclosures, DOJ-NA, supra note 123).
192. Bill of Complaint at I961-62, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9); ROBERT HESSEN, STEEL
TITAN: THE LIFE OF CHARLES M. SCHWAB 264 (1975).

193. Master's Report, supra note 174, at 68I.
194- Id. at 591-94.
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reflect any increases. 95 But if the hourly rate was known, the number of
worker-hours was anyone's guess. Bethlehem was operating at
unprecedented volume, expanding its workforce from fifteen thousand to
seventy thousand in under two years, at times hiring three thousand new
workers per month.' 6 These new hires usually had no experience.'"gs
Meanwhile, other yards were "poaching" the Bethlehem supervisors.'
The tight labor market invited worker activism,"9 further threatening
efficiency. Also, supplies could be cut off altogether if the Army needed
them." Finally, the railway crisis was reaching its peak just as
negotiations began, and nobody knew when fuel and material would
arrive.2"' In this context, fine-tuned methods of cost estimation seemed
downright silly. Bethlehem disbanded its cost estimation department
altogether." 2
These difficulties were evident to negotiators on both sides.
Bethlehem was represented by its vice president, Joseph W. Powell."
The EFC was represented by the manager of its contract division, G.S.
Radford, and by the manager of its steel ship construction division,
Admiral F.T. Bowles.2" The men, veterans of the shipbuilding industry,
had known each other for years. 5 At the opening of negotiations, on
December 13, 1917, Powell informed Radford and Bowles that it was

"impracticable to estimate within a reasonable percentage what would be
the actual cost of construction. ' 2 Radford acknowledged this to be a
"fair statement." 2
Despite the uncertainty, Radford and Bowles wanted Bethlehem to
accept fixed-price contracts for the vessels. However, Powell knew that
any fixed price satisfactory to Bethlehem would be so high that the
government would prefer a cost-plus arrangement." With this in mind,
Powell insisted on a CPFF contract with an incentive bonus."°9 The
contract called on the government to pay the entire cost, plus a fixed fee

195. Id. at 553.
196. Transcript of Record at 1347, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (Testimony of Powell).
197. Id. On strikes and labor unrest in shipbuilding during World War I, see HURLEY, supra note
35, at 186-95.
I98. Transcript of Record at 1348, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (Testimony of Powell).
199. Id. at 1367 (stating unionism was rampant at one of Bethlehem's yards).
200. Id. at 1350.
201. Id.
202. Master's Report, supra note 174, at 681-82.
203. Id. at 575-76. The firm was also represented by its technical manager. Id.
204. Id. at 646, 686.
205. Id. at 643.
206. Id. at 530.
207.

Id.

208. Id. at 628.
209.

On hybrid CPFF/incentive contracts, see supra text accompanying notes 112-18.
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of ten percent of the most accurate available estimate." ' On top of that,
the contract required the government to pay a "savings bonus" of onehalf the difference between the estimate and the actual cost.21' For that
reason, the arrangement was known as a "savings contract." Bethlehem
bore no downside risk: if costs exceeded the estimate, the government
still paid them, plus the fixed fee.
With Powell insistent, Radford and Bowles accepted the savings
clause. They then fought for what they considered a reasonable estimate.
As negotiations stretched into January 1918, Powell somewhat lowered
his estimate but went no further. With time at a premium, ' Radford and
Bowles acquiesced on January 3, 1918, accepting Powell's figures for
seven contracts covering twenty-one tankers and eight cargo vessels." 3
The two men reported that Bethlehem had "insisted on comparatively
high prices for these vessels. ' 14 The final prices, they explained, did
represent a "material reduction" from where the negotiations started,
but they were still "not satisfactory to us.." '15 Nonetheless, Radford and
Bowles felt that their acquiescence was justified: "Realizing that the
Nation will need these vessels, we have been actuated by the belief that
further delay in placing the contracts should be eliminated and we
believe that we have
'' 6 made the best compromise possible under very
difficult conditions.

,n

There was a disturbing wrinkle. Even as Powell dealt sharply with
the shipbuilding experts Radford and Bowles, he also conducted
negotiations -unbeknownst to them-with their superior, Charles Piez,
who knew nothing about shipbuilding and relied on Powell for advice. 17
In fact, Powell wrote to Piez that Bethlehem would sign a contract at
whatever
price Piez chose-an offer that the innocent Piez never took
1,8
up.

When the case reached the Supreme Court years later, Frankfurter

210. On the ten percent ratio, see Bill of Complaint at i96o, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9).
211. Master's Report, supra note 174, at 521, 627.

212. Transcript of Record at 1616-18, 162o, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (Testimony of
Radford).
213. Master's Report, supra note 174, at 589.
214. Id. at 531.
215.

Id.

216. Id. According to Radford's later testimony, taken after Bowles' death, Bowles cared about

the prices, whereas Radford himself simply viewed it as his duty to finish the negotiations as soon as
possible so as to get construction underway, regardless of price. Transcript of Record at 1614, 1616-i8,
Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (Testimony of Radford).
217. On Piez's ignorance and relationship to Powell, see Master's Report, supra note 174, at 646.
218. On the offer, see id. at 588. On Radford and Bowles' lack of knowledge, see id. at 588-89.
Piez testified that the "natural thing" for him to do would have been to ask for another reduction in
price, but he did not recall whether he did. Id. at 532-33. The Master's findings do not suggest that
Piez made any such request. See id. at 588-89. Note that, in testimony years later, Radford revealed
that, even after he learned of Powell's promise, he did not try to use it to get the prices reduced, for he
felt it was not the "proper policy" of the EFC to dictate prices to contractors. Transcript of Record at
1623-25, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (Testimony of Radford). Powell claimed that his
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derided this communication as Powell's "alibi letter."21 9
Once made, the large January contracts served as models for all
subsequent contracts for tankers and cargo vessels, executed at various
times over the coming months.2" (Because the cost of troop ships was
even more uncertain, the parties never attempted an incentive formula
for them.)... Of the tankers and cargo vessels, Bethlehem had completed
only three when the war suddenly ended.2 ' At that moment, the firm and
its fellow shipbuilders found themselves producing for an emergency that
no longer existed. The government, then as now, possessed the power to
cancel contracts. But it had reasons not to cancel. Some ships were so
near completion that cancellation was not cost-effective. 3 Also, firms
had invested, and workers had retrained or relocated, in reliance on
wartime shipbuilding. Cancellation would ruin businesses, slash jobs, and
disrupt regional economies. "4 Needless to say, firms and workers exerted
political pressure against cancellation. 5 Further, the Wilson
administration viewed the shipbuilding program as a golden opportunity
to dethrone Britain in postwar commerce. In light of these factors, the
EFC cancelled only twenty-two percent of its wartime orders." 7 Among
the beneficiaries was Bethlehem.22 Its surviving contracts for tankers and
cargo vessels, all under the savings formula, yielded forty of the former
and twenty-six of the latter upon completion in 1920."9 Significantly, in
the subsequent litigation, the government's failure to cancel never came
up in court. 3 ' Questions of law were decided as if the contracts had been
behavior was explained by the personal enmity between himself and Bowles, which arose from some
previous, unrelated litigation. Transcript of Record at 1411-16, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9)
(Testimony of Powell).
219. Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Stanley Reed (Jan. 29, 1942), microformed on
The Felix Frankfurter Papers, Part I, Reel 4 (Univ. Publ'ns of Am.).
220. Brief for Petitioners at i 1-12, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) [hereinafter Govt. S. Ct.
Br.].
221. Memorandum on Behalf of Bethlehem, supra note 123, at 2.
222. Untitled Draft of Government District Court Brief, supra note 181, at 127-28.
223. Day, supra note 70, at 592.
224. HURLEY, supra note 35, at 252.
225. Id. at 252-54; ZEIS, supra note 145, at lo9.
226. KENNEDY, supra note 5o, at 301-05, 324-39.
227. Day, supra note 70, at 592.

228. Memorandum on Behalf of Bethlehem, supranote 123, at 2.
229. On date of delivery, see Untitled Draft of Government District Court Brief, supra note 181, at
128. For a list of the vessels of each type, see Master's Report, supra note 174, at 590. For another list,
confirming that these constituted the entirety of the post-requisition contracts for tankers and cargo
vessels made between Bethlehem and the EFC during the war, see Bill of Complaint at 1965-66,
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942) (Nos. 8 & 9). The two lists differ in how
many vessels were produced; I have assumed that the Master's Report is more trustworthy. Still, the
complaint lists the same contract numbers for the types of vessels at issue as does the Master's Report,
so we can rely on it to prove that all of the post-requisition contracts for tankers and cargo vessels
were covered by the litigation.
230. Its only mention was in the Master's Report, supra note 174, at 541. Justice Black briefly
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performed during war.
When the job was finished, the EFC began settling its accounts with
Bethlehem. It took years. The EFC required thousands of employees to
straighten out its poor accounting. Bethlehem's records were often
incomplete or misleading. The firm refused to turn over documents.23 '
After an arbitrator released his conclusions on certain interpretive
disputes in March 1923, the final settlement seemed near. When Schwab
strolled into a conference with EFC officials, he expected to be paid what
the arbitrator recommended. 3 But the government attorneys had other
ideas. The profit that Bethlehem stood to receive, they concluded,
showed the agreements to be "unconscionable," "extortionate," and
' The savings contracts
"hostile to the public interest." 33
for the tankers
and cargo vessels, insisted EFC officials, were invalid. 34
C.

THE QUESTION OF THE FAIRNESS OF THE EXCHANGE

Were EFC attorneys justified in their conclusion? Let us first
consider the contract itself, regardless of its results. EFC negotiators
shared Bethlehem's view that cost-plus contracts were demoralizing for
executives and workers. 35' They proposed a fixed-price contract but
apparently did not offer a price high enough that Powell would consider
it. According to Radford's testimony, the savings contract, which
imitated the fixed-price contract to some degree, was
"a very good form
36
of contract" and "reasonable"-"in theory at least.,2
However, the attractiveness of the actual agreement for the
government depended on the accuracy of the estimate. If the estimate
exceeded what the cost would have been under a plain CPFF contract,
that excess would offset cost savings. If sufficiently inflated, the estimate
might wipe out the cost savings altogether and even raise the total price
above what it would have been under a plain CPFF arrangement.
Unfortunately for the government, the parties decided the estimate only
a few months into mobilization, at a time of the greatest cost uncertainty.
(Recall that the armed services in World War II refused to commit
mentioned cancellation as part of an abstract policy discussion without specific reference to the actual
case. Bethlehem, 35 U.S. at 309.
231. On EFC accounting, see The Shipping Board Scandal, supra note 176, at so; on the rest, see
Nye Comm. Report, supra note 6I, at 87.
232. Memorandum on Behalf of Bethlehem, supranote 123, at 3-5.
233. Tilden Adamson, Special Examiner, Adamson Report on Bethlehem Claims i (Apr. 5, 1923)
(Special Reports, File C, Drawer i, Records Relating to the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Records of
the Department of Claims, Records of the U.S. Shipping Board, Record Group 32, National Archives,
College Park, MD); C.G. Parker, General Counsel to the Shipping Board, et al., Report on the Claims
of the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. 4 (May I8, 1923) (same location as previous source).
234. Memorandum on Behalf of Bethlehem, supra note 123, at 4-5.
235. Transcript of Record at 1622, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (Testimony of Radford);
see also Transcript of Record at 1338-39, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (Testimony of Powell).
236. Transcript of Record at 1623, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (Testimony of Radford).
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themselves to such benchmarks until they had accumulated years of cost
data.) Further, in the calculation of the estimate, the incentive
mechanism required these giant uncertainties to be resolved in favor of
Bethlehem, so as to give the firm a reasonable chance of winning the
bonus. 37
The goal of providing an incentive to reduce cost could have been
achieved without exposing the government to the risk inherent in the
Bethlehem contract's estimate. For instance, the difference between the
estimate and the actual cost could have been plugged into a formula that
would raise the fee by some ratio. Instead, Bethlehem enjoyed a direct
claim on the difference itself. In addition, that claim (fifty percent) did
not need to be so high. Percentages in Navy contracts during the same
war, for example, ranged from fifty percent down to ten percent.38
Further, the parties could have retained the incentive effect while
reducing the risk to the government if they had transferred some limited
downside risk to Bethlehem, e.g., by devising a penalty for high cost that
might somewhat reduce the contractor's very substantial fixed fee, as
contracts did in World War 11.239 Yet the ten percent fee remained
inviolable. On its face, then, the contract greatly favored Bethlehem.
What profit did Bethlehem ultimately make? Summing all the
contracts for tankers and cargo vessels under the savings formula, the
estimated cost was about $i20 million. On this basis, Bethlehem
automatically received a fixed profit of about ten percent, or about $12
million. Significantly, the actual cost of the ships turned out to be just
under $93 million, less than the estimated cost by about $27 million. This
difference was classified as "savings," of which Bethlehem received half
as a bonus. This came to around $13 million, which, when added to the
$12 million fixed fee, yielded a total profit of about $25 million. With
extra charges added to the cost figure, the profit ended up at twenty-two
percent of cost. That was very handsome for a contract with no risk of
loss-indeed, with a guaranteed return targeted at ten percent. 4
237. See Master's Report, supra note 174, at 552 (giving Piez's testimony on this point), 685 (in
which the Master affirms that the estimate was to be liberal); Transcript of Record at 1623, Bethlehem,
315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (same point). On Bethlehem's large allowances for future cost increases in
its estimates, see Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 321 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Powell stated that the
estimate was to be one-third of the way from the bottom of the range of possible cost, Transcript of
Record at 1445, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (Testimony of Powell), but this is not consistent
with the other sources cited in this note.
238. CROWELL, supra note 26, at 145.

239. SMITH, supra note 25, at 337-38 (describing an incentive contract in which profit fell to zero at
very high cost).
240. The figures differ slightly from one stage of litigation to the next. I have taken the dollar
amounts from United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 113 F.2d 301, 304 (3d Cir. 1940), since no higher
court gave a complete set of numbers. These numbers match the Master's Report, supra note 174, at
572. They yield a profit on cost of twenty-three percent. For reasons that are not explained, the
Supreme Court used numbers that do not quite match, see Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 292-93, 322-23, and
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But was it necessarily a bad bargain for the government? To what
degree did the large savings result from cost reduction, and to what
extent from inflation of the estimate? A few calculations show that, for
the government to be as well off under the savings contract as under a
plain CPFF contract, Bethlehem had to cut the total cost by at least
12.6% from what it would have been under the latter format.24 ' To say
for certain whether Bethlehem succeeded is of course impossible, for we
can never know what the cost would have been under a hypothetical
contract. The evidence which the parties gathered on cost-cutting was
indirect. 42 The courts' findings on the issue were not very specific.243
Even without specific evidence, the incentive to cut costs,
nonexistent under a plain CPFF contract, gives reason to think
Bethlehem did cut costs significantly. Powell, who, in addition to
negotiating the contract, controlled operations, testified that the savings
provision raised the morale of the firm, e.g., by causing the foremen to
realize "that by saving money they were helping earn money for the
company." 2" There was at least some incentive compensation for some
employees." 5
Despite all this, there were competing reasons to doubt Bethlehem's
cost-cutting. The firm was not using any new technology and had no
hope of saving money on physical inputs; its only chance to cut costs was
by improving worker efficiency. ,6 Powell testified that the firm did make
reached a profit of twenty-two percent. I have therefore given twenty-two percent as the profit.
241. Imagine that the savings bonus and the cost reduction exactly offset each other, i.e., that the
bonus of $13.38 million was exactly offset by a cost reduction of $13.38 million. Recall that the actual
cost, with the savings provision, turned out to be $92.99 million. In this scenario, then, the savings
provision would have motivated Bethlehem to reduce costs by $13.38 million, down to $92.99 million.
This means that the cost without a savings provision (i.e., under a plain CPFF contract) would have
been the sum of $13.38 million and $92.99 million, which comes to $io6.37 million. A reduction in cost
from $io6.37 million to $92.99 million is 12.58%.
242. See, for example, the government's misguided effort to glean Bethlehem's efforts to reduce
cost by comparing costs on contracts early and late in the period of construction, with little attention to
what the costs would have been without the incentive scheme. Govt. S.Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 2431. Bethlehem's attorneys were no more illuminating on this point. Brief for Respondents at 33-52,
Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9).
243. Compare Master's Report, supra note 174, at 678 (stating there was "no evidence" that the
savings clause reduced the cost of the ships, but not addressing whether there was any direct evidence
it did not, and not basing the decision in any way on this finding), with Bethlehem, I13 F.2d at 307
(stating that "the record contains some evidence tending to show that the savings resulted, in part at
least, from increased efficiency," but apparently not basing the decision on this finding) (emphasis
added).
244. Transcript of Record at 1339-40, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (Testimony of Powell).
On Powell's role, see id. at 1369.
245. Among several factors that Powell hoped would allow the firm to "improve on conditions"
and "cut... costs," he included the practice of "offering special incentives to our supervisory force."
Id. at 1438. But see infra note 248.
246. Transcript of Record at 1369, i449-5o, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (Testimony of
Powell).
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such an improvement, but he admitted that his assertion was "based on
pure judgment only," not on "any study" nor "any facts that I could
' Further, Powell was strangely equivocal when asked to talk
quote."247
specifically about incentive compensation for employees.4 Besides, even
if one assumes that significant cost reductions did occur and that they
resulted primarily from some sort of incentive compensation scheme, it
seems absurd that the government had to pay Bethlehem a $13 million
inducement to implement such a scheme, considering the government
would pick up all the costs of the scheme (e.g., the bonuses and the costs
of administration) automatically. Finally, Radford and Bowles had stated
ex ante that the estimate was inflated, and the large excess of the
estimate over the actual cost seemed to confirm their assessment. In light
of all this, it is at least understandable that the Shipping Board
considered the contract a bad bargain.249
247. Id. at 1371. Any study of Bethlehem's management, had it been made, would have been of
limited use, for the rapid increase in the firm's workforce inevitably sapped efficiency, meaning there
was no constant benchmark against which to judge its effort to reduce costs. Brief for Respondents at
33-35, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9).
248. Bethlehem knew that it would not find out the size of the bonus, if any, until years after
performance was complete, since there was certain to be a dispute between the firm and the EFC over
cost allowances. Transcript of Record at 1332-33, 1445, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9)
(Testimony of Powell). This would have made it difficult for any but long-term employees to
participate directly in the bonus. That was important, considering that the firm would lay off most of
its force once the war ended. Still, Bethlehem might implement incentive compensation during
performance as part of an effort to win the bonus later on. See supra note 245. However, when asked
directly whether the foremen, by "saving money" in their work and "earn[ing] money for the
company" were "also helping earn money for themselves," Powell did not answer affirmatively. He
replied: "That had nothing to do with that particular form of contract." He then added that "the
incentive method we established with this form of contract should immediately give them [i.e., the
foremen] an incentive to do the work as quickly and as well and as cheaply as it could be done."
Transcript of Record at 134o, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (Testimony of Powell). This last
statement appeared to be a recapitulation about how the savings provision in the EFC contract raised
general morale, rather than a firm statement that Bethlehem was paying incentive compensation. And
even if the firm were paying incentive compensation, it is possible that it would have done so anyway
without the savings provision. After all, Bethlehem had instituted various measures to increase worker
efficiency before making that contract. Govt. S. Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 29-30. Also, it should be
noted that the most serious problem with labor efficiency appears not to have been motivation of
workers on the job, but rather massive turnover due to competition between shipyards. On the
centrality of the turnover problem, see Transcript of Record at 1367, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8
& 9) (Testimony of Powell). This problem was later resolved by fixing wages across the shipyards. Id.
at 1432-33.

249. The notion of a good-faith cost-cutting effort is also undermined by Bethlehem's cavalier
treatment of costs. Because the government paid all costs, the contractor had every reason to stretch
the definition of cost to include self-dealing payments. Indeed, Bethlehem did just that. For example,
executive bonuses and sales to subsidiaries were very large. See Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 294 (stating
that Bethlehem's costs included the sale of 43,000 tons of steel to its shipbuilding subsidiary);
BRANDES, supra note 26, at 174 (stating that Bethlehem's president gave himself what may be the
largest wartime pay increase in U.S. history). Also, it should be noted that the large difference
between the estimate and actual cost was partly attributable to the return of peace earlier than
expected. Transcript of Record at 1370, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (Testimony of Powell).
Attribution of cost reductions to the return of peace undermined the notion that the bonus was
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Despite the lack of direct evidence about cost-cutting, the courts
ultimately concurred with the Board as to the unfairness of the contract.
Although the Special Master expressed ambivalence, the District Judge,
all three judges of the Court of Appeals, and all six sitting Justices of the
Supreme Court agreed, more or less, that Bethlehem seriously inflated
the estimate. 5 In reaching this conclusion, it appears they followed the
conventional wisdom of the period that high profits were the best
available measure of the abuse of market power. Such thinking serves as
a reminder of one potential danger of re-pricing after performance, i.e.,
that the decision-maker will judge the profit-to-cost ratio against a fixed
standard without considering the need to reward improved efficiency by
the contractor. The government, for its part, conceded in both its appeals
that the contract would not have been unconscionable if Bethlehem had
adequately explained the discrepancy between the estimate and the
actual cost in terms of its own efforts at cost reduction. 5'
Regardless, the courts' resolution of the factual question allowed the
judges to reach the critical legal question of what common law recourse
the government possessed in the frequent wartime situation where its
numerous disadvantages forced it to pay rents to a contractor. That legal
question-whether a wartime government was bound to pay a promised
increase in price when it got nothing in return-proved decisive for the
Bethlehem case and for the common law governance of war contracts
more generally.
III.

DEFENSE CONTRACTS AT COMMON LAW:
THE SEARCH FOR A THEORY OF RELIEF

A.

WHY THE LITIGATION TOOK So LONG

Before we analyze the government's arguments, we must briefly
consider why so much time passed between the Shipping Board's
decision to contest the validity of the contracts in 1923 and the Supreme
Court's grant of certiorari in 1940. First, the specifics of the narrative.
The Justice Department in 1924 hired a private law firm in Philadelphia
to handle the case.25 The following year, that firm filed a bill in equity in
attributable to Bethlehem's cost-saving efforts, though it bolstered the notion that the estimate was a
good-faith estimate of wartime costs ex ante.
250. See infra text accompanying notes 331-37, 351-54,369-71, 624, 627-30; Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at
319-23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
251. Govt. Sup. Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 75, 84-85; Brief in Behalf of the U.S. and the U.S.
Shipping Bd. Merch. Fleet Corp. at 31-32, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., i13 F.2d 301 (3d
Cir. i94o) (Nos. 7045 & 7046) (National Archives-Mid-Atlantic Region, Philadelphia, PA).
252. Letter from [James M. Beck], Acting Attorney General, to Henry P. Brown, Spec. Assistant
to Attorney General (Mar. 29, 1924) (Section i, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) (stating that Henry P.
Brown has been appointed). Henry P. Brown's son and partner, Joseph J. Brown, was appointed a
representative of the government in 1926. Letter from William D. Mitchell, Attorney General, to Rep.
William B. Oliver (Dec. 4, 1929) (Section 4, DOJ-NA, supra note 123). In 1928, when Henry P. Brown
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federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 5 3 It took until 1931
to finish the hearings before the Special Master. 54 The next year, the
Master ruled against the government but then withdrew his report, only
to issue effectively the same ruling in 1935 .2 The U.S. Maritime
Commission (the successor agency to the Shipping
Board) wrested
156
control of the case from the private firm in 1937. The case was then
decided in the District Court in 1938 and the Third Circuit in 1940.
Looking back on the case, Jackson said he "never found any
adequate explanation" for this "great delay., 257 Indeed, the sources do
not reveal a definitive reason. Still, several factors surely had an effect.
Bethlehem was slow to produce documents."' The original Special
Master, Owen J. Roberts, was appointed to the Supreme Court midway
through the proceedings and had to be replaced by William Clarke
Mason, a private attorney. 59 The original District Judge also had to be
replaced."' Most important, the government's main attorneys up to 1937
were preoccupied with full-time private practices of their own, as was the
Master himself261 The Justice Department, for its part, failed to hold
these outside lawyers accountable262 Up to 1937, not a single full-time
"

died, Joseph J. Brown had already assumed primary responsibility for the case. Letter from George R.
Farnum, Assistant Attorney General, to [John T. Sargent], Attorney General (Nov. 20, 1928) (Section
4, DOJ-NA, supranote 123).
253. Bill of Complaint at 1934, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9).
254. Letter from Joseph J. Brown, Spec. Assistant to Attorney General, to J. Frank Staley,
Assistant Attorney General (Apr. 6, 1931) (Section 4, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) (stating that the
hearing just ended).
255. Master's Report, supra note 174, at 518-19, 566 (giving dates); Memorandum from J.Frank
Staley, Assistant Attorney General, to the Assistant Attorney General Morris (Jan. IO, 1936) (Section
5, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) (stating that the second report gave "approximately the same results" as
the initial one); Letter from Roy St. Lewis, Assistant Attorney General, to Joseph J,Brown, Spec.
Assistant to Attorney General (Feb. 24, 1932) (Section 4, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) (confirming that
the initial report was a defeat for the government).
256. See infra text accompanying notes 339-42.
257. Robert H. Jackson, Oral History 997 (1954) (Box 191, RHJ-LC, supra note 22).
258. Nye Hearings,supra note 143, at 578o-81.
259. Master's Report, supra note 174, at 517-18.
260. Letter from J.Frank Staley, Assistant Acting Head, Adm. Div., to Joseph J.Brown, Spec.
Assistant to Attorney General (Feb. I6, 1931) (Section 4, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) (stating that, after
the original District Judge was appointed to the Third Circuit, the Attorney General unsuccessfully
asked the Chief Judge of the Third Circuit to let him hear the case anyway); Memorandum from J.
Frank Staley, supra note 255.
261. Letter from Roy St. Lewis, Assistant Attorney General, to Homer Cummings, Attorney
General (May 2, 1933) (Section 4, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) (stating, after nine months of waiting for
the Master's report, that the Master was "an outstanding lawyer and a very busy one"); Letter from
George R. Farnum, Assistant Attorney General, to John T. Sargent, Attorney General (Feb. 24, 1927)
(Section 3, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) (stating that the firm representing the government did not
dedicate itself full-time to the case, but was "pretty busy in other matters," still attending to its private
clients).
262. At least one Justice official tried to get the Browns fired for their "conspicuous lack of
initiative." Memorandum from George R. Farnum, Assistant Attorney General, to Attorney General
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lawyer at the Department knew much about the case.2,3 During the
Master's inexplicable delay in issuing his final report from 1932 to 1935,
top officials had not a clue what was happening." In the wake of World
War I, the Attorney General had warned that the explosion in
governmental civil litigation could not be efficiently handled if the
Justice Department continued its traditional reliance on part-timers."'
Bethlehem exemplified the pathologies of that outdated system.
B.

POSSIBLE COMMON LAW APPROACHES TO DEFENSE CONTRACTS

From when they started the dispute in 1923, government attorneys
faced an uphill climb. The bare substantive imbalance between what was
given and received did not itself warrant a judicial refusal to enforce a
contract as written. For a court to override the results of a bargain, there
had to be some more specific authorizing doctrine, such as fiduciary duty,
public policy, duress, mistake, misrepresentation, or incapacity. A
contract might be modified on the ground of unconscionability, a
doctrine directly triggered by uneven exchange. But this required some
evidence that one of the authorizing doctrines listed above was in play.
In cases of the most extreme imbalance, the contract might be declared
unconscionable without any such free-standing evidence, but this
occurred only because the severity of the imbalance itself confirmed that
266
something must have been amiss in the bargaining process.

(Feb. 24, 1927) (Section 3, DOJ-NA, supra note 123). Yet the Browns stayed on. A year later, and
three years before the hearings ended, the Attorney General was still worrying about the lack of
attention showed in the case by the Browns. Letter from John G. Sargent, Attorney General, to
Chauncey G. Parker, General Couns. to the Shipping Bd. (Apr. I I, 1928) (DOJ-NA, supra note 123).
263. Letter from J. Frank Staley, Assistant Attorney General to Sam E. Whitaker, Assistant
Attorney General (Apr. 12, 1937) (Section 5, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) (stating that Justice
Department lawyers know too little about the case to "make any intelligent observation about the
argument"); Memorandum from J. Frank Staley, Assistant Attorney General, to the Assistant
Attorney General Morris (Jan. xo, 1936) (Section 5, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) (stating that nobody in
the Justice Department has had "active connection with the litigation").
264. Memorandum from William D. Mitchell, Attorney General, to Mr. Gardner (Dec. 13, 1932)
(Section 4, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) (stating that the report was to appear "in the near future");
Letter from [Homer Cummings], Attorney General, to Rep. James V. McClintic (Mar. 5, 1934)
(Section 4, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) (stating that the report is expected "any day"); Letter from
George C. Sweeney, Assistant Attorney General, to South Trimble Jr., Solic. of the Dep't of Com.
(July 6, 1934) (Section 4, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) (stating that the Master would consider the report
later that summer).
265. 1924 ATTORNEY GENERAL

ANN.

REP. I.

266. Paul A. Sweeney, Spec. Assistant to the Attorney General, Am. Electro Prod. Co.: Brief on
the Law of Unconscionable Contracts at 26 (ca. 1923) (Entry 300, Records of the War Transactions
Section, Records of Other Department of Justice Organizations 1918-27, 193o-43, 1964-88, Record
Group 6o, National Archives, College Park, MD). For later commentaries on procedural and
substantive elements of unconscionability, see John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in
Perspective, 45 MIcH. L. REV. 253, 281 (1947); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability in the Code- The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 486-88 (1967); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN
CONTRACT LAW 516-17 (5th ed. 1997).
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Government attorneys in the Bethlehem case were to spend years
searching for the doctrine that would authorize a court, when faced with
a factually evident unfairness, to remedy it.
i.
The FiduciaryDuties of Government Officers and Defense
Contractors
In 1922-1923, before litigation began in earnest as to the validity of
the Bethlehem contract, several attorneys at the Shipping Board, as well
as an attorney at the Justice Department who advised them,
brainstormed theories of relief for imbalanced wartime contracts.267 The
most important of these theories centered on trust law. Its relevance
stems from the broader relationship between trust law and government
contracting. In private law generally, a trustee was bound by a duty of
absolute loyalty to the beneficiary and a duty of ordinary care in
managing the trust property.261 If a trustee transferred property to a third
party in a way that breached the trust, the beneficiary had a right to
recover the property or its fruits, unless the third party had given legally
sufficient consideration for the property and possessed neither actual nor
constructive knowledge of the breach.6 9 According to the Supreme
Court, government officers were trustees of the public fisc. What is more,
every contractor was constructively "held to a recognition of the fact that
government agents are bound to fairness and good faith as between
themselves and their principal."'27 Hence, if the contractor should have
known that a government agent was acting in a way that breached the
duty of loyalty or care, the government was not bound by the deal.
This principle, in the sphere of the duty of loyalty, made for easy
cases. Proof that the negotiating officer accepted a bribe from the
contractor revealed a breach of trust and invalidated the contract."'
Applying the principle in the sphere of the duty of care was trickier. How
carelessly did an officer need to behave for a contractor to be charged
with awareness of his breach? In one leading case, the Supreme Court
attested that when the government "comes down from its position of

267. Geoffrey Goldsmith, Assistant Couns. to the U.S. Shipping Bd., Emergency Fleet Corp., The
Law as to Unconscionable Price in Government Contracts (June 14, 1922) (Special Reports, File C,
Drawer I, Records Relating to the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Records of the Department of
Claims, Records of the U.S. Shipping Board, Record Group 32, National Archives, College Park,
MD); Ralph E. Moody, Spec. Assistant to the Attorney General, Compilation of Authorities on and
Discussion of War Contracts and the Relation of the Citizen to the Government (1922), reprinted as
appendix to Memorandum on Behalf of Bethlehem, supra note 123; Parker, supra note 233. Moody's
memo influenced the Shipping Board. See Memorandum on Behalf of Bethlehem, supra note 123, at 5.
268. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 329-30 (1921).
269. Id. at 508-20; 2 JAIRUS WARE PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 1312

n.(a) (Edwin A. Howes, Jr. ed., 6th ed. 191i).
270. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406,414 (1889).
271. United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 305-o6 (i9io); Garman v. United States, 34 Ct. Cl. 237,
242 (1899); see also SHEALEY 2d ed., supra note 144, at 12-13.
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sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the
same laws that govern individuals there." If the state failed to hire
competent agents, then it had to "be charged with the consequences that
follow such omissions in the commercial world,.272 suggesting that
careless transactions would still be enforced. Despite this sweeping
rhetoric, the federal courts did in some cases relieve the government of
contractual losses caused by the negligence of its employees. However,
aside from cases in which the negligent officer had no authority to award
the contract at all,273 courts limited such relief to the most obviously
unfair bargains. The Court of Claims, in a much-cited case arising from
the Civil War, refused to enforce a government contract whose price was
five times market value.274 The opinion announced that, "whenever there
are circumstances to excite suspicion," such as the five hundred percent
overcharge, a court would "look narrowly into the case and hold the
party who seeks to enforce such a contract to stricter proof of fairness
than would be required between two [private] individuals." '75 The
massive overcharge, said the court, meant that the contractor had either
bribed the government agent or taken advantage of his ignorance. Even
if it was the latter, the contract still entailed a breach of trust and was
therefore invalid. 76
The Supreme Court followed similar reasoning two decades later in
Hume v. United States, in which a clerk's error led to a price thirty-five
times greater than market value. To collect on such a contract was to
force government officers to breach their duty to the public fisc, which
the Court would not permit. 77 Hume also declared that a contract so
unconscionably imbalanced created a presumption of fraud (i.e.,
unconscientious dealing) even without direct evidence thereof27
These cases made clear that the duty of care for public trustees had
very limited application to pricing. It seemed to touch only those
contracts (in the words of Hume) that "no man in his senses and not
under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair
man would accept on the other. 2 79 Given this high threshold, it is no
surprise that, from when Hume was decided in 1889 through the mid272. Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875). For a modern analysis of the general issue of

whether the government is bound by ordinary private law when it makes contracts, see Joshua I.
Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts: Congruence and Exceptionalism in Government Contracts Law,

64 G.W. L. REV. 633,637-38 (1996).
273. SHEALEY 2d ed., supra note i44, at 16-18.
274. Beard v. United States, 3 Ct. Cl. 122, 130 (1867).
275. Id. at i29.

276. Id. at 128.
277. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 4o6,414-15 (1889).
278. Id. at 414; see also SHEALEY ist ed., supra note i44, at 4-5. On fraud's general meaning of
"unconscientious dealing," see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 685 (8th ed. 2004).
279. Hume, 132 U.S. at 415.
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1920S, not a single reported federal decision applied the case's holding
that an unfair price, in the absence of corruption, could serve as the basis
for a breach of trust.28°
Attorneys who worked for and advised the Shipping Board wanted
to take advantage of the trust theory articulated in Hume." ' To do so,
however, they would have to convince a court that the contracts at issue
were "such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make
on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the
other."2' Bethlehem's riskless profit of twenty-two percent might be
senseless and unfair in a common-sense way, but from a legal
perspective, it did not compare with the exponential imbalances in Hume
and Beard. Besides, Hume and Beard both involved government officers
who were, if not corrupt, at least negligent. In the Bethlehem case, by
contrast, Radford and Bowles had simply done what any reasonable
person would do in a desperate situation. As the Court of Claims said in
a leading case, the "diligence and care required of a purchasing agent,"
when in grave need of goods and under time pressure, was "no higher
than that which a prudent, energetic man would exercise, in like
circumstances, in his own business affairs. '83 By this standard, the court
found that a price forty percent greater than usual, agreed to because
there were no low-cost suppliers
in the area, was valid as within the
4
government agent's authority.'
Faced with these adverse precedents, government attorneys sought
to turn trust law to their advantage by positing a different theory: not
only the contracting officer, but also the contractor itself, was a trustee of
the government.2s5 This innovation, if accepted, made a huge difference.
Under the old, familiar principle, a government contract was treated as
one between a trustee (the officer) and a third party (the contractor).
This meant the trustee, if not personally interested in the deal, had to
exercise the care of an ordinary person, nothing more.2" And even this

28o. This is based on a LEXIS search for all federal cases citing Hume (i.e., all those containing the

citation "132 U.S. 406") from 1889 through 1926. For a narrow construction of Hume in response to
the government's citation of the case in relation to the interpretation of a statute on the pricing of war
contracts, see Standard Steel Car Co. v. United States, 6o Ct. Cl. 726, 737-41 (1925).
281. Hume and its trust theory are invoked in Goldsmith, supra note 267, at 33-37; Moody, supra
note 267, at 14-15; Parker, supranote 233, at 4-5.
282. Hume, 132 U.S. at 415. Moody argued that "no honest and fair man would accept" a

government contract providing for greater than just compensation and that this was enough for
invalidation. Moody, supra note 267, at 22. This reading was contrary to Hume's clear emphasis on the
wild unbalance in the contract.
283. Wentworth v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 302,311 (1869). Technically, the court was construing a
statute, but it derived its conclusion from the common law, not the statutory text. Id. at 3 10-I1.
284- Id. at 308 (stating the overcharge), 311-12 (giving the holding).
285. Goldsmith, supra note 267, at 26-29; Moody, supra note 267, at 15; Parker, supra note 233, at
286.

BOGERT,

supra note 268, at

329.
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modest standard, as we have seen, was weakly enforced."7 Under the
radical new theory, however, a government contract was treated as one
between a trustee (the contractor) and a beneficiary (the government).
In such an agreement, the trustee had to act "wholly for the benefit of
the beneficiary. '' 28 Courts viewed such a contract "with great suspicion
and jealousy. ' 98 The trustee had to treat the beneficiary "with the utmost
fairness and openness and pay an adequate consideration for all that he
receives."" 9 Adequate consideration, as distinct from the mere sufficient
consideration necessary to enforce a typical contract, meant equal
value.' It was a mandate for judicial price regulation, one long exercised
with vigor in the private law of trusts.
How could the government convince a court to adopt this theory?
Some attorneys argued that the contractor's trustee status was inherent
in citizenship, since a democratic commonwealth was an association for
the mutual benefit of its members, in which all owed allegiance."' Others
said the status came into being, or became stronger, when citizens
supplied the state with the means to conduct war.293 As a matter of policy
and justice, this last argument was not crazy. The nation needed
contractors' services as badly as it needed young men to take up arms. If
the latter were expected to fight and risk their lives in the trenches at low
wages, couldn't the former be expected, at the very least, to conform to a
higher standard than absolute self-interest, especially since the market in
total war was not as efficient as in peace? Seeing as how the nation had
never depended on big companies for national security as much as it did
in World War I, it was not outlandish to ask courts to rethink the statecontractor relationship.
Unfortunately for the government, "no overt case-language"
supported the theory.294 For this reason, it did not stand up in court. The
government invoked the theory for the first and last time in 1923, in a
fraud suit against the Bentley Company arising from an enormous
wartime construction project notorious for waste and corruption.9 The
District Judge, while noting that fairness would "be more rigidly
scrutinized than if [the contractor] had been dealing with a private
287. See supra text accompanying notes 272-84.
288. BOGERT, supra note 268, at 332.

289. Id. at 334-35; see also Kelton v. United States, 32 Ct. Cl. 314, 348 (1897) (stating that a
contract between a public trustee and the government would "always" be "set... aside for the
asking").
290. BOGERT, supranote 268, at 334-35.
291. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 324-26 (8th ed. 2004).

292. Moody, supra note 267, at 2-15.
293. Goldsmith, supra note 267, at 29; Parker, supra note 233, at 4.
294. Goldsmith, supra note 267, at 26.
295. BRANDES, supra note 26, at 151-55, 188; United States v. A. Bentley & Sons Co., 293 F. 229
(S.D. Ohio 1923).
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individual, ' : 6 found "no cases" to support the trustee status of the
contractor.2 7 He threw out the argument. The government did not
appeal.29 This defeat appears to have soured the government on using
the theory in subsequent cases.
The theory of the defense contractor as trustee exemplified a radical
approach to curtailing war profits. It would have transferred defense
contracting to the strictest sector of fiduciary relations-a region
insulated from the market, where judicially crafted standards of fairness
came first and the actual terms of a contract came second. The theory's
startling implications may well explain its rejection.
2.

An IncrementalApproach: Separate Considerationin Savings
Contracts
At the same time, government attorneys recognized, and judges
fleshed out, a more incremental approach to the challenge. If a court
could not openly look behind every defense contract to decide whether
its substance was fair, it could at least identify certain elements of
contract format that tended to produce excessive profits and then
manipulate the doctrines of contract law to blunt their effect.
The treatment of savings contracts (the same format used in the
Bethlehem case) by the Court of Claims after the First World War serves
as a good example of this incremental approach. The story began with a
series of cases concerning contractors who made clothing for the Army.
The government provided fabric to these manufacturers and soon
concluded, in the midst of performance, that they were wasting too much
of it. Government officers therefore modified the agreements: each
contractor was to use "best efforts to avoid all possible waste" and would
receive, as added compensation, one-fifth the value of fabric saved."9
This modification gave rise to several disputes resolved by the Court of
Claims in 1923-1926, all in unanimous five-judge decisions. Concluding
that the contractors were obligated to avoid waste even under the
original agreements, the court, following a strict reading of the
preexisting duty rule, said the savings clause could not be enforced
without fresh consideration. What is more, the court interpreted the
savings provision (with almost no evidence, in the text or otherwise) to
require such consideration in the form of cost-saving efforts on the part
of the contractor that it had not made, or would not have made, under

296. A. Bentley, 293 F. at 236.
297. Id. at 235-36.
298. In a later order, apparently not reported, the District Judge dismissed the complaint
altogether and was affirmed, on grounds separate from the trust issue, in United States v. A. Bentley &
Sons Co., 16 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1927).

299. F. Jacobson & Sons v. United States, 61 Ct. Cl. 420, 423-24 (1926); Cohen, Endel & Co. v.
United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 513, 513-15 (1925); J.J. Preis & Co. v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 81, 81-82
(1923).
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the original agreement.3" If the contracts were allowed to stand without
such a requirement, noted the court in dicta, they might be invalid not
only for want of consideration, but also as contrary to the public policy
against gifts of public money."' If the contractor fulfilled the judiciallyimposed requirement of extra cost-saving efforts, it received the bonus;
otherwise, it did not."'2
Denial of unearned profit was the stated goal and the end result of
the court's approach. Yet there was a big difference between its
incrementalism and the radical theory of contractor-as-trustee. Under
the trustee theory, the court based its intervention on the total profit of
the contractor and the total benefit to the government. The fabric cases,
by contrast, focused narrowly on modifications to the contract and their
format. The court never mentioned the contractors' overall profit.
Indeed, the bonuses appear to have been small, about one percent of the
cost of material, or less. 3 These cases did not represent some judicial
campaign to identify and police the most exploitative defense contracts.
It should be no surprise that the profits denied in these cases were
not particularly large. The court singled them out for non-enforcement
simply because they ran afoul of the preexisting duty rule -a rule whose
application might bear some correlation to excessive profits (e.g., via
mid-stream hold-ups) but not necessarily a strong one.30 4 To a critic of
war profits, then, the rule was weak as an instrument of policy. Still, it
had the virtue of allowing a cautious judge to intervene in a problem that
might otherwise have gone untouched. It permitted the judge, in
overriding the contract, to rely on the categorical and ostensibly neutral
distinctions with which courts were most comfortable, in contrast to the
unusual field of trustee-beneficiary transactions, which entailed messier
questions of fairness.
Things got more tricky when the Court of Claims confronted a
wartime savings contract executed all in one piece. In Burke & James v.
300. F. Jacobson, 61 Ct. Cl. at 424-25; Cohen, 60 Ct. Cl. at 5 18- 1 9 ; J.J. Preis, 58 Ct. CI. at 86. At no
point in any of the decisions does the court say that the actual intent of the parties was that the
contractor be denied the bonus without extra effort. Indeed, the contracts contained no specification
of any extra effort or how it was to be measured.
301. J.J. Preis, 58 Ct. Cl. at 86. Note there was Supreme Court authority (not cited in J.J. Preis)
stating that judges had greater reason to be on the look-out for failure of consideration in government
contracts cases than in private ones, due to the negligence and bad faith of government agents. United
States v.Barlow, 132 U.S. 271, 282 (1889).
302. F. Jacobson, 61 Ct. Cl. at 424; Cohen, Endel, 6o Ct. CI. at 519; J.J. Preis,58 Ct. Cl. at 87.
303. Burke & James, Inc. v. United States, 63 Ct. Cl. 36, 56 (1927) (noting the "comparatively
small percentage between the yardage actually used and the allowance" in the fabric cases); J.J. Preis,
58 Ct. CI. at 84 (noting that, in the disputed transaction, the contractor returned to the government
3.5% of the cloth provided to it, of whose value it would have received 20%).
304. Indeed, as a practical matter, it is notoriously hard to predict whether a court will apply the
preexisting duty rule in a case where formally it should. I STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTs: LAW
IN ACTION 309 (995).
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United States, decided in 1927, the contractor's estimate turned out to be
far above actual cost, producing a profit of sixty-four percent.35 There
was no allegation of bad faith. Rather, the contractor simply made an
"egregious error" in the estimate.3" Whereas the savings bonuses in the
fabric cases had been relatively small, the one in Burke & James resulted
in a large and undeniable rent. Yet this time, though the imbalance cried
out for remedy, the court was stripped of the rationale of the preexisting
duty rule.
What to do? The judges split, three to two. The majority concluded
that a savings contract, even when executed all in one piece, should be
construed to require separate consideration for the savings bonus."' But
what was the separate consideration to be? In contrast to the fabric cases,
there was no original contract to serve as a baseline. The court answered
that the contractor, in order to get the bonus promised in the text of the
agreement, had to do "more than the precise terms of the contract
exacted of it," e.g., to expend "additional sums ...to effect a saving in
materials," exert "extraordinary
care in the use of materials," or employ
"additional labor." 3" There was no evidence that the contractor did any
of this, so the court denied the bonus."'
This interpretation flew in the face of the contract's wording.31 ' With
no hard evidence in either party's actions, the court could only say that,
in light of the "purpose" of the savings provision, the consideration for
the bonus had to be "a reduction in the cost of materials below the
contract allowance.. 3 I. This twisted the meaning of consideration. Surely
the government's consideration for the savings provision-i.e., the thing
that induced the government to include the provision in the contractwas not cost reduction per se, but the incentive that the bonus gave the
contractor to reduce costs. The court's assertion that consideration
meant an actual monetary benefit was no less absurd than saying that
consideration fails whenever a party enters a contract for the purpose of
making a profit but does not actually make one. As one government
attorney privately admitted, the construction was "unjustified and wholly
at odds with the intentions of the parties."3 '3
305. Burke & James, 63 Ct. Cl. at 52.

306. Id. at 58.
307. Id. at 53.

308. Id. at 52-58.
309. Id. at 55.
310. Id. at 58.

311. Id. at 53 (admitting that "the letter of the agreement" results in unconscionable profits).
312. Id. The invocation of a failed contractual purpose was a common way for courts in this period
to fudge doctrine to reach an equitable result. Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700,
702

939).

313. Memorandum from Paul Page, Attorney, Maritime Comm'n, to Robert H. Jackson, Solicitor
General 5 (939) (Folder labeled "Legal File-Attorney General-Bethlehem Steel Case," Box 86,
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After its extensive discussion of the interpretation and consideration
issues, the court briefly added an alternative rationale for judgment
against the contractor: unconscionability. Under this heading, the court
emphasized that the government reasonably relied on the contractor's
expertise when the latter made the estimate; that the contractor made a
"gross error" in the estimate; and that the savings bonus, based on the
estimate, raised the contractor's profit to sixty-four percent from twentysix percent. (The latter figure was the fixed fee, which the government
did not seek to recover, even though it, too, was inflated by the error.)
The combination of these factors, declared the court, rendered
enforcement of the bonus unconscionable."4
Of the court's two rationales, unconscionability may seem far more
plausible since it aimed at the goal of fair exchange openly and directly,
not by way of tortured interpretations or the manipulation of
consideration doctrine. Why, then, didn't the court rely on
unconscionability alone? While the particular format of the savings
contract limited the applicability of the requirement of separate
consideration, unconscionability's focus on the contractor's total profit
could conceivably be applied to any contract with a profit around sixtyfour percent or higher (provided there was also some procedural
problem, such as the contractor's estimation error). With the decision
commanding only a slim majority, perhaps the judge casting the swing
vote felt uncomfortable stating that unconscionability by itself could
invalidate a sixty-four percent profit. After all, this profit was far lower
than the exponential returns that went unenforced in Hume and Beard. It
brought the court within striking distance of ordinary war profits. By
coupling unconscionability with separate consideration, the court left
itself an "out" in case the government later asked it to invalidate
contracts devoid of a savings clause but with large profits.
What is more, the court's reliance on interpretation and
consideration allowed for a clear and seemingly neutral determination of
how much the contractor could recover: the court simply denied the
savings bonus. Without this determination in the background,
unconscionability would have required the court to exercise discretion
far more openly in choosing a number, since the products involved
(newly invented aerial cameras) had no determinate market value
separate from the exigencies of the war itself-a common situation in
war contracting. Hence, even though the court invoked
unconscionability, separate consideration remained integral to its
approach. It seems doubtful that it would have invoked the former
RHJ-LC, supra note 22).

314. Burke & James, 63 Ct Cl. at 58-60. For the numbers, see id. at 51-52. The 26% figure is the
fixed fee of $34,600 divided by the total cost of $13o,659.50.
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without the latter.
As a way to address war profits, the incremental approach of Burke
& James had some merit. The savings contract might provide a useful
incentive but could also be abused. Adding a requirement of special
efforts avoided throwing out the baby with the bathwater, even if the
court's fact-findings on that matter were rather cursory. At the same
time, the approach had severe problems. First of all, it rested on a
method of construction that flaunted the evidence. This made it easy for
courts in other jurisdictions to refrain from adopting the approach; they
had only to point out the absurdity of the logic."5 And there was another,
more subtle, problem. While the court's rhetoric made clear that it
wanted to prevent contractors from obtaining unearned profits, the
approach was anchored to the savings format. Thus, the court could not
reach excessive profits that arose, say, from a fixed-price contract, or
from a fixed fee based on an inflated estimate, or (in a concealed way)
from the inflation of cost in a cost-plus arrangement. By contrast, the
theory of contractor-as-trustee would have reached all such profits.' 6
C.

THE MASTER'S HEARING:
POWER

No

MISREPRESENTATION, ONLY BARGAINING

Once the Bethlehem litigation began, the government faced a choice
between the radical theory of contractor-as-trustee and the incremental
approach of Burke & James."7 Joseph J. Brown, the private attorney who
represented the government before the Master in 1932, presented an odd
variation on the Burke & James argument. The Burke & James court had
concluded, on the basis of the savings format, that the contract's
"purpose" was for the savings bonus to accrue only as a result of the
contractor's cost-saving efforts. This "purpose," implied the court, was
the parties' actual intent and ought to be enforced, despite the letter of
the contract. In the Bethlehem case, Brown claimed that the government
had reasonably relied on a false representation by Bethlehem that the
contract was structured in such a way that the savings bonus would
accrue only as a result of an increase in Bethlehem's efficiency.
Specifically, according to Brown, Bethlehem made the government think
that the estimates were accurate predictions of what the cost would be,
given the firm's current efficiency and assuming no increases in cost from

315. See infra text accompanying note 350.
316. Indeed, the government in Bentley apparently sought to use that theory to contest cost
allowances in a cost-plus contract. United States v. A. Bentley & Sons Co., 293 F. 229, 245 (S.D. Ohio
1923) (recounting the government's claim that cost allowances requested by the contractor and
previously allowed by the government were fraudulent).
317. The same attorneys who posited the radical theories simultaneously recognized and invoked
the argument that a savings contract required separate consideration. Moody, supra note 267, at 23;
Parker, supra note 233, at 6.
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any source.' The government, attested Brown, actually understood the
savings contract in the way that the court in Burke & James had imputed
to the parties-that there would be no "additional compensation unless it
was earned as a result of economies effected" by the contractor.3"9 But
contrary to Bethlehem's representations, continued Brown, the estimates
did allow for increases in cost, leading to the excess of the estimate over
actual cost.32 ° Therefore, he concluded, the contract was invalid on the

ground of misrepresentation. As a remedy, Brown wanted Bethlehem's
profit reduced to zero, on a punitive damages theory."' Alternately, he
wanted it limited to ten percent of actual cost, which, he said, was
customary in wartime shipbuilding.322 The latter option called for a profit
about equal to the fixed fee, meaning that it approximated the usual
remedy for misrepresentation, i.e., placed the government in the position
it would have occupied had the contract been as Bethlehem led it to
believe.323

The evidence for Brown's story, as one government attorney
'
privately admitted, was "woefully weak."324
Brown had no effective
answer to the overwhelming evidence that the EFC did not view the
estimates as close predictions of cost. Powell flatly told the EFC that the
estimates made allowances for possible future cost increases.325 Piez, who
had experience with savings contracts, testified that the estimate in such
a contract had to include "actual cost, if we knew the cost, plus an
allowance for contingencies," not to mention other allowances.3, 6 Most
important, Radford and Bowles explicitly stated that they considered the
estimates too high. They assented because the nation needed the ships
regardless of price, without mentioning any reliance on Bethlehem's
318. Brief Submitted on Behalf of Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Ltd., et al. at 19-21 (on
the understanding), 273-3 18 (on reliance by the government), United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
23 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (Nos. 3315 & ri97o) (Enclosures, DOJ-NA,supra note 123).
319. Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
320. Id. at 51-61, 226-72.
321. Id. at321-22.
322. Id. at 337.
323. In his discussion of remedies, Brown made only the punitive-damage argument (allowing no
profit) and the "customary profit" argument (allowing profit of ten percent of actual cost). Id. at 32137. He did not refer to expectancy as the measure of damages. Id. However, in the next stage of
litigation, the government stated that it had been "damaged to the extent that the base costs were
inflated." District Court Brief at 94, Bethlehem, 23 F. Supp. 676 (Nos. 3315 & 11970) (National
Archives-Mid-Atlantic Region, Philadelphia, Pa.). This measure would suggest expectancy as the
proper remedy, even though the government officially stuck to the punitive damages theory. Id. at 2526. Brown's theory of allowing only a ten percent profit on actual cost was jettisoned. Id.
324. Memorandum from Paul Page, supra note 313, at i. Page did note that the government might
argue fraud on a different basis: that Bethlehem had warranted its estimates as fair and reasonable,
when they surely were not. Id. at 2.
325. Record at 1825, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (942) (Nos. 8 & 9)
(Exhibit G-io9, Letter from Joseph W. Powell to the Emergency Fleet Corp.).
326. Transcript of Record at 15oo-o1, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9) (Testimony of Piez).
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representations. 7
Though unsupported by the facts, Brown's theory might have been
attractive to an adjudicator who wished to make the contract more fair,
but in a hidden way. Effectively, Brown dreamed up a contract that
would have been fair, i.e., that would have guaranteed that Bethlehem's
bonus came only from its cost-saving efforts, not from the inflation of its
estimates. He then posited (falsely) that the EFC had bargained for this
idealized contract. Brown's theory gave the court the opportunity to
enforce an approximation of this idealized contract, but in a way that set
no precedent, since it merely reguired the court to misconstrue the
idiosyncratic facts of a single case.
The success of Brown's strategy depended on the willingness of the
adjudicator to indulge a sympathy for the party suffering the unfairness.
But the Master did not indulge. In his report, submitted in 1935, Mason
rejected the claim of misrepresentation, correctly noting there was no
reliance: "The Government has not produced a word of testimony to
prove that, had the Government representatives known exactly what the
profit to Bethlehem under the contracts ... eventually would be, the
contracts in question would not have been made."3 9
Bethlehem's profit resulted not from fraud, but from bargaining
power, pure and simple. Mason acutely understood the government's
dependence on private organizational capacity in wartime: "It was
Bethlehem's organization that was necessary to insure success to the
shipbuilding program of the Fleet Corporation." Seizure, Mason knew,
would have been counter-productive. "[T]he taking possession by the
Fleet Corporation of the Bethlehem plants," he explained, "could not
have accomplished the [government's] desired result.""33 Therefore, "if
Bethlehem demanded its price on the basis of substantial commercial
profits..., the Government was obliged to take the contracts on such
basis or not at all." 33' And the government did take them, "with open
eyes," and "did so because of a realization of the necessity of attaining an

327. Master's Report, supra note 174, at 530-31.
328. Even though Brown's case rested exclusively on misrepresentation, and not on the theories of
separate consideration or unconscionability invoked in Burke & James, Brown did include an analysis
of Burke & James in one of his briefs. Argument in Support of Requests for Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law Submitted Upon Behalf of the United States of America and the United States
Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. at 46, Bethlehem, 23 F. Supp. 676 (Nos. 3315 & I1970)
(Enclosures, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) [hereinafter Second Post-Hearing Brief]. He asserted that,
whereas the contractor in Burke & James made an error in its estimate, Bethlehem had deliberately
falsified its estimate, thus making the case for relief against Bethlehem stronger than against the
contractor in Burke & James.Id.
329. Master's Report, supra note 174, at 538.
330. Id. at 539. Mason also noted that the government in World War I had no legal power to draft
management: it could not "compel performance by an unwilling organization." Id.
333. Id.
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objective.., which, without Bethlehem, might not be possible."33 '
According to Mason, the law put no limit on the use of economic
pressure, so long as the actors were informed and competent. "[H]ow
much one takes from those needing service in necessity," he pronounced
with cold resignation, was merely a "matter of conscience." It was
essential, he concluded, "to pay for such service at the contract price,
even though, when the necessity be over, the obligor may regard the
weight of his debt unduly burdensome.""'
It was a harsh statement, considering that Brown (while not actually
relying on a theory of unconscionability) had called Bethlehem's profit
excessive.334 In response, Mason observed that firms in the highly
concentrated shipbuilding industry had made profits comparable to those
in the Bethlehem case even in the years after the war.335 (This comparison
may have been unfair, since the war contracts entailed no risk, whereas
the peacetime ones possibly did. 3"6) In addition, added Mason, high
wartime profits might be justified as a subsidy for Bethlehem, paying it
off for maintaining its plants in peacetime and rendering "standby"
service, ready to produce when war came.337 In fact, however, it seems
that the motivation for Bethlehem's massive pre-19I7 investment
stemmed from the expectation of profit for supplying Britain and other
foreign belligerents, not the United States (though there was little factfinding on this issue)."38
D.

THE DISTRICT COURT: "DAYLIGHT ROBBERY, BUT NOT THEFr"

By this point, attorneys at the U.S. Maritime Commission (the

Id.
333. Id. at 540-41.
334. E.g., Brief Submitted on Behalf of Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Ltd., et al. at 335,
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942) (Nos. 8 & 9). There was also a reference
to unconscionable profits in Bill of Complaint at 1959, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9).
335. Master's Report, supra note 174, at 549-51.
336. Petition for Writs of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit at 16 n.8, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9).
337. Master's Report, supra note 174, at 540. It should be noted that Mason made one additional
ruling in his report. In its original complaint in 1925, the government noted that Schwab as Director
General of the EFC limited the profits of other shipbuilders without touching those of his own firm.
Bill of Complaint at 1961-65, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9). The General Counsel of the
Shipping Board believed that these facts would serve as the basis for a claim of breach of fiduciary
duty against Schwab. Letter from Chauncey G. Parker, General Counsel, Shipping Bd., to the
Attorney General (Mar. I, 1926) (Section 3, DOJ-NA, supra note 123). However, Joseph J. Brown did
not press the claim in his brief in 1932. See Brief Submitted on Behalf of Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corporation, Ltd., et al. & Second Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 328; see also Brief... On Behalf of
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd. et al. [Bethlehem Post-Hearing Brief] at 66-68 (refuting the claim
while noting it is not raised). Mason ruled that Schwab had done nothing wrong, since he simply acted
pursuant to an agreement not to deal in any way with Bethlehem in his capacity as Director General.
Master's Report, supra note 174, at 542-43. The claim never arose after this.
338. Govt. S. Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 56 (citing testimony).
332.
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successor agency to the Shipping Board) were fed up with Brown. His
strategy, insisted the Commission's General Counsel, Max O'Rell Truitt,
was "calculated to lose" the upcoming proceeding in the District Court.339
When commission attorneys began preparing their own alternate
argument, 340 Brown resigned. 4 ' It was good riddance, declared Truitt, for
Brown "had made a good many unfounded charges," which were
"responsible for the unfavorable report of the Master.""42
In the District Court, the Commission retained the claim of
misrepresentation. In the words of one attorney, "it had been made our
story and we were stuck with it. ' ' 343 Any hope of victory rested on
alternative claims that Commission attorneys added. In particular, they
explicitly invoked the theory of Burke & James that a savings bonus
required separate consideration.3" More important, they claimed
unconscionability. The true issue in the case had always been unfair
exchange, and unconscionability allowed the court to take account of it
directly, not merely in relation to the contract's format or the parties'
states of mind. Indeed, the Commission opened its brief by stating that
the "ultimate" question in the case was whether Bethlehem should
receive profits "which it has not earned. '
Still, unconscionability required some defect in the bargain besides
the imbalance itself. Unlike Hume, Beard, and Burke & James,
Bethlehem did not involve negligence. The Commission scraped together
a few alternatives. One was "the permeating presence of the fraud
element.,, ' 46 This referred to Brown's theory of misrepresentation, as well
as Bethlehem's more general representation that the estimates were fair
and proper,"47 which one Commission attorney thought might be
considered deceptive."4S As additional defects, the Commission briefly
mentioned the "emergency conditions" under which the contract was
made and the general danger that government officers might not serve
their trust with zeal. 9
339. Letter from unnamed official to J. Frank Staley, Assistant Attorney General (Apr. 1937)
(Section 5, DOJ-NA, supra note 123) (quoting a conversation with Truitt).
340. Paul D. Page, Jr., Bethlehem Jottings 3 (Sept. 1939) (Section 6, DOJ-NA, supra note 123).
341. Letter from Joseph J. Brown, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, to Max O'Rell
Truitt, General Counsel, Maritime Comm'n (Sept. 20, 1937) (Section 5, DOJ-NA, supra note 123).
342. Quoted in Letter from Sam E. Whitaker, Assistant Attorney General, to Homer Cummings,
Attorney General (Sept. 30, 1937) (Section 5, DOJ-NA, supra note 123).
343. Memorandum from Paul Page, supra note 313, at 2.
344. District Court Brief at Io8-i8, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 23 F. Supp. 676 (E.D.
Pa. 1938) (Nos. 3315 & I 197o) (National Archives-Mid-Atlantic Region, Philadelphia, Pa.).
345. Id. at 1-2 (emphasis in original).
346. Id. at io7.
347. Id. at 55.
348. Memorandum from Paul Page, supra note 313, at 2.
349. District Court Brief at 104-05, io7, Bethlehem, 23 F. Supp. 676 (Nos. 3315 & i97o) (National
Archives-Mid-Atlantic Region, Philadelphia, Pa.). There were no accusations against any
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District Judge Oliver B. Dickinson ruled against every one of the
government's claims. Handing down his opinion in 1938, he rejected the
Burke & James theory that the savings bonus required separate
consideration, reasonably relying on the contract's wording.35 As for
misrepresentation, he followed Mason, ruling that Bethlehem drove a
hard bargain which the EFC knowingly accepted. Unlike Mason,
however, Dickinson did not leave open the possibility that the bargain
was fair. Instead, he denounced Bethlehem for overreaching:
The managers for [Bethlehem] adopted the famous Rob Roy
distinction who admitted he was a robber but proudly proclaimed that
he was no thief. The contractor boldly and openly fixed the figures in
the estimated cost so high as to give them the promise of large bonus
profits. The managers for the Fleet Corporation knew that the estimate
was high ...and so protested it. The reply of the contractor's managers

was,.... ["]You take it or leave it." Whatever wrong there was in this
may have been the wrong in a daylight robbery but there was no
element of deception in it.'
Seeing as how Dickinson likened Bethlehem's bargaining to
"daylight robbery," one might think he would accept the argument for
unconscionability."' Indeed, he referred to unconscionability as the "real
cause of action" in the case.353 He even cast doubt on the fairness of an
incentive contract per se, suspicious that it provided an added incentive
for a party to do what it was already '35
obligated to do, creating an
"agreement to pay something for nothing. 4
Still, even though Dickinson considered it "unholy and sinful to
make of the calamity of the people a source of inordinate gain," he
insisted that "we are dealing with a matter of contract and not sentiment,
'
patriotic or otherwise."355
He expressed anxiety about the security of
contracts. "It may well be thought that of late years," he fretted, in an
apparent reference to the New Deal, "we have gone quite far enough
toward abolishing the obligation of debt. ' ' ,, 6 Shocked at Bethlehem's
conduct, yet convinced that the contract had to be enforced, Dickinson
had backed himself into a comer. He escaped by framing the question in
such a way that he had to rule against the government. Just as the court
in Burke & James cabined its use of unconscionability by simultaneously
basing its ruling on the peculiar format of the savings contract, Dickinson
treated the issue of unconscionability as a question of whether savings

government officers.
350. Bethlehem, 23 F. Supp. at 679.
351. Id.
352.

Id.

353.
354.
355.
356.

Id.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 678-79.
Id. at 679-80.
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contracts were per se unconscionable. (Unlike the Burke & James court,
he did not consider the possibility that their fairness might be judged case
by case.) Incentive contracts, of course, were not uncommon in the
general run of commerce. In "view of [this] general and common
practice," he concluded,
"they could not be condemned as
357
unconscionable."
The government had convinced the court that the contract was
morally unfair, but this was not enough to win. Dickinson, grumbled one
lawyer at the Commission, was operating under "an unsound theory that
'a daylight robbery' of Government by one of its citizens, while to be
condemned upon grounds of patriotic sentiment, may be legally
impregnable."' 3' In the eyes of one Justice official, it was Dickinson, not
Bethlehem, who hid behind the Rob Roy distinction: the government
now owed Bethlehem several million dollars, "which the court held was
daylight robbery, but not theft. ' 359 The judgment, lamented Robert
Jackson (then Solicitor General), was one "which the lower court feels
compelled technically to grant, although the result shocks the '36court's
conscience. Such a judgment should be resisted to the uttermost. 1 0
E.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT: "COMMERCIAL GREED" WITHOUT
"PATRIOTIC FEELING"

Dickinson's rhetoric, though it exasperated government attorneys in
light of his ruling, gave them hope for the appeal. Though nearly all the
other arguments on the government's side were weak, wrote a
Commission attorney to Jackson, unconscionability still stood a chance:
"[W]e are forced to concentrate our appeal on the unconscionable results
of this contract, to convince the court that to enforce these payments
would in effect hold that a robber may successfully defend the proceeds
of his robbery in a court of equity .... 6'
As the case went to the Third Circuit, the government retained all
the arguments it had made below.362 Plus, it repeated the Court of
Claims' dictum in the fabric cases that a savings bonus without proof of
357. Id. at 68o-8i.
358. Memorandum from Bon Geaslin, General Counsel to the Maritime Commission, to Frank
Murphy, Attorney General 6 (Feb. 14, 1939) (Section 6, DOJ-NA, supra note 123).
359. Letter from Sam E. Whitaker, Assistant Attorney General, to Homer Cummings, Attorney
General (June 27, 1938) (Section 5, DOJ-NA, supra note 123).
36o. Memorandum by the Solicitor General Authorizing Appeal from Robert H. Jackson,
Solicitor General (Mar. 2, 1939) (Folder labeled "Legal File-Attorney General-Bethlehem Steel
Case," Box 86, RHJ-LC, supra note 22).
361. Memorandum from Paul Page, supra note 313, at 5.
362. The fraud theory was reformulated to say that Bethlehem's superior knowledge imposed on it
a disclosure obligation that it violated. Brief in Behalf of the United States of America and the United
States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation at 46-47, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
113 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 194o) (Nos. 7045 & 7046) (National Archives-Mid-Altantic Region,
Philadelphia, PA).
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6
cost savings by the contractor violated public policy., ,
Dickinson, as Jackson noted ruefully, was "not a New Deal judge. ' 64
The panel assigned to the case in the Third Circuit, by contrast, consisted
of three Roosevelt appointees. 6' Unfortunately for the government, their
political background had no effect. Handing down their decision in 1940,
the judges adopted the exact same view of the contract as Mason and
Dickinson: it was a naked exercise of bargaining power which the law
was powerless to redress. Repeating Mason's point about the
government's dependence on Bethlehem's administrative resources, the
court observed that "Bethlehem's existing shipbuilding organization"
was "necessary to insure success to the program of the Fleet
Corporation., 66 Seizure of the plants "could not have accomplished the
shipbuilding program with the speed which was essential" to it.3 67 The
EFC was therefore "obliged to accept the terms offered by
Bethlehem."'68 The company "cannot be charged with having
misrepresented the facts," though it "may be condemned for having
taken advantage of the Nation's necessities to secure inordinate
profits."' ' Indeed, "Bethlehem insisted upon assuring itself a margin of
profit which in view of the necessities of the Government was so large as
to indicate an attitude of commercial greed but little diluted with
37
patriotic feeling.""
As for unconscionability, the Third Circuit conceded that
"Bethlehem took advantage of the war emergency to drive a hard
bargain with the Government." '' This kind of exploitation might be read
as a procedural defect that would lessen the requirement for imbalance
in the exchange. 72 However, the Third Circuit did not consider this
possibility, perhaps because the government neglected to raise it.
Instead, the court judged the fairness of the transaction by the standard
articulated in Hume for exchanges so imbalanced that they created a
presumption of invalidity without other evidence: the bargain had to be
'
one that "no man in his senses and not under delusion would make."373

363. Id. at 27-28. The government also added an argument based on breach of fiduciary duty by
the contracting officers, based on Court of Claims dicta. Id. at 44-46.
364. Letter from Robert H. Jackson, Solicitor General, to Ernest Lindley (Mar. 29, 1939) (Folder
labeled "Legal File-Attorney General-Bethlehem Steel Case," Box 86, RHJ-LC, supranote 22).
365. They were Judges Biggs, Mars, and Clark. Bethlehem, 113 F.2d at 303. For their
appointments, see History of the Federal Judiciary, at http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last
visited Sept. 23, 2005).
366. Bethlehem, 113 F.2d at 305.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 305-06.
369. Id. at 306.
370. Id. at 305.
371. Id. at 306.
372. See supra text accompanying note 266.
373. Bethlehem, 113 F.2d at 306 (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 82,
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Bethlehem's profit did not rise to this level, since it did not compare with
the exponential profits in Hume or like cases. Besides, observed the
court, fat profits were common in wartime shipbuilding contracts.3 74 This
point reflected one of the biggest limitations of the unconscionability
doctrine: in its pure form, it was supposed to police deviations from a fair
market price, meaning that if a market exhibited a systemic problem
(e.g., excessive prices in war procurement), all contracts were immune to
judicial intervention.375
The court dismissed the arguments inspired by Burke & James with
a passing reference to the text of the agreement."' As for public policy,
the court refused to consider a case-by-case approach, instead deciding
only whether savings contracts per se were impermissible, which of
course they were not.377 Once again, the government had elicited much
outraged rhetoric, but not a single favorable legal conclusion. However
unfair the exchange, the courts offered no help.
IV.
A.

THE DURESS THEORY AND THE NEW DEAL'S
CHALLENGE TO THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY

THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TURNS THE TABLES

Four days after the Third Circuit handed down its decision, France
fell to Hitler. The shockingly swift Nazi victory shattered the assumption,
hitherto widespread, that the European conflict would die down to a
stalemate. The Second World War, as one American observer recalled,
"was going to a decision and it was going with unbelievable speed, and
783
the decision looked as if it would be one we could not live with.
Confronted with the possibility that Hitler might conquer Europe and
attack the United States, Roosevelt urgently requested a new air force of
fifty-thousand planes and a two-ocean navy.379 In the latter half of 1940,
Congress appropriated thirty-six billion dollars for rearmament."8 By a
remarkable accident of history, the Bethlehem litigation arrived at the
stage of final appeal just as the nation confronted, once again, the
question of how to control the cost of war.
Suddenly relevant, the case became the direct responsibility of the
Justice Department, at that time under the direction of Robert Jackson.
The Department immediately asked the Supreme Court to hear the
ioo (Ch.)).
374. Id.
375. Id. In addition, the court repeated Mason's point that the profits might be considered a
subsidy to Bethlehem to insure "standby" service in case of another war. Id.
376. Id. at 307.

377. Id.
378. CArON, supra note 98, at 21.
379. Id. at 21-22.
38o. Higgs, supra note 2i, at 171.
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appeal. "The Government," announced the petition, "is now engaged in
a program of military and naval armament comparable to or greater than
that undertaken in 1917 and I918. ''3"* In light of this new reality,
"[n]othing less than a decision of this Court should be allowed to settle
the doctrine that a court of equity is forced without flinching to apply the
harshest rules of a free market ...to transactions such as these."'
The courts below had upheld the contract on the ground that it
revealed nothing more than the exercise of bargaining power against a
nation in need. In a shrewd move, the Justice Department decided to
accept this interpretation of the transaction as the brute exploitation of
market necessity. But then it turned the tables by arguing that such an
interpretation, far from making the transaction legitimate, revealed it to
be the product of economic duress."' 3 There had to be some boundaries
to the permissible use of bargaining power in war. The Court, declared
the Justice Department, had to decide "the extent to which the country's
need should place the Government at the mercy of its contractors."' '
Now the government's main argument, 38' duress would come to occupy
most of the Court's opinion.386
In terms of the power to limit war profits, the duress theory was a
major breakthrough. It applied to any transaction in which the necessity
of war led to a large profit. In other words, its coverage was
commensurate with the extent of the problem. It was not limited by false
pretenses about the parties' states of mind, as was Brown's theory of
misrepresentation, nor by result-oriented manipulations premised on the
accidental peculiarities of the contract's format, as were the cases in the
Court of Claims. The charge of unconscionability had lacked force in the
381. Petition for Writs of Certiorari, supra note 336, at 12.
382. Id.
383. Govt. S. Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 64-67. Before reaching the Supreme Court, the
government had never argued duress. However, attorneys did brainstorm the theory before the
litigation began. The issue of necessity arose as an offshoot of the trustee theory, Moody, supra note
267, at 22; or as a kind of aggravating factor, Parker, supra note 233, at 6; or merely as a reason to
press the litigation, Adamson, supra note 233, at i.Another attorney briefly mentioned duress, within
a laundry-list of charges, in a draft petition for certiorari in September 1939. Draft Petition for
Certiorari at 14 (ca. Sept. 1939) (Section 6, DOJ-NA, supra note 123).
384. Petition for Writs of Certiorari, supra note 336, at 13.
385. The core of the brief focused on duress and unconscionability (with the latter newly argued
on the basis of quasi-duress). Govt. S. Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 51-85. The Justice Department
retained arguments about separate consideration, id. at 31-5I; public policy, id. at 48-49; and the
contracting officers' fiduciary duty, id. at 85-86. It dropped fraud altogether. However, duress was
clearly the main point: in Jackson's handwritten notes for oral argument, the first words under
"Theory of Relief' were "War necessity equal duress." Robert H. Jackson, untitled handwritten notes
for oral argument in Bethlehem case at 3 (Folder labeled "Legal File-Supreme Court O.T. 1941Cases Nos. 8, 9-U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation," Box 122, RHJ-LC, supra note 22).
386. In the majority opinion in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942), the
discussion of the law took up pages 296-309, of which duress and unconscionability (which the
government based on quasi-duress) occupied pages 299-309.
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lower proceedings, since it required, except in the most extreme cases, a
bargaining defect to authorize judicial intervention. Duress filled the
order. It authorized a broad substantive inquiry into every big profit
made under necessity, whatever the exact circumstances." 7
Of all the government's previous arguments, the sweep of duress was
matched only by the theory of contractor-as-trustee-a theory which
Frankfurter, the sole Justice to advocate the duress theory, also
espoused. 38' No longer twisting facts or stretching doctrine to redress the
inequity of one or a few cases, the government now invited the judiciary
to serve openly as the defense industry's regulator of last resort.
As regulators, courts would need to award profits so as to incentivize
cost reduction, optimize investment, and reward risk, much as officials
later did under the Renegotiation Act. In keeping with this vision, the
Justice Department explicitly rested its claim to relief on certain factual
premises: first, Bethlehem's savings bonus did not result from any cost
reduction by the firm;3"9 second, Bethlehem did not expect U.S. war
387. The government argued the duress theory in such a way that a victory would have allowed the
theory to be applied subsequently to contracts generally, not merely to savings contracts alone. The
government stated that a contract "expressly providing" for a profit comparable to Bethlehem's as a
set percentage of actual or estimated cost would be invalid. Govt. S. Ct. Br., supra note 22o, at 57, 8485. It added that allowing events beyond Bethlehem's control to confer upon it a profit of twenty-two
percent was no different from fixing the profit at that level expressly. Id. at 59.
Conceptually, the government did not confine the duress theory to the contract format. In its
discussion of the duress claim, id. at 63-75, it mentioned the savings format only in incidental ways:
first, when discussing what Bethlehem had exacted by duress, id. at 64, 71; and second, when stating
that in quantum meruit (which was the remedy for duress), Bethlehem deserved the fixed fee but not
the bonus, id. at 74-75. Likewise, in the section discussing unconscionability (which was premised on
quasi-duress), every reference to the savings format was conceptually incidental: as the form taken by
the inordinate profit, id. at 76; or as part of the facts of Burke & James, which was cited in this section
only for its theory of unconscionability (as part of a series of cases espousing that same general
doctrine), not for its theory of separate consideration, id. at 77-78. Similarly, in its petition for
certiorari, the government, in the first and most-developed of its reasons for granting the writ,
discussed profits and necessity broadly and referenced the savings contract only incidentally. Petition
for Writs of Certiorari, supra note 336, at 12-16. Direct discussion of the savings format was relegated
to later sections. Id. at i6-18. In a five-page recollection of the case years afterward, Jackson
mentioned the savings format only once, when discussing the abandoned theory of misrepresentation,
and even this reference he later crossed out. Jackson, supranote 257, at 995. His discussion otherwise
focused broadly on exploitative bargaining. Id. at 995-99.
It appears that Jackson and Frankfurter considered improper cost allowances, which were really
concealed profits, relevant to the analysis. In his handwritten notes for oral argument, Jackson noted
that the official profits did not include Bethlehem's sale of supplies to its subsidiary. Jackson, supra
note 385, at 5. Frankfurter mentioned this, as well as the general looseness of the contract's definition
of cost. Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 319-20, 323 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). These comments suggest that
the duress theory might later have been applied to recover such allowances, among other forms of
exorbitant profit.
388. Frankfurter said it was reasonable to judge large defense contracts "by standards not unlike
those by which a fiduciary's conduct is judged." Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 337.
389. Govt. S. Ct. Br., supra note 22o, at 24-30 (making the factual claim), 57 ("the only
justification which has ever been advanced for the bonus-for-savings clause is its alleged value as an
incentive for efficiency"), and 75 ("to receive payment beyond its fixed profit" in quantum meruit,
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contracts when it massively expanded its plant before 1917, meaning that
the prospect of profits from such contracts could not have led to its
investment decision;" and third, the profit was not commensurate with
the contract's low level of risk.39' The third premise was undeniable. The
second, judged by the limited fact-finding, was fairly solid.392 The first,
however, was contestable, as we have seen.393 Its contestability typified
the uncertainty that always plagued the process of re-pricing after
performance-an uncertainty that, under any regime (including the
Renegotiation Act), would inevitably entail error costs and
administrative costs. Those costs, however, had to be balanced against
the benefit of determining prices at a time of improved information and
more equal bargaining power.
The Justice Department concluded that the contract was invalid due
to duress, meaning that Bethlehem deserved only the fair value of its
services. The firm had achieved no more cost reduction, and assumed no
more risk, than it would have under a plain CPFF contract. Therefore, it
should receive the profit appropriate to such a CPFF contract, no more.
The typical CPFF contract for wartime shipbuilding, argued the
Department, had a fixed fee of about ten percent, the same as
Bethlehem's. So Bethlehem should get only its fixed fee.394
B.

GATHERING A QUORUM IN THE SUPREME COURT

Once the Justice Department filed its brief in January 1941, the
litigation hit one final snag. Three Justices recused themselves: Stone,
because he had supervised the litigation as Attorney General seventeen
years earlier; Roberts, because he had served as Master; and Frank
Murphy, because he had been Attorney General during the first
appeal.39 James C. McReynolds retired that same month, reducing the
Court below its quorum of six, so the case had to be postponed. 396 Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes then retired that June. The two vacancies
"Bethlehem must prove that it rendered some service, the value of which is reasonably measured by
the compensation claimed. This ... Bethlehem... cannot prove.... [T]he difference between the
estimated and actual cost of the vessels was not due to any increase of efficiency brought about by
Bethlehem's efforts.").
390. Id. at 56. The government also argued that the contract did not promise to pay such a subsidy
for investment. Id.
391. Id. at 62-63 ("In determining the amount of profits which can lawfully be exacted from the
Government in wartime contracts, regard should be had to the extent of the risk assumed by the
contractor"; "Bethlehem" took "no risk of loss whatever").
392. Id. at 56 (citing testimony).
393. See supra text accompanying notes 241-49.
394. Govt. S. Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 74-75.
395. For the names of the Justices recusing themselves, see Memorandum from "RS" to Robert H.
Jackson, Attorney General (Jan. 27, 1941) (Folder labeled "Legal File-Attorney GeneralBethlehem Steel Case," Box 86, RHJ-LC, supra note 22).
396. Id.
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were filled by James F. Byrnes, who as a Congressman had spurred the
Justice Department to press the litigation,"9 and Jackson, who was first
author of the brief."' While Byrnes seems never to have considered
recusing himself, Jackson had to. Now down to five Justices, the Court
could not hear the case. But as mobilization took off, Murphy changed
his mind in October and decided to sit.3" Argument was ultimately
scheduled for Tuesday, December 9, which turned out to be two days
after Pearl Harbor.m
C.

CORPORATE EXTORTION OF GOVERNMENT AS A NATIONAL
POLITICAL ISSUE

By accusing Bethlehem of coercing the government, the Justice
Department was entering a heated political debate over the balance of
power in business-government relations, an issue central to both World
Wars and the New Deal. During that era, the most telling distinction in
American political economy was not between Republicans and
Democrats, nor even between advocates of laissez-faire and of
government intervention. Instead, it was between two different attitudes
toward the role of bureaucratic planning in economic life. On one side
were those who believed that the rise of large corporate bureaucracies
and industrial concentration was a good thing, whether as an end in itself
or as a stepping stone toward government administration of the
economy. On the opposite side were those who believed that mass
administrative organization was damaging to efficiency and dangerous to
freedom, and who therefore preferred a decentralized system of
economic decision-making. Ellis W. Hawley, in his classic study The New
Deal and the Problem of Monopoly,4 "' labeled the former group
"corporatists" and the latter group "antitrusters." The distinction
obviously obscures differences of opinion within the two camps, but it
does capture the crux of the national debate.
The corporatists defined their program in opposition to the
nineteenth-century economic system, in which numerous small
businesses competed intensely with one another. This system, in the eyes
of the corporatists, had produced too-high output at too-low prices,
erased profits (particularly as new technologies created economies of
397. The dispute had been kept confidential until Byrnes broadcast it to the nation. HESSEN, supra
note 192, at 261-62. In 1924, he took to the House floor and attacked the Attorney General for
dragging his feet in bringing the case, accusing him of coziness with Bethlehem directors. [Byrnes]
Asserts Daughtery Favors C.M. Schwab, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1924, at 4.
398. Govt. S.Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 87.
399. High Court Will Hear the Bethlehem Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1941, at 38 ("Justice Murphy
Decides to Sit."). Murphy said he had "naught to do with the case" as Attorney General. J. WOODFORD
HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 279 (1968).

400. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 289 (942).
401. ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966).
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scale that raised fixed costs), increased risk, discouraged investment,
caused rampant bankruptcies, and created a dangerously volatile
business cycle with severe bouts of unemployment. The nightmare finally
lifted when, in the late I8oos and early I9OOs, industry after industry
became concentrated in large corporations whose vast bureaucracies
replaced chaos with rationality. Large bureaucracies made marketing
possible, empowering the firm to measure and shape demand. And as
firms became fewer and larger, it became possible to restrict output so as
not to exceed demand. As a result, corporations could maintain high
prices, control risk, and invite continuous investment, thus guaranteeing
high wages, technological advance, and stable growth. These results
could be further assured if industries became concentrated and if
executives at different firms openly cooperated with each other to limit
output to a rational level. Under this new system, executives would be
motivated not by competition, but rather industrial statesmanship. Some
of the leading advocates of this position were, not surprisingly, corporate
executives themselves, such as Gary of U.S. Steel. These business leaders
did not believe in laissez-faire. Granted, they wanted to abolish certain
forms of government intervention (e.g., antitrust). But aside from that,
they wanted the state to actively support inter-firm cooperation and
planning. With the establishment of the National Recovery
Administration (NRA) in i933, these executives largely got their wish:
the Act empowered each industry to form its own cartel and use the law
to enforce the rules of the cartel against recalcitrant firms. This might be
called the right-wing version of corporatism. In the left-wing version, the
executives, rather than planning the economy on their own, would serve
as technocrats to implement the decisions of elected officials. Faith in
corporate bureaucratic planning as the key to social welfare united the
two versions.4"'
This was anathema to the antitrusters, who looked back fondly on
the nineteenth-century system of competition between small businesses.
That system, so they argued, diffused power and thereby preserved the
social equality and personal independence necessary to democracy and
freedom. At the economic level, the antitrusters believed that small-unit
competition benefited everyone because it forced down prices and made
goods plentiful, thus raising the purchasing power of all workers.
Industrial concentration resulted not from superior efficiency but unfair
government favoritism. Giant bureaucracies did not represent a better
way of doing business, but were instead instruments by which private
persons could manipulate the economy for their own benefit. If an
industry became concentrated, the best response was to make it
402.

See

HAWLEY,

supra note 4oi, at 19-28o. For a similar, more recent, analysis, see

supra note 16, at 31-47.

BRINKLEY,
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competitive again by using the antitrust laws to prevent the abuse of
market power and to break up large firms (except in rare cases when
bigness really was more efficient, such as public utilities, for which the
best response was public ownership or tight regulation to keep prices
low).4 '
To committed antitrusters, it was deeply significant that
concentrated bureaucratic power rested largely in the hands of private
corporations. This empirical fact, they believed, meant that any kind of
economic planning would inevitably serve the interests of those
corporations. It was not a stretch to make this prediction about the rightwing version of corporatism, under which executives would simply run
the economy as they pleased, with nothing but their supposed good faith
to hold them accountable. Yet the antitrusters were similarly wary about
the left-wing version of corporatism. While socialist dreamers might
envision a world in which corporate technocrats did the bidding of
elected officials, the antitrusters recognized that the corporations
themselves actually embodied and controlled the vast bureaucracies that
made planning possible, which gave them leverage over any officials who
attempted to regulate them.
Jackson, the leading voice of the antitrusters in the late 1930S,
articulated this point. To begin with, he was suspicious of all
bureaucracy. "Bureaucracy or regimentation of any kind is distasteful,"
he declared in 1938.44 "Plain and practical people," he wrote that same
year, "have an instinct that a distant and none too well equipped
bureaucracy is not an effective or acceptable force to control the mass of
detailed transaction necessary to even a simple business.""4 5 Besides,
regardless of bureaucracy's benefits, American political culture was
unlikely to tolerate a big public administrative class. Government
regulation of business, Jackson argued, "calls for more foresight in
recruiting consistently competent minor public servants and giving them
adequate pay and security than the present state of the American
political mind is willing to recognize."'° The lack of such public servants
was fatal, he thought, for regulation "is a fundamental problem of man
power." "In practice," he explained, "regulation means complicated and
continuous negotiations," and it was foolish to assume that "now or in
the immediate future we have or will get, in government, adequate
numbers of adequate men to represent the public interest in those

403. HAWLEY, supra note 401, at 280-379; see also BRINKLEY, supra note 16, at 48-64.
404. Robert H. Jackson & Edward Dumbauld, Monopolies and the Courts, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 231,
237 (938).
405. Robert H. Jackson, FinancialMonopoly: The Road to Socialism, FORUM, Dec. 1938, at 303,
304.
4o6. Id. at 307.

November 2005]

DURESS IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING

negotiations."4 7 Contrary to what corporatists believed, the government
could not tame or use corporations without itself possessing the massive
bureaucratic machinery required to monitor and hold them accountable.
"It is naive," Jackson attested, "to suppose that a few public
representatives in an industrial conference, by the sheer force of their
moral or intellectual suasion, will be able to stand up against the
resourcefulness and power which private enterprise can command."""
Corporatism would be "little more than the legal sanctification of the
status quo" of ever-increasing corporate power.4' The government, in the
eyes of Jackson and his colleagues, should refuse to take part in the
corporations' game of bureaucratic endeavor, whether as a partner or as
a supervisor, for it was not equal to the task, and in doing so, it opened
itself to capture and exploitation by private interests.
Total war was central to the controversy between corporatists and
antitrusters. Whatever their political beliefs, everybody had to admit the
impossibility of national mobilization without mass administrative
coordination. Modern warfare obliged the government to take advantage
of all existing bureaucratic capacity and, therefore, to cooperate with
corporations. To corporatists, this was a terrific opportunity. The
government's hour of need gave businessmen the chance to run the
economy in the rational fashion they had always known to be best. For
decades after World War I, advocates of industrial cooperation cited the
effort of 1917-I918 as the model of how the economy should work:
executives of different firms, motivated by patriotic statesmanship rather
than competition, conferred with each other to avoid waste and calibrate
output to the demand of the consumer, in this case the government, with
high prices and high profits encouraging investment in needed additional
capacity.4" ' Indeed, when the NRA took power in 1933, it modeled itself
on Baruch's WIB and presented its program as a kind of war effort.4" '
Antitrusters conceded that total war necessitated some government
partnership with the business bureaucracy. Rather than a grand social
experiment, however, the antitrusters considered this a serious danger.
Many antitrusters wanted to avoid it at any cost, and so they turned to
isolationism. For antitrusters
like
Jackson who embraced
internationalism, total war still involved a painful violation of their
beliefs. "[A] war economy," Jackson once declared, "is completely at

407.
408.
409.
410.

Id.
Id.
Id.

See KENNEDY, supra note 50, at 134-35 (noting WIB mentality of high prices and profits for
high production).
411. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The New Deal and the Analogue of War, in CHANGE AND
CONTINurry IN TWENTIETH-CEN-rURY AMERICA 81, 120-22 (John Braeman et al. eds., 1964).
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'
odds with the free economy that is implied in free competition."412
The
antitrusters subjected wartime corporatism to a double critique. First, it
was bad policy: though corporatists professed that high prices were
necessary to cover increased costs and new investment, big contractors
were in fact taking advantage of market power to put more money in the
pockets of their executives and shareholders.4 3 Second, corporatism was
implemented by undemocratic means: war contractors, exploiting their
monopoly power over much-needed management capacity, forced the
policy on the rest of the country. Corporatism's dominance in World War
I did not reflect its effectiveness or popularity, but merely the public's
acquiescence in the face of concentrated power. Antitrusters repeatedly
compared corporations with robbers and striking workers (a group often
condemned for coercive tactics). If the government had to rely on private
steel companies in a future war, warned the Southern populist Benjamin
Tillman, it would "be unmercifully robbed."4 4 The prices ultimately paid
to those firms, declared Mississippi Senator James K. Vardaman in 1917,
'
amounted to a "hold-up pure and simple."415
The wartime practices of
steel and copper companies, fumed North Dakota Senator Gerald P. Nye
in 1935, constituted a "strike," one "carried on behind closed doors," in
which the firms "won higher profits as a result of their delay." That same
year, Nye's committee cited a wartime "strike of capital," defined as "the
use by business of its power of forcing price concessions from the
Government by making that a condition of continued production."' 6
The Depression, from the antitrusters' perspective, provided a
similar opportunity for business to extort the government. Elected
officials needed immediate production to lift their constituents out of
poverty, and to get it in the short term, they had to induce business to
cooperate. When executives conditioned renewed production on profitfriendly policies, they were again denounced as robbers and strikers.
Roosevelt himself privately indulged in this rhetoric. Speaking to a
colleague in 1937, he postulated "that business was deliberately causing
the depression in order to hold a pistol to his head and force a retreat
from the New Deal. 4 17 Later that year, Jackson, in a national radio
address that made him famous, responded to business demands for
government cooperation by announcing, in an apparently unconscious
echo of Nye, that the nation faced a "strike of capital.', 8 It was "a

412. Jackson, supra note 257, at 830.
413. A good example of this argument can be found in Prices and Social Policy, NEW REPUBLIC,
Feb. 17, 1941, at 243. This question was also debated between Bethlehem President Eugene Grace and

the Nye Committee. See Nye Hearings,supra note 143, at 5746, 5751-52, 5754-59.
414. UROFSKY, supra note 28, at 133 (citation omitted).
415. Id. at 205 (citation omitted).

416. Nye Comm. Report, supra note 61, at 94.
417. HAWLEY, supra note 401, at 389 (citation omitted).

418. Robert H. Jackson, The Menace to Free Enterprise, Address to the American Political
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general strike-the first general strike in America-a strike against the
government-a strike to coerce political action."4 '9 "Uncle Sam" was
being "told to stick up his hands and deliver over his utilities program,
his monopoly program, his social security program and his tax program
to one or another interested group."'
Lest Americans forget the true meaning of what big business was
asking for, Jackson reminded them of the corporatist experiment of
1917-1918. The war, he explained in another national radio address that
same week, was "one of the most notable instances of cooperation
between government and big business, on the latter's own terms."42' The
results, as Jackson recounted them, were grim:
[There were] almost continuous appeals by President Wilson and by
the [War Industries] Board itself to big business to keep prices down so
that goods might continue to flow to the trenches and among the home
population on whose activities production depended. Meanwhile, as
the Government's contribution to cooperation, anti-trust prosecution
was abandoned, the government paid for its purchases pretty much
what was asked and general prices were fixed at profiteering levels,
because big business would not "cooperate" on any other terms. The
results of that cooperation were a further stride toward monopoly by
the biggest aggregations of capital in American industry and a ghastly
waste of the nation's money under pressure of war.4"

As they had in the war, so now in the Depression, corporations were
"profiteering at the expense of national recovery.' 423 The war experience
was a standing warning against corporatism: "What big business has
previously done in the name of 'cooperation' is too well remembered for
us to commit ourselves to it again in the dark."' 4
Although the nation did not commit itself to corporatism in 1937, it
could hardly resist in 1940, with the rising Axis threat and the immediate
need for large war contracts. As Roosevelt recruited business executives
for the new National Defense Advisory Council (NDAC), liberals sensed
the return of corporatism. "With the possible exception of the NRA,"
warned one journalist, "the NDAC represents the greatest concentration
of big-business influence ever seen in Washington. 2' 45 "[M]ost of the old
NRA gang," worried John T. Flynn, a former associate of Nye, "are
Science Association 2 (Dec.
RHJ-LC, supra note 22).

29,

1937) (Folder labeled "Subject File-'Strike of Capital,"' Box 30,

419. Id.

Id. at 3.
Robert H. Jackson, Business Confidence and Government Policy, Address for Broadcast
Over the Mutual Broadcasting System 3 (Dec. 26, 1937) (Box 200, Raymond Clapper Papers,
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).
422. Id. (emphasis added).
423. Id. at 5.
424. Id. at 3.
425. Jonathan Mitchell, Is Our Defense Lagging?,NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 26, 1940, at 265, 267.
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moving in on Washington under the banner of national defense. '' , 6 In
exchange for taking on the risky enterprise of war production,
contractors were demanding more business-friendly financial rules for
contracts, lower profits taxes, and the relaxation of antitrust
enforcement. "[T]he industrialists in whose plants our war materials are
to be manufactured," announced the New Republic, "believe that they
can drive a hard bargain.' 4 7 Again came the accusations of a hold-up and
a strike. Bruce Bliven asked whether "we have reached a point where
any industry can hold up the government of the United States at the
point of a blackmail letter."4s I.F. Stone denounced the "Sitdown Strike
of Capital,"" 9 while the New Republic ran the headline, "Arms Makers'
Sit-Down."43 '
These coercive tactics, as liberals saw it, yielded handsome returns
for business. The chief of the Antitrust Division, Thurman W. Arnold,
reported to Jackson in early 1940 that "certain large business interests
are in a position to take advantage of... the Government... when the
war expenditures program gets well under way."43' Despite this warning,
antitrust prosecution eventually became a "casualty of the war effort."432
Further, Congress overhauled the tax system in the Second Revenue Act,
passed on October 8, 1940. In the key industries of shipbuilding and
aviation, the Act scrapped the absolute caps on profit as a percentage of
cost that had governed defense contracts since the mid-1930s.433 In place
of these caps, Congress adopted a graduated tax ostensibly designed to
control gains from defense. The Roosevelt administration had pushed for
a relatively tough law, but when Congress proved reluctant to pass a tax
during an election year, and key committee members stubbornly
defended the interests of major firms, the President took what he could
get.434 In its final form, the Act allowed companies a choice of how to
calculate defense profits, creating a huge loophole. Although taxation
was inherently limited as an instrument to control war profits, the
426. John T. Flynn, Other People's Money: One-Man Fight, NEW
585.

REPUBLIC,

Oct. 28, I94O, at 585,

427. Business and Blackmail, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 1940, at 295, 295.
428. Bruce Bliven, Get Tough, Mr. President!,NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. I6, 1940, at 377, 378.
429. I.F. STONE, BUSINESS As USUAL 157 (1941).
43o. T.R.B., Arms Makers' Sit-Down, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, i94o, at 351.

431. Letter from Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attorney General, to Robert H. Jackson, Attorney
General (Jan. 15, 1940) (Folder labeled "Legal File-Attorney General-Antitrust Activities-War
Materials Industries," Box 85, RHJ-LC, supra note 22). On Arnold's conviction that antitrust law was
necessary to protect the government in wartime, see Thurman W. Arnold, Antitrust Activities of the
Department of Justice, 19 OR. L. REV. 22 (939); Thurman Arnold, Defense and Restraints of Trade,
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weakness of this statute was especially striking. U.S. Steel more than
doubled its profits in 1940 but avoided the tax completely. 435 Bethlehem,
soon to become the nation's biggest defense contractor, 4" received more
than a billion dollars in defense money by the end of I940.43' It saw its
annual profits jump from $i9million to $48 million, yet the tax cost it
only $imillion."
Some defended this type of policy as a necessary compromise to
jump-start the war effort. "If you are going... to prepare for war in a
capitalist country," wrote Secretary of War Henry Stimson, "you have
got to let business make money out of the process or business won't
work."439 To liberals, it was a crushing defeat. The Act, complained one
commentator, was "one of the most shameless pieces of lobby-written
legislation passed in many years."' It wrote "profiteering into law.""'
The New Republic branded it a "Sham."" 2 The economist George Soule
called it a "joke.""13 Jackson, as a member of the cabinet, held his tongue.
Years later, however, he recalled how Roosevelt had been "obliged to
appeal for the cooperation of business men" at immense cost." "As we
moved into a war economy," he remembered, "the anti-trust policy [and]
taxation... were moving in a direction that I didn't like. I wasn't happy
in the situation." 445
Corporations' exploitation of their wartime bargaining power
against the government, then, was a big issue for Jackson. The duress
theory in the Bethlehem appeal translated this political theme into a legal
argument, right down to the problem's origin-the inequality of
bureaucratic capacity. The Third Circuit and the Master, after all, both
stated that the EFC could not accomplish its mission without
Bethlehem's existing organization." 6 This created the opportunity for, as
the antitrusters would say, a hold-up. Indeed, Jackson put the problem in
exactly these terms when he looked back on the case years later. Picking
up on Dickinson's image of Bethlehem's conduct as "daylight robbery"
without deception,"7 Jackson stated: "My proposition was a very simple
435. Max Gissen, Tax Excess Profits!, NEw REPUBLIC, June 2, 1941, at 755; E.D. Kennedy, War
REPUBLIC, Oct. 27, I94I, at 529, 529.
436. Higgs, supra note 21, at 186.
437. Robertson, supra note 98, at 781.
438. What Excess Profits Tax?, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 6, 1941, at 4.
439. Henry Stimson, Diary (Aug. 26, 1940), quoted in KENNEDY, supra note 62, at 622.
44o. Gissen, supra note 435, at 755.
441. Id.
442. Excess Profits Sham, supra note 433, at 467.
443. George Soule, The Fear of Plenty, NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 31, 1941, at 425,425.
444. Jackson, supra note 257, at 966.
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one-that you can no more rob the government than you can deceive
it."" 4 He elaborated: "At a time when the government was engaged in a
war and under the utmost necessity for production, and this corporation
had the facilities which the government didn't have, to hold it up in that
fashion was not only morally wrong, but a legal wrong.""
The sources do not disclose which attorney in the Justice
Department first pushed the idea of arguing duress.45 Whoever it was,
the theory resonated strongly with Jackson's politics, and so he
essentially stepped out of his role as Attorney General and made himself
Solicitor General for the purpose of the appeal, signing his name first on
the brief and planning to handle the oral argument personally.45 ' In his
handwritten notes for that argument, under the heading "Theory of
'
Relief," the first words were: "War necessity equal duress."452
The
Supreme Court's rejection of the government's case crushed Jackson.
Admitting that he was "damned prejudiced" about the matter, he wrote
to Douglas that "I cannot understand the decision of the court in this
case. I really regard it as the dirtiest day's work the Court has ever done
and a defeat for the Government worse than Pearl Harbor. ' 453 Years
afterward, he said it "was one of the shocks of my experience
on the
454
Court that this case was treated that way. I never got over it.
It may seem odd that Roosevelt allowed his Justice Department to
try to control contractors' profits through the courts, even as he
acquiesced in the generous profit policies of Congress. Pointing out the
inconsistency, a conservative journalist lamented that the "left hand
45
'5
doesn't know what the right hand is doing in Government today.
However, Roosevelt often allowed his subordinates to pursue
contradictory policies at the same time, waiting to see which worked best.
As the President himself once quipped, "I never let my right hand know

448. Jackson, supra note 257, at 997.
449. Id.
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what my left hand does. 51456
D. A NEW

UNDERSTANDING OF DURESS

Hold-up, robbery, necessity, strike, pressure of war-these rhetorical
shafts drew their force from one of the foundational distinctions in
American culture: the difference between freedom and coercion. In
political debate, this distinction possessed an obvious, even visceral,
intuitive meaning. But as a matter of law, it was a slippery, indeterminate
doctrine, not necessarily suited to the Justice Department's needs. In its
brief, the Justice Department re-shaped the doctrine into something new.
Before the modem era, duress had no independent meaning. It was
an appendage of crime and tort: if someone made a promise under threat
of conduct that was itself criminal or tortious, the courts would not
enforce it. Initially confined to threats of physical harm, this variety of
duress was extended in the 1700s to threatened economic harm, so long
as it was unlawful in itself.45 7 Duress might have retained this narrow
scope had Chancery not invented a related doctrine called undue
influence. In cases of undue influence, judges refused to enforce
promises extracted via threats (including economic ones) against persons

who were elderly, weak, or vulnerable in some other way. Significantly,
the finding of coercion did not require the threatened conduct to be
unlawful in itself. If a man threatened to do what he otherwise had a
legal right to do, his threat might still be actionable, depending on the
subjective effect of the threat on the other party. At the time it was
invented in the i6oos and I700s, undue influence was not especially
groundbreaking; it was just another paternalist limit on the capacity to
contract.
However, because undue influence switched focus from the legal
status of the threatened act to the mental state of the victim, the doctrine
fit nicely with nineteenth-century liberalism. In the liberal view, the end
of feudalism meant the breakdown of rigid, ascriptive power relations. In
their place came market society, a domain of social fluidity in which
personal will and initiative went unconstrained. In this world, a contract
came about because each party, free to do as it chose, affirmatively
wanted to make the agreement. In this context, undue influence came to
be understood more broadly as "the interference with another's will,
which should ideally be free. The test for the existence of undue
influence became.., whether or not the individual will had been
'overpowered."' 459 Thus redefined, undue influence fused with duress
456. BRANDES, supra note 26, at 232 (citation omitted).
457. John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 254-62
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when the barrier between law and equity crumbled in the late i8oos. The
purpose of the unified doctrine was to protect free will."'
Essentially psychological, the new definition officially held sway well
into the twentieth century. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared in
1912 that the "test of duress is not so much the means by which the party
was compelled to execute the contract as it is the state of mind induced
by the means employed-the fear which made it impossible for him to
exercise his own free will." 6' This rule was quoted by the Corpus Juris
Secundum, published in 1917 and cited by courts for decades afterward.46 '
Earl C. Arnold, later the Dean of Vanderbilt Law School,' 63 quoted it
when writing in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review in 1928 to
back up the premise that "duress is now viewed subjectively. ' 64 "The
trend of the modern decisions," wrote a student in 1941, was to ask,
"Was the free agency or will power of the duressee subverted or coerced
by the conduct of the duressor? ' '6 Another student, commenting on the
Bethlehem appeal, explained that the purpose of economic duress was
' 46 to
restore payments "made by one who was in fact deprived of his will. 1 1
Despite the prevalence of the free-will psychology, the Justice
Department argued duress in a manner that eschewed that principle. The
brief never used the terms will, consent, voluntary, involuntary, agency,
volition, overcome, deprive, or any other subjective psychological
terms. 6 7 With respect to the question of coercion, the government never
mentioned the state of mind of any official. 468 Rather, the duress
argument focused solely on the objective, external economic
circumstances surrounding the EFC. To go without the ships would put
the war effort in jeopardy; to seize the plant would undermine efficiency
and likewise damage the war effort. Hence, the EFC had "no choice but
to accept whatever terms Bethlehem insisted upon." 46 It was thereby
460. Id. at 265.
461. Fountain v. Bigham, 84 A. 131, 135 (Pa. 1912).
462. See Central Acceptance Corp. v. Nash Bluefield Motor Co., 139 S.E. 654, 656 (W. Va. 1927)
(citing 13 C.J.S. § 319 (1917)); see also Slade v. Slade, 33 N.E.2d 951, 954 (I11.
App. Ct. 1941); Coleman
v. Crescent Insulated Wire & Cable Co., i68 S.W.2d io6o, lo66-67 (Mo. 1943) (citing 17 C.J.S.
Contracts § 175).
463. See Earl C. Arnold, Book Review, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 298, 299 (I939).
464. Earl C. Arnold, Availability of Duress and Fraud upon the Principalas Defenses to the Surety
and Guarantor,77 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 28 n.20 (1928).
465. Lyndon Sturgis, Comment, Duress:A Double Concept, 6 Mo. L. REv. 73,75 (i94I).
466. Bernard Stolbun, Comment, Economic Duress and Contractual Liability-The Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Case, 21 TEX. L. REv. 56, 63 (1942).
467. These terms are absent from the duress argument in Govt. S.Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 63-75.
468. The Justice Department did discuss how Piez relied on Powell for judgment about ships, but
this was to show that he could not make an independent judgment about the fairness of the price,
meaning that Powell's letter to him was meaningless. This had nothing to do with the question of
whether any official was coerced to do anything. Id. at 65 n.I9.
469. Id. at 63; see also id. ("no alternative"); id. ("without alternative choice"); id. at 65 ("no real
freedom to reject"); id. at 66 ("compelling circumstances"); id. at 66 ("a real choice").
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"forced to make" the contract at Bethlehem's price.47 "[W]hen the life of
the nation is at stake," explained the brief, "the Government officials
charged with the responsibility of securing necessary ships and material
cannot refuse to enter into contracts simply because the demands are
unreasonably high." 7 ' This was not a normal market transaction, in
47
which "both buyer and seller have freedom to refuse.""
These
circumstances formed the basis for the lower courts' "findings of
compulsion" and confirmed the "coercive effect" of the transaction.473
One might argue, of course, that the invocation of objective
economic circumstances was nothing new in the law of duress. While
courts typically emphasized the deprivation of free will, their unspoken
test for such deprivation often turned on just how desperate the
circumstances seemed to be.474 But even so, the very fact that judges cast
an evaluation of market circumstances as a supposedly categorical
determination about one party's mental state was itself significant: this
rhetoric allowed courts to avoid openly setting bounds on permissible
market action. It allowed them to avoid the appearance of regulating.
But the Justice Department refused to play the game of analyzing states
of mind. Instead, it exposed the systemic market failure of wartime for
what it was.
The true evil that came of this market failure, as the Justice
Department explained it, was not interference in the mental process by
which some party exercised its will, but the substantive maldistribution of
resources-the flow of public money into private hands for nothing in
return. As a preface to its duress argument, the Justice Department spent
twelve pages trying to show that Bethlehem's profits were "inordinate"
in light of such factors as cost reduction, investment incentives, and
risk.475
We cannot be certain of the intellectual sources of the Justice
Department's theory, since the drafting attorneys' notes have not
survived. Significantly, however, law professors in the 192os and I930s
had developed striking new theories of freedom, coercion, and duress.
Especially important was Robert L. Hale's work on the practical
meaning of coercion, which in turn motivated John P. Dawson to
470. Id. at 63; see also id. at 66 (contract "imposed" on the EFC); id. at 74 ("exacted by the force of
a national emergency").
47!. Id. at 66-67; see also id. at 66 ("could not refuse to enter into the contracts"); id. at 67
("circumstances which in fact make refusal impossible").
472. Id. at 67.
473. Id. at 66, 68; see also id. at 68 ("moral compulsion"); id. at 69 ("compulsion"); id. at 70
("compulsion of an overriding national emergency"). The word "coercion" was used only once, in the
instance cited in the text above.
474. See the cases summarized in Annotation, Doctrine of "Business Compulsion," 79 A.L.R. 655,
658-68 (1932).
475. Govt. S. Ct. Br., supra note 22o, at 51-63.
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reformulate the doctrine of duress. We know that the Justice
Department attorneys drafting the brief had read Dawson's work on
duress, 4"6 and the influence of both scholars seems evident throughout
the document.
Let us begin by considering Hale's ideas. One of the first
professional academics accredited in both law and economics, Hale
taught at Columbia from the 91ios through the 1940s. He was basically a
Lockean individualist, but "of a sort unrecognizable to traditional
47' 7
liberals," since he insisted on "a functional definition of autonomy.
Traditional liberals posited a private sphere of property and contract in
which all persons enjoyed liberty to do as they pleased, liberty being
defined negatively as the lack of private coercion and governmental
constraint. But Hale, in a 1923 article, argued that this supposedly free
private sphere was necessarily pervaded by coercive governmental
power. When the government protects property, as Hale put it,
"[p]assively, it is abstaining from interference with the owner when he
deals with the thing owned; actively, it is forcing the non-owner to desist
from handling it, unless the owner consents.14 8 Laissez-faire advocates
might counter that the state's use of force merely prevented the nonowner from using force against the owner. But that was not accurate,
argued Hale, for "the non-owner is forbidden to handle the owner's
property even
where his handling of it involves no violence or force
479
whatever. ,
Bargaining, the cornerstone of the market system, was inherently
coercive, since each party's ultimate recourse was to walk away from the
deal-to exercise the power, backed by state coercion, of forcing the
other party not to use the resources bargained for. This was key. A
worker who owns no productive property "must eat. While there is no
law against eating in the abstract, there is a law which forbids him to eat
any of the food which actually exists in the community." 4 ° That law is the
law of property, which "compels [the worker] to starve if he has no
wages, and compels him to go without wages unless he obeys the behests
of some employer. It is the law that coerces him into wage-work under
penalty of starvation."4"' Of course, coercion is a two-way street, since the
employer's "fear that [workers] will exercise the threat to work
elsewhere" causes the employer to increase wages, and in so doing, "he
476. See id. at 67 (citing Dawson's work).
477. FRIED, supra note I, at 7 (referring to early twentieth-century progressives generally, of which
Hale is Fried's chief example).
478. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. ScI.
0.470. 471 (1923)479. Id.
480. Id. at 472.

481. Id. at 473.
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48
submits by so much to [the workers'] wills. 2 .
Having demonstrated that "nearly all incomes are the result of
private coercion," Hale concluded that "to admit the coercive nature of
[a] process" should not be "to condemn it. 483" Traditional liberals thought
in terms of categories: freedom (good), coercion (bad). Hale, by contrast,
defined freedom functionally as the power to actually do one thing or
resist doing another, and so he recognized that freedom for some people
typically entailed constraints on other people. Freedom was not a neutral
default that the government violated through regulation, but rather a
scarce resource that any government necessarily had to choose to
distribute in some way. To take away the owner's control of a factory and
hand it over to a state official "would neither add to nor subtract from
the constraint which is exercised with the aid of the government. It would
merely transfer the constraining power to a different set of persons. It
might result in greater or in less actual power of free initiative all
around," but that was an empirical question.4" Whether a system of
laissez-faire "would be more or less 'free' (in the sense of giving people
greater power to express their wills) than would a state of communism,
depends largely on the economic results of communism respecting the
character of factory work." ' The "economic results" of the system and
the "character" of the work were paramount because they decided how
much actual, positive power/freedom each individual would possess.
In the liberal concept of economic duress, all market action was
voluntary unless taken under pressure of threats that overcame the will.
Under Hale's view of the market, this definition made no sense. What
did "voluntary" mean? Say that it simply meant that the person willed to
do the act. This definition was over-broad: a person still willed to do an
act even when motivated by the threat of bad consequences for not doing
it. Indeed, the person willed to do the act with more alacrity the more
terrifying the consequences of failing to act. 486 Say instead that
"voluntary" meant the person had every desire to do the act, and no
desire not to do it. That definition captured a much narrower range of
market action than liberal theory would have it, for market actors almost
never got exactly the price they wanted. Indeed, if a firm got the price it
asked for, it regretted not having demanded a more favorable price.
From Hale's perspective, the very essence of a market decision was that
it took place within a matrix of pressures exerted by the various parties.
The relevant issue, then, was the economic situation and the set of

482. Id. at 474.
483. Id.

484. Id. at 478.
485. Id.
486. Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A
Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 149, 149-50 (I935).

Comparison of "Political" and "Economic"

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vo1. 57:93

alternatives, consequences, and pressures that it entailed, not the
specious, pseudo-psychological question of whether an act was
"voluntary."
This shift in focus fit with the Justice Department's fixation on
objective market circumstances. The "full use of Bethlehem's facilities,"
it explained, was "vital" to the "prosecution of the war,"' 87 meaning that
the government effectively lost the option to withhold its business-the
primary source of power for any bargainer. This made the "situation
quite different from that of the private concern which seeks the
''
construction of ships, or the performance of other business contracts. 48
For the private firm, "the need for the ships is purely economic; if the
contractor demands too much, the owner will have no desire for the
ships, for his opportunities of profit will vanish as the cost of the ship
goes up. '"489 This creates an "automatic limit to the price upon which the
contractor can insist."' '4' That limit did not exist in a large war
transaction; the contractor possessed "unqualified power to exact such
terms as he chooses. ' 49 ' This "unqualified power" got closer to the true
issue than did the voluntary or involuntary nature of the weaker party's
decision.
Was there a way to invoke this issue within the existing framework
of the common law? Mainstream commentators had, at the very least,
sensed the inadequacy of "free will" as a rule of decision. Consider the
Restatement (First)of Contracts, published in 1932. On the one hand, it
trumpeted the will theory: "The test of what act or threat produces the
required degree of fear is not objective.... The question is rather, did it
put one entering into the transaction in such fear as to preclude the
exercise by him of free will and judgment. '49' However, the Restatement
added that the preclusion of free will was not enough for duress unless,
on top of that, some act or threatened act of the duressor was "wrongful"
in some objective way. 49 A wrongful act might be criminal or tortious, or
merely "wrongful in a moral sense. ' ' 49' Admitting that it was "impossible
to enumerate all conceivable kinds of wrongful acts," the authors
included a residual category of "other wrongful acts" at the end of their
definition of duress. 495 Similarly, Samuel Williston, in the 1936-1938
edition of his treatise, made a sweeping declaration of the will theory:
487. Govt. S.Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 64.
488. Id. at 66.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492 cmt. a (1932).

493. Id. § 492 cmt. g. The illustrations make clear that the Restatement is referring to wrongfulness
both of acts and threatened acts.
494- Id.
495. Id. § 493 & cmt. a.
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"The real and ultimate fact to be determined in every case is whether or
not the party really had a choice-whether 'he had his freedom of
exercising his will."'" 6 Yet he added that the "pressure must be wrongful,
'
and not all pressure is wrongful."497

The Justice Department might have argued that Bethlehem's threat,
i.e. to not enter into the contract, violated a patriotic duty and was
therefore "wrongful in a moral sense." A court's acceptance of this
stance would have required an awkward judicial innovation, since the
determination of which firms were obligated to serve the government
during wartime was accorded by statute to the executive, through its
power to issue production orders or seize firms. For a judge to impose a
duty on a contractor to accept a war order, even when the executive had
not officially mandated such acceptance, would cut against the common
law aversion to general affirmative duties. Refusal to participate in the
war effort was nonfeasance, not malfeasance."'
The lack of a wrongful threatened act placed the transaction within a
special class of duress cases that the authorities had trouble explaining.
These were the cases, as Williston put it, where "a party is constrained to
enter into a transaction.., by force of circumstances for which the other
party is not responsible."4 The difficulty was obvious: the only
threatened act by the "other party" in such a case would be not to enter
the contract, which, in a free market, could not be wrongful.
"[C]ertainly," cautioned Williston, "there is no broad doctrine forbidding
a person from taking advantage of the adversity of another to drive a
hard bargain."5" Yet, if the desperate circumstances were "known and
advantage taken of them by the other party[,] a degree of pressure which
would not ordinarily amount to duress, might have such coercive effect as
to invalidate a transaction."5 ' The "might" was an unsatisfying hedge.

496. SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (rev. ed.
1936-1938) § 1603 (quoting Joannin v. Ogilvie, 52 N.W. 217, 218 (Minn. 1892)). For criticism of
Williston's confusion between subjective and objective notions of duress, see John Dalzell, Duress by
Economic PressureI, 2o N.C. L. REV. 237 n.3 (1942).
497. WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra note 496, § 16o6.
498. The general common law principle was that nonfeasance was not actionable. Granted, the
issue here is not whether nonfeasance was itself actionable, but whether a contract based on a threat of
nonfeasance was enforceable. The Restatement (First) of Contracts, in explaining the wrongfulness
element of duress, made a distinction between (I) threats of acts that were both wrongful and
actionable, and (2) threats of acts that were wrongful yet not actionable, but which the courts would
not permit parties to use to induce others to enter contracts. The examples given in the Restatement,
however, show that the authors were thinking of affirmative acts, not refusals to act. Examples
included threats to expose a cheater at cards, to use one's influence with bankers to stop the victim
from getting a loan, and to expose the victim's drinking habits. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS
§ 493 illus. 17-19 (1932).

499.

WILLISTON

& THOMPSON, supra note 496, § i608.

500. Id. § 1618.

5O1. Id. § 16o8 (emphasis added).
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Besides, as Hale showed, a term like "coercive effect" was conclusory.
As for what really decided these cases, Williston had no answer.
The true meaning of duress in these cases had nothing to do with the
voluntary or involuntary nature of the desperate party's assent, for a
party desperate to prevent some terrible evil very much needs and wants
to undertake all transactions necessary to avert it. That the party felt
pressure to make the agreement did not distinguish the case, for market
transactions by their very nature are made under pressure. Perhaps, then,
the high level of pressure made for duress. Even that was not right, for
surely there was no duress when a party, under immense pressure to buy
some service, contracted for it at a fairprice. Only in the case of an unfair
price would the court annul the transaction. In other words, in cases like
these, the defining element of duress was the substantive unfairness of
the exchange, not its procedural trappings (voluntariness, wrongful
threat, etc.). The defining characteristic that covered all cases of duress
was not the type or level of pressure, but rather the use of that pressure
for distributive ends that the court considered unfair.
This explanation of economic duress fit with Hale's concept of the
market, for, rather than rely on the presence of overpowering pressure
(which, by definition, was present in every bargain), it looked to the
substantive ends for which the strong party used that pressure. The first
scholar to posit this price-based explanation was Dawson, who was, not
surprisingly, a follower of Hale. "Any discussions in the field of
economic duress," thought Dawson, "must start" from Hale's thesis.5"
Significantly, Dawson did not start out studying duress or coercion.
Rather, he had written a series of articles on the role of the monetary
system in contract law, especially the way courts dealt with contracts that
tilted out of balance due to inflation."° These studies made Dawson
especially sensitive to the issue of fair exchange. When he turned his
attention to duress in the late 193os, he saw the same issue at stake. In a
1937 article entitled Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French
and German Law, he argued that the "problem of economic duress
cannot be divorced from the larger problem of the fair exchange."'' The
article showed that French and German courts invoked duress more
502. This point is implicit in John P. Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French
and German Law (pts. I& 2),II TUL. L. REV. 345 (1937), 12 TUL. L. REV. 42 (937), and is made more
explicitly in Robert L. Hale, Bargaining,Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV.603, 62124(943).
503. Dawson, supranote 502, pt. Iat 345 n.*.
504. See John P. Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany, 1914-1924, 33 MICH.
L. REV. 171 (934); John P. Dawson, The Gold Clause Decisions,33 MICH. L. REV. 647 (1935); John P.
Dawson & Frank E. Cooper, The Effect of Inflation on Private Contracts: United States, 1861-1879
(pts. I & 2), 33 MICH. L. REV. 706, 852 (1935). On Dawson's life and work, see James J. White & David
A. Peters, A Footnote for Jack Dawson, ioo MICH. L. REV. 1954 (2002).
505. Dawson, supranote 502, pt. I at 346.
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frequently than did American ones. In France and Germany, as Dawson
revealed, duress fit into a larger tradition of judicial price regulation,
including the doctrines of usury and laesio enormis (whereby a judge
could modify a sale if the price were half the "fair" value). These
doctrines were used "to cancel out advantages secured through misuse of
superior bargaining power."' ' Since the market, as Dawson put it,
echoing Hale, was "merely another system, more elaborate and more
highly organized, for the exercise of economic pressure," the "central
problem of modern times" was "the control of economic power."5" As
courts confronted this problem, the "connection between the concept of
the fair exchange and the manifold problems produced by disparities in
bargaining power" became ever "more intimate."'' In their effort to
address these "cognate problems of ensuring a fair exchange and
redressing inequality of bargaining power," German courts in World War
I had, significantly, declared that "the pursuit of excessive profit in war
time was an 'exploitation' of national necessities, forbidden by general
rules of private law." 5"
Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange received only a minor,
oblique citation in the brief (it was the only law review article cited in the
whole document)."I Yet Dawson's innovative understanding of duress
pervades the argument, from the introduction focusing on "inordinate
profits" to the exclusion of any reference to free will. Not tied down to
the subjective state of the weak party, this approach to duress gave a
court more leeway to recognize a dysfunctional market situation and to
regulate prices within it openly.
This principle was evident in the Justice Department's
unconventional choice of precedent to support its argument. Had they
wished, the attorneys easily could have cited the recent flowering of
economic duress in courts across the country and encouraged the
Supreme Court to follow the trend. The American Law Reports in 1932
noted that "business compulsion" was "tending more and more toward
recognition.""' A Harvard Law Review note in 1934 spoke of a "broader
view of duress" taking hold in the courts." 2 Williston in 1937 for the first
time used the heading "economic duress" in his treatise and added
506. Id. pt.

2 at 73.
507. Id. pt. I at 345.
5o8. Id. pt. 2 at 73.
509. Id. pt. 2 at 68-69.

51o. Govt. S.Ct. Br., supranote 22o, at 67-68 (citing Dawson for the proposition that the civil law
frequently recognizes duress in cases of purely economic compulsion; conceding that Anglo-American
courts usually do not; but arguing that such courts do find duress in cases of "necessities created by
grave emergency").
511. Annotation, Doctrine of "Business Compulsion," supra note 474, at 655.
512. Note, Quasi-Contractual Recovery of Money Paid to Avoid Penalty or Forfeiture, 47
REV. 1413, 1414 (I934).

HARV.

L.
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several dozen supporting cases. 3
But the Justice Department largely ignored the recent case law.
Instead, it focused on a separate line of precedent, one fully developed
more than a century earlier: salvage cases in admiralty." 4 In the typical
salvage case, a ship at sea ran into distress, and another ship, sailing by,
rescued the crew and as much of the cargo as possible. When the sailors
got back to shore, a court decided what compensation the rescued ship
should pay the salvor. Rather than rely on the court to set the
compensation, the two captains might, by contract, determine the price
between themselves at sea. Such contracts, however, were made in a field
where judges were accustomed to decide prices themselves. The
admiralty courts thus reserved a "clear right" to ignore such agreements
whenever the salvor was "taking advantage of his control of the
situation." ' 5
The Justice Department invoked several salvage cases,' 6
highlighting Post v. Jones (1856), in which the Supreme Court refused to
approve an exorbitant bargain struck on a desolate shore. "The
contrivance of an auction sale, under such circumstances," the Post Court
declared, "where the master of the [distressed vessel] was hopeless,
helpless, and passive-where there was no market, no money, no
competition-where one party had absolute power, and the other no
choice but submission.., is a transaction which has no characteristic of a
valid contract."5 7' Where there was "no market" and "no competition,"
judges in admiralty had broad discretion to set prices, keeping in mind
the value of the property, the labor expended, the level of risk, the
quality of service, and the policy goal of encouraging future salvage.' In
setting prices, judges had to consider how best to shape incentives, for
salvage efforts "greatly protected" the
"general interests of the
51 9
navigation and commerce of the country.9
The law of salvage was a world unto itself. In an ordinary case of
513. Compare WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra note 496, § 1618, with SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS §§ 1617-1618 (1920).
514. See G.H. Robinson, The Admiralty Law of Salvage, 23 CORNELL L. REV. 229, 230 (1938)

(stating that the salvage doctrine reached its
contemporary form by the early i8oos).
515. Id. at248. The first quotation isfrom Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. National Oil Transport Co.,
281 F. 336,340 (S.D. Tex. 1922).

516. They were by far the most frequently cited type of case, both in the section on common law
duress, Govt. S. Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 68-69, and in the section on unconscionability (which was
based on quasi-duress), id. at 8o-8i.
517. Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. (i9How.) I5O, 159 (1856),quoted in Govt. S. Ct. Br., supra note 220, at
68-69.
518. For these factors, see Robinson, supra note 514, at230, 249-51. On the necessity for broad
judicial
discretion insalvage cases, see The Emolous, 8 F.Cas. 704, 707 (C.C. Mass. 1832) (Story, J.).
The Justice Department quoted a discussion of the multiple policies behind salvage price
determination. Govt. S. Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 81-82.
519. Emolous, 8 F. Cas. at 707 (quoting The William Beckford, 3 C. Rob. Adm. 355).

November 2005]

DURESS IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING

unconscionability or duress, the court merely imposed a fair market
price-a price set collectively by numerous anonymous buyers and
sellers, which the court simply observed and followed, without
questioning its underlying justice or policy implications. 2 ° In salvage, by
contrast, where no working market existed, judges had power to
consciously and deliberately impose their own conceptions of justice and
efficiency. Conceptually, the task resembled that of officials under the
Renegotiation Act, whose mission was to devise efficient incentives and
enforce a publicly acceptable notion of distributive justice at a time when
ordinary market processes did not meet the needs of the community.
The Justice Department was implicitly asking wartime judges to act
like admiralty judges. Its claim, after all, depended on its assertion that
Bethlehem neither achieved the cost reductions nor assumed the level of
risk necessary to justify such a large profit. 2 ' Rather, Bethlehem
deserved the usual compensation under a plain CPFF agreement. The
Justice Department reassuringly stated that profit under a plain CPFF
agreement had "been fixed by the practice of the market place" at about
ten percent in wartime shipbuilding, meaning that judges were "not
required to substitute their own judgment for that of the business
community."522 Despite this reassurance, however, the Justice
Department was still implicitly calling upon the Court to assume an
activist regulatory role in the sense that the judges had to decide whether
the plain CPFF agreement was the proper measure in the first place-a
question that could not be answered without inquiring into incentives
and risk." 3 That is, the court still had to make the kind of inquiry typical
of admiralty judges (and of officials under the Renegotiation Act). It was
a difficult inquiry, to which courts typically were not suited. However,
given that the Justice Department was invoking the aid of the judiciary as
a last resort due to the absence of legislation, its attorneys did manage to
find, in the law of salvage, the best judicial model available.
Before Bethlehem, nobody realized that salvage could provide this
type of model. Up to 1941, no reported federal case had ever cited Post
v. Jones outside of admiralty. 24 (The only state cases to cite it concerned
the compensation of fiduciaries-another area of strong judicial price
regulation. 5 ) In its focus on admiralty, the Justice Department may
again have drawn inspiration from Dawson, who reported in his article
520. Hale, supra note 502, at 625.
521. See supra text accompanying notes 389, 391.
522. Govt. S. Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 74-75.
523. See supra text accompanying notes 389-394.
524. This is based on a search of the Westlaw database "Federal & State Case Law - Before 1945"
for "Post v. Jones" or "i9 How. i5o" or "6o U.S. i5o" or "6o U.S. (i9 How.) 150," for the years 1855

through

1942.

525. Parker v. Hill, 69 N.E. 336, 337 (Mass. 1904); May v. May, lO9 Mass. 252, 258 (1872).
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that courts in France had used salvage as the foundation for a much
broader doctrine of economic duress. 2
Jackson personally embraced the price-based concept of duress
argued in the brief. His handwritten notes for oral argument make this
clear. In the section on the law, the very first words under "Point I" are
"Unequal bargaining power leaving no real choice in one require
reasonable contract. 52 7 Considering that Jackson was not close to the
academy, it may be that other attorneys made the initial connection to
Dawson's work. Once the approach was presented, though, we can see
how Jackson's beliefs about the market made him receptive to it.
When discussing the bare procedures of the market, Jackson spoke
in terms of pressure rather than voluntary action, of regulation rather
than freedom. "Under [the] classical and competitive economic system,"
he wrote in 1937, "prices and production are regulated by
competition. ' 528 The point of trust-busting, as he put it, was "to avoid
government regulation by letting business men regulate each other
' Big business might
through the processes of competition."529
denigrate
the price-cutting small firm as a "chiseler,"
but
the
"Antitrust
Law
53
philosophy relies on the chiseler to regulate.
The virtues of the market, in Jackson's eyes, did not depend on the
categorical definition of market actions as free or voluntary, but rather
on the diffusion of actual decision-making power among a large number
of individuals. This is what he meant when he used terms like "free
economy."53' Jackson's positive vision can be gleaned from his critique of
corporate capitalism. "Big business," he feared, had "come to exercise an
increasing power over the standard of living, the wages and the economic
opportunities of our people. 5 32 Because of this, Jackson denounced big
business as "The Menace to Free Enterprise. 3 3 The expansion of
corporate bureaucracy meant that fewer individuals had the chance to
make real business decisions and share a measure of responsibility. "[I]n
modern business," he lamented, there were "the many men 'who must do
what they are told' and the few men who use the business machine as a

526. Dawson, supra note 502, at 353-55. The Justice Department may also have gotten the idea
from the citation of Post in WILLISTON & THOMPSON, supra note 496, § 16o8 n.3. Section 16o8 is cited in
Govt. S.Ct. Br., supranote 220, at 68.
527. Jackson, supra note 385, at 8.
528. Jackson & Dumbauld, supra note 404, at 237. Hale likewise spoke of prices as regulatory
devices. Hale, supranote 486, at 168.
529. Letter from Robert H. Jackson, Assistant Attorney General, to Bruce Barton (July 15, 1937)
(General Correspondence, Box 9, RHJ-LC, supra note 22).
530. Id.

531. For the term "free economy," see Jackson, supra note 257, at 830.
532. Jackson, supra note 418, at 3.
533. Id.at i.
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whole 'with imperial freedom of design."' 534 Freedom for the few, in
other words, meant restriction for the many.
The rise of big business, then, had constricted the freedom of
individuals by transferring opportunities away from proprietorships and
toward bureaucratic positions. These bureaucracies, in turn, made it
possible for corporations to grow big enough to acquire market power,
which in turn constricted the freedom of buyers. In the economic slump
of 1937, Jackson accused big business of raising the prices of commercial
goods above their 1929 levels. These were "prices only big business could
get"-that only market power could sustain-and that "small business
and consumers were forced to pay. 5 35 In reaction to incidents like this,
Americans wanted "freedom from arbitrary economic power. '' 136 The
chief example of that arbitrary power was unilateral price-setting.
Lumping monopoly behavior together with socialist planning, Jackson
insisted that the "American people desires no economic or political
dictatorship imposed either by government or by big business, no system
of detailed price regulation by governmental edict or of price fixing by
decree of private interests. 53 7 In this context, it makes sense that Jackson
wanted to rein in the large war contractor, who, in the words of the brief,
"has an unqualified power to exact such terms as he chooses." 5" For
Jackson, the unlimited exercise of economic power, manifested in
unreasonable prices, violated the only notions of freedom and coercion
that made any sense to him.
Jackson's economic philosophy illuminates not only the argument he
presented, but also the reason he cared so much about the appeal in the
first place. With the war administration strapped for managers, it saved
time and money by dealing mainly with the biggest firms. Of the prime
contracts awarded in the latter half of 1940, sixty percent went to only
twenty firms, and eighty-seven percent went to only one hundred firms.539
As Jackson once wrote, "No condition is so favorable to corporate
growth as profits," for they "both provide and attract capital."' Large
profits on defense contracts, then, were tied in the most direct way to the
growth of the largest firms, the institutions Jackson most feared. Further,
"
since World War II necessitated the first broad-based income tax,54
' those
profits would come in large part from the pockets of ordinary Americans,
the people Jackson most wanted to protect from corporate dominance.
534. Jackson, supra note 421, at 3. Jackson is quoting Woodrow Wilson without citation.
535. Id. at 5.
536. Id. at3.
537. Jackson & Durnbauld, supra note 404, at 237.

538. Govt. S.Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 67.
539. WADDELL, supra note 31, at 78-79.

540. Robert H. Jackson, The Big CorporationsRule, NEW REPUaLIC, Sept. 4, 1935, at 99.
541. KENNEDY, supra note 62, at 624-25.
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Jackson's view of the market originated from the small-farmer
tradition in which he grew up.542 That tradition was an offshoot of the
philosophy of republicanism, which scholars of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries have increasingly recognized as a long-standing
American alternative to liberalism.543 In the republican view, the main
goal of politics was to fend off authoritarian rule-something that could
only be accomplished if individual citizens each possessed enough
independent wealth and security to make political judgments in a
disinterested fashion. Jackson picked up on this theme when he said that
small businessmen were more trustworthy and principled defenders of
free enterprise than corporate employees could ever be.5" From this
perspective, the distribution of ownership rights and economic power
had far-reaching public consequences. This undermined liberalism's
public/private distinction and the categorical, non-substantive notions of
freedom and coercion that went with it, including the free-will definition
of duress. When discussing the nature of freedom, twentieth-century
republicans like Jackson-and the Southern and Western populist
Congressmen who provided most of the votes for the New Deal-spoke
a language similar to that of liberal intellectuals like Hale and Dawson,
even though these intellectuals derived their notions of freedom from
totally separate sources, such as Marxian socialism and Jamesian
pragmatism. 5 Republicans like Jackson and left-liberals like Hale
disagreed on many things (e.g., the latter were more sanguine about the
fairness and efficiency of public bureaucracy). 6 Yet they were united in
their aversion to corporate power and in their intuitive understanding of
freedom, both of which were crucial to the Bethlehem appeal.
E.

THE STRUGGLE OVER THE MEANING OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT

Had the Court accepted the Justice Department's theory, it would
have been a major transfer of responsibility to the judiciary. This went
against the tide of the New Deal and of early twentieth-century
progressivism as a whole. Generally, in the eyes of progressives, courts
542. BRINKLEY, supra note 16, at 6o.
543. The extensive literature on republicanism includes ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FRE
MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970); STEVEN HAHN, THE
ROOTS

OF SOUTHERN

POPULISM:

YEOMAN

FARMERS

AND THE TRANSFORMATION

OF THE GEORGIA

o

UPCOUNTRY, 185o-i89 (1983); SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY AND THE RISE OF
THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788-1850 (1984); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1993); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor.-Labor and Law in
the Gilded Age, 1985 WiS. L. REV. 767.

544. Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Bruce Barton, supra note 529.
545. On Hale's intellectual origins, see FRIED, supra note I, at 18-i9. For a general treatment of
the intellectual background to twentieth-century liberalism, see JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN
VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN

THOUGHT, 1870-1920

(1986).
546. Hale supported the systematic collectivization of rents. FRIED, supra note I, at 148.
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lacked the capacity to address economic problems, which were best left
to legislatures and executive officials. Though less enthusiastic about
executive planning than most of his colleagues, Jackson generally shared
their skepticism of judicial power. The legislature and executive had to
act affirmatively to prevent or roll back the concentration of private
power that Jackson so much despised. Antitrust policy, he hoped, would
rescue the competitive system and stave off the imposition of public
economic planning that unchecked private power would otherwise
necessitate. 47 But the federal courts, much to Jackson's disappointment,
had willfully misconstrued and "perverted" his beloved antitrust laws. 5
Judges' penchant for "evading or emasculating laws they don't like"
caused the problems targeted by those laws to fester, demanding more
drastic remedies in the future. The disastrous NRA might never have
seemed necessary if the courts had not substituted their own judgment
for that of the legislature from the 189os to the I93Os.'
Even if judges were not recalcitrant, worried Jackson, the threat of
monopoly was so large and protean that it strained the institutional
capacity of the courts, which were restricted to deciding narrow cases
with particularized facts, making it hard for them to tackle the crisis as a
whole.5" And when the legislature tried to place checks on concentrated
economic power, the very process of litigation proved so slow and
expensive that private interests could use it as an instrument to thwart
those checks. Despite his reservations about administrative agencies,
Jackson as Attorney General denounced a proposal to saddle them with
highly intrusive judicial review, since this would place new "weapons in
the hands of those whose animus is strong enough and whose purse is
long enough to wage unrestricted warfare on the administration of the
laws." 55' The judiciary was a machine set in motion by private parties, and
so long as such parties wielded disproportionate power, courts could not
be fully trusted.
Frankfurter was the only voting member of the Court to accept the
547. Jackson & Dumbauld, supra note 404, at 237-38.
548. Id. at 243.

549. Robert H. Jackson, It's Up to Us, COMMENTATOR, Dec. 1937, at 43, 47. Also, Jackson supported
Roosevelt's court-packing plan, deemphasizing the President's disingenuous justification for it as an
effort at administrative efficiency, and arguing (more honestly) that it was necessary to bring "the
elective and non-elective branches of the Government back into a proper coordination." Stephen R.
Alton, Loyal Lieutenant, Able Advocate: The Role of Robert H. Jackson in Franklin D. Roosevelt's
Battle with the Supreme Court, 5 WM.& MARY BILL RTS. J. 527, 571 (I997).
550. Jackson & Dumbauld, supra note 404, at 255-56 (stating that the adversary process and caseby-case decisions are not adequate to deal with monopoly); see also Jackson, supra note 549, at 45
(noting that judicial policies are revealed piecemeal); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 286-302 (reprint 1979) (1941) (giving a full critique of "government by lawsuit").
551. Robert H. Jackson, Untitled report of the Attorney General recommending veto of the
Walter-Logan Bill, Dec. 1i, 194o, in 86 CONo. REC. 13,943, 13,944 (940). On Jackson's reservations
about agencies, see id. at 13,945.
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duress theory. His support for it was even more anomalous than
Jackson's. Frankfurter was less nostalgic than Jackson for the atomistic
economy of the nineteenth century and more optimistic about the
potential of expert public administration. 52 Accordingly, his doubts
about the judiciary were even greater than Jackson's. On the Court,
Frankfurter gained a reputation for unmatched deference to the political
branches. 53 This attitude derived from his beliefs about the relative
competence of different governing institutions. In constitutional
interpretation, for example, Frankfurter drew a distinction between
relatively specific rules and general standards like the due process clause.
Courts could legitimately apply the former, but with respect to the latter,
"application is largely unrestricted and the room for play of individual
'
judgment as to policy is correspondingly wide."554
That opened the way
55
for abuse.
When judges indulged the "illusion of mathematical
certainty," they were too often "translating their own unconscious
economic prejudices or assumptions."" Judges had no right to do that,
argued Frankfurter, for they were not as well-positioned as other
institutions to deal with modern economic problems. Those problems,
complex and unprecedented, could be addressed only through aggressive
experimentation in policy, which a legislature could do far better than a
passive court. Fruitful experimentation required information to be
gathered
across society, and legislatures and agencies were better at that,
557
too.

Nowhere were the limits of abstract categorical principles more
apparent than when judges took up the task of setting prices.
Progressives of every stripe, Frankfurter included, had long bemoaned
the federal courts' practice of requiring regulatory commissions to allow
public utilities a "fair return" on the "fair value" of their property. The
"fair return" requirement, argued liberal economists, was simply
meaningless: the expected return on a business asset determined its
value, so it was impossible to use the value as the basis for setting the
return."' In reality, thought liberals, utility rates depended on a
subjective political choice about distributive justice between producers
and consumers, as well as technical determinations about the optimal
552. For Frankfurter on public administration, see FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS
GOVERNMENT 151-64 (930).

553. For an overview of commentary on Frankfurter's deference, see Alfred S. Neely, Justice
Frankfurter,Universal Camera and a Jurisprudenceof Judicial Review of AdministrativeAction, 25 U.
TOL. L. REV. I, 1-6 (1994); see also JEFFREY D. HOCKETr, NEw DEAL JUSTICE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF HUGO L. BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND ROBERT H. JACKSON 141-213 (1996).
554. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND His TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 167-68 (1982).
555. Id. at 168.
556. Id. at 75.
557. FRANKFURTER, supra note 552, at 48-51.
558. For Hale's critique of "fair return," see FRIED, supra note I, at 176-78.
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level of investment and the rate needed to attract it. Frankfurter
expressed this thinking in 1939: "The determination of utility rateswhat may fairly be exacted from the public and what is adequate to enlist
enterprise-does not present questions of an essentially legal nature in
the sense that legal education and lawyers' learning afford peculiar
competence for their adjustment." The matter should be left to
"commissions and legislatures."559
'
This progressive critique applied to numerous instances of judicial
interference with legislative and administrative policies about resource
allocation, from rate regulation to industrial organization to labor
relations. Surprisingly, Jackson and Frankfurter did not follow this
critique-indeed, vehemently rejected it-with respect to the pricing of
defense contracts. But surely this was an area suited to legislative and
administrative competence. The Constitution gave Congress the power
to maintain the military. It made the President commander-in-chief.
Contract pricing was an integral part of mobilization, the most
complicated economic task a modem government could undertake. It
implicated numerous matters of policy: meeting military needs, insuring
against risk, allocating new investment, encouraging efficiency, and so
forth. Indeed, at the same time the Justice Department was preparing the
Bethlehem brief, Jackson was telling the President to veto an
administrative procedure bill that would have, among other things,
mandated judicial review of defense-related agencies' contracting
decisions. The "awarding of contracts," thought Jackson, fell into the
category of "actions of an executive or administrative nature" that had
"never been regarded as... reviewable" by courts. Under the new
proposal, however, the discretion necessary to the executive would be
"transferred to the courts." Hence, the bill threatened "to retard and
hamper the work of the executive branch."'s6 It is hard to ignore the force
of this point. In hindsight, the staggering workload borne from 1942 to
1945 by the large renegotiation agencies (which did not even need to
reckon with judicial procedures) cast doubt on whether the courts could
have managed the task of keeping contract prices in line. 6'
Not only did defense contracting strain the technical competence of
courts, it was also unavoidably and obviously political. If utility rate
559. Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 122 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Senator Champ Clark, in the midst of interrogating Bethlehem's president about the justice of war
profits, attested that the controversy over "the fair return on utility investments" was "a comparable
situation to a cost-plus contract" in wartime, due to the difficulty of deciding what costs to allow. Nye
Hearings,supra note 143, at 5739.
560. Jackson, Untitled report of the Attorney General recommending veto of the Walter-Logan
Bill, supra note 55I, at 13,945.
561. SMITH, supra note 25, at 358-67 (on the decidedly non-judicial organization and operations of
the renegotiation bureaucracy), 384 (stating that the "size of the total case load" made "satisfactory
performance impossible"), 388-91 (on the size of the task).
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regulation entailed the question of just distribution between producers
and the public, defense contracting entailed that same question at even
higher intensity. From the beginning, the procurement program consisted
of a delicate political dance between Roosevelt and big business. The
President had to induce corporate leaders to accept his politically
tenuous internationalist agenda. 62 This helps explain his acquiescence to
the Second Revenue Act. It helps explain why he did "not find it politic
to bring the [war profits] tax question directly to the nation."5 3 The
political branches were meant to handle this balancing of competing
social interests.
Bethlehem's lawyers realized the awkwardness of the New Dealers'
request for judicial intervention. The Justice Department, so they
argued, was "asking this Court to appropriate to the judicial branch.., a
function which is legislative and executive in its essential character. ' ' i4t
was asking the Court to overturn the Congressional choice to implement
profit-friendly policies in the Second Revenue Act. There was a delicious
irony here. Since the nineteenth century, corporations like Bethlehem
had urged courts to limit the regulatory discretion of legislatures.
Bethlehem's lead attorney, Frederick H. Wood, achieved just such a
result in Schechter Poultry, in which the Court struck down the
centerpiece legislation of the New Deal."' Now that the Justice
Department was urging the courts to control contract prices more
aggressively than Congress had, big business was crying judicial
usurpation.
Still, irony aside, Bethlehem had a point. Walter B. Kennedy, a
professor at Fordham Law School and a genuine adherent to the
Holmesian tradition of judicial restraint,' 6 predicted that the Bethlehem
case would prove a "crossroads decision," on a par with McCulloch and
Lochner, for it tested whether the New Deal Justices would hold
themselves to the principle that "Governmental 'policies' should not be
reviewed by judicial bodies."' '6 The "wisdom or expediency of attempts
to fix profits, prices and wages," Kennedy insisted, "should reside in the

562. BRANDES, supra note 26, at 245-47; CATrON, supra note 98, at 16-17.
563. Gissen, supra note 435, at 755-56.
564. Brief for Respondents at 77, 83, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942)
(Nos. 8 & 9). Although Bethlehem's general point rang true, its particular accusation that the Justice
Department was trying to re-impose flat-rate profit limitation was not quite accurate since the
Department was in fact advocating a more flexible approach, in which, for example, increased
efficiency could justify increased profit. See supratext accompanying notes 389-391.
565 . A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 500 (935) (giving Wood's
name).
566. Kennedy, supra note 23, at 140 (stating that the "morals of the market place" should be
corrected "not by an unwise extension of the judicial power, but by 'the enactment of a statute in
accordance with established forms"').
567. Id. at 139.
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Congress and/or in the President," since these branches, unlike courts,
were capable of "flexible and changing discretion."' 5
How, in light of their commitment to judicial restraint, could
Jackson and Frankfurter support the duress theory? For one thing, a
federal judge would have the opportunity to re-price a contract if and
only if the executive initiated the process by invoking duress in court.
The theory entailed not independent judicial power, but judicial power
on the condition of executive authorization. In light of this, one might
question the benefits of the strategy to the opponents of big business,
since the wartime executive drew heavily from the business world.
However, the executive branch contained not only career businessmen,
but also career military officers. While those officers after 1945 became
identified with the "military-industrial complex," their allegiance in 1940
was uncertain, especially considering the long-standing tradition of
independent military professionalism.' 69 Besides, even if a militarycorporate alliance ran the administration during the war, litigation might
continue after it ended, by which time more disinterested personnel
might be in charge and (more importantly) the pressure of the
emergency would have lifted. As we have seen, Jackson feared the
judicial machinery in part because concentrated private power had the
ability to set it in motion; that was not a concern here.
Under this explanation, the Bethlehem appeal might seem an effort
to carve a route through the judiciary by which the executive could
circumvent the generous profit policies of Congress. In purely cynical
terms, this might not have been a bad strategy for liberals. Ever since
1938, Congress had been growing less sympathetic to Roosevelt and
more friendly to big business. Meanwhile, from 1933 to 1941 the
proportion of Democratic appointees on the U.S. Court of Appeals rose
from about twenty percent to over seventy percent.57 Further, since
about 1935 the Justice Department had been vetting nominees to ensure
they were friendly to administration policy."'
Still, Jackson and Frankfurter could not have justified, to others or
to themselves, a deliberate attempt to subvert the people's intent as
expressed in Congress. But to Jackson, war created a bargaining situation
that cast doubt on the legitimacy of public decisions. In World War I, as
568. Id. at 164.
569. Koistinen, supra note 56, at 104 (1982) (stating that the military had been suspicious of
corporate America before 1940); WADDELL, supra note 31, at 51 (stating that the military services were
relatively autonomous at the start of World War II).
570. DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS 30, fig. 2.2 (2000).
571. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT

THROUGH REAGAN 30-38 (1997); see also Rayman L. Solomon, The Politics of Appointment and the

Federal Courts' Role in Regulating America: U.S. Courts of Appeals Judgeshipsfrom T.R. to F.D.R.,
1984 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 285,323-27 (1984).
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Jackson said in 1937, Congress and the executive adopted the policies
they did only because "big business would not 'cooperate' on any other
' They were
terms."572
acting "under pressure of war.5 173 This claim-made
in a political speech-was even more radical than the legal claim that
Bethlehem coerced the EFC, for it suggested that the political branches
themselves might be deprived of the capacity to act in the public interest.
Indeed, some liberal criticism just before and after passage of the Second
Revenue Act reflected not just disagreement but de-legitimation. The
legislation was "lobby-written," exacted through a "hold up" or a "SitDown [strike]. 5 74 As we have seen, Jackson's embrace of judicial
restraint was pragmatic to begin with, a response to judges' failure to
fulfill his overriding substantive goal of controlling concentrated
power. 7 ' By 1940, courts had become less threatening and the defense
establishment more so, so it makes sense that Jackson wanted to use all
available means to protect his concept of the public interest. As a remedy
for Bethlehem's abuse, he would have preferred strong legislation if he
could get it,576 but if he could not, the courts were a fallback.
Besides, the Justice Department technically did not defy Congress
because judicial price-setting rested on the common law, not the
Constitution. This distinguished it from a utility's request for a judicial
price increase, or the Schechters' request for judicial protection from the
NRA. If a court altered the price of a defense contract on the ground of
duress, it would only be enforcing a default rule, one that Congress could
modify. However, Congress might find it politically difficult to override a
Supreme Court decision that accused a big corporation of exploiting the
nation's necessity for unconscionable gain.
Another reason for liberals to embrace the duress theory was that
they generally considered common law creativity to be necessary and
honorable, especially when it furthered some legislative impulse and,
often, even when it did not.577 This factor is especially illuminating in
Frankfurter's case. He shared the ascendant progressive view that the
judiciary did and should make policy choices. Yet he emphasized, more
than did many of his progressive colleagues, that the judge operated
under a different set of institutional and professional constraints than did
the legislator and could therefore be expected to be somewhat more
572. Jackson, supra note 421, at 3.

573. Id.
574. See supra text accompanying notes 427-430, 440-443.
575. See GLENDON SCHUBERT, DISPASSIONATE JUSTICE: A SYNTHESIS OF THE JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF

ROBERT H. JACKSON 315-29 (1969)

(explaining how Jackson, as a Justice, pragmatically weaved

between different attitudes on the relations of judicial power to bureaucratic power and individual
rights).
576. Letter from Jackson to Lindley, supra note 364 (stating, with respect to the District Court's
ruling in the Bethlehem case: "This is the sort of thing that creates the necessity for some legislation.").
577. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
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principled."' In keeping with this emphasis on constraints, Frankfurter
had more respect than did many of his allies for the half-conscious
manner in which judges typically made common law. Consider a passage
from Holmes that Frankfurter admired. According to the "official
theory," as Holmes put it, each common law decision followed
"syllogistically from existing precedents. '579 Yet "in substance," the
growth of the common law was "legislative.""" The "secret root from
which the law draws all the juices of life" was the judge's unspoken
consideration "of what is expedient for the community.""' Hence, "when
ancient rules maintain themselves..., new reasons more fitted to the
time have been found for them, and.., they gradually receive a new
content and at last a new form from the grounds to which they have been
transplanted."':' Later on, Frankfurter himself expressed the more
general principle that courts can and should make policy decisions, but
only when confined by preexisting conceptual bounds. Judges "cannot
5
decide things by invoking a new major premise out of whole cloth. 11
They had to "make the law that they do make out of the existing
materials and with due deference to the presuppositions
of the legal
5 4
system of which they have been made a part.1 8
The private law of contracts, Frankfurter believed, was shot through
with historically grounded checks on the use of bargaining power. "The
fundamental principle of law that the courts will not enforce a bargain
where one party has unconscionably taken advantage of the necessities
and distress of the other," he insisted, "has found expression in an almost
infinite variety of cases." 5 As this phrasing suggests, Frankfurter largely
followed the Justice Department's definition of duress as a necessitous
and unfair exchange, lapsing into the language of free will very rarely in
his twenty-five-page dissent.,86 Yet whereas the Justice Department had
578. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533-35

(947) (noting both the judge's duty, in the realm of common law, of "adaptation and adjustment of
old principles to new conditions" and the difference between judge and legislator). On the emergence
of an entire "legal process" school based in part on Frankfurter's thinking, see DUXBURY, supra note 2,
at 223-41; Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, supra note 2, at 502-05.
579. FELIX FRANKFURTER, The Early Writings of 0. W. Holmes, Jr., in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE
SUPREME COURT: EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 234, 237 (Philip B.
Kurland ed., i97o).

580. Id. at 236.
581. Id.
582. Id. at 237.

583. Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas and
the Clash of Personalitiesand Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, 1988 DUKE L.J. 71, 77
(citation omitted).
584. Id. (citation omitted).
585 . United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 327-28 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
586. Id. at 322-24 (analyzing the fairness of the exchange), 336 (stating that the "pressures of war
deprive [contracting officers] of equality of bargaining power in situations where bargaining with
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selected precedents somewhat narrowly, zeroing in on the salvage cases,
Frankfurter cited seemingly any case he could find that invalidated 8 a7
contract for necessitous unfair exchange, the more ancient the better.
He seemed more concerned with proving the antiquity and familiarity of
the broad doctrine than with finding cases that bore an analytic similarity
to the present policy problem. As we shall see below, Frankfurter
grasped the policy problem exceptionally well, so his broad citation
strategy can probably be explained as a reflection of his particular
version of common law creativity, which rested for its legitimacy on
finding a sturdy historical principle to apply in new situations. The duress
doctrine's supposed familiarity and antiquity also suggested that
Congress might have known about the doctrine and relied upon its
existence, adding the legitimating glow of legislative approval to an
already ancient principle. By authorizing the executive to make contracts
without special legislative protections, Frankfurter insisted, "Congress
did not impliedly repeal historic legal principles."' "Authority... to
make contracts," by this reading, did "not imply authority to make
unconscionable contracts."' ' Indeed, congressional floor debates from
World War I, he noted, showed that "Congress expected that the
shipbuilders of the nation would provide their services for a reasonable
compensation.""9
To the majority, however, Frankfurter's stance was judicial activism.
Writing for the Court, Black wrote that "if the Executive is in need of
additional laws by which to protect the nation against war profiteering,
the Constitution has given to Congress, not to this Court, the power to
make them."59' One might think that Black, a New Dealer and onetime
Senator, was simply following the normal path of judicial quietism,
private contractors is the only practicable means of securing necessary war supplies"). Frankfurter
never used the words will, agency, consent, voluntary, involuntary, volition, overcome, or deprive in the
sense that they were used in the "free will" analysis. He quoted Holmes' well-known statement that
the party under duress is still making a choice. Id. at 326-27 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (i918)). (The same Holmes quotation appears in Hale, supra note 486,
at i5o.) Frankfurter did occasionally come near to indulging in the old free-will language, as when he
said it was "a basic psychological truth" that "[w]here the one person can dictate, and the other has no
alternative but to submit, it is coercion." Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 327 (quoting Atkinson v. Denby, 7
Hurlst. & N. 934, 936). He also quoted the aphorism that "necessitous men are not.., free men." Id.
at 326 (quoting Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden ito, 113).
587. As to the sheer volume and factual variety of cases cited, compare Govt. S. Ct. Br., supra note
220, at 63-85, with Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 325-30 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter explicitly
emphasized the antiquity of the doctrine. Id. at 313, 327, 329; see also Letter from Frankfurter to the
"Brethren" (Jan. 6, 1942) microformed on The Felix Frankfurter Papers, supra note 219, at Part I,
Reel 4 (stating that, in writing his dissent, "much material has to be plowed through that apparently
was not covered by the briefs").
588. Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 335 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
589. Id. at 334.
590. Id.
591. Id. at 309.
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letting the political branches find their own answers to a question that
judges were not suited to address.
However, Black was not as passive as one might think. He was
hardly one to suppress his own political opinions. During his ten years in
the Senate, he had been "probably the most radical man" in the
chamber,592 a Southern populist crusading against everything from
alcohol and immigration to public utility holding companies and the
Supreme Court (he was perhaps the strongest backer of Roosevelt's
court-packing plan).593 After the failure of that plan, Roosevelt thirsted

for revenge. He decided to ruffle the feathers of his Senatorial opponents
by putting the marginal Black on the Court. The appointment, as even a
recent (and sympathetic) biographer of Black has written, was a "joke"
that the President played "on all the politicians and pundits in
Washington.""s Black did not disappoint. In his first years on the bench,
he became notorious for his "intense political partisanship and mediocre
legal abilities," exhibiting "quixotic behavior" in trying to get nonprogressive doctrines overturned overnight.595 Even Brandeis and Stone,
liberals though they were, worried about Black. "There are enough
presentday battles of importance to be won," wrote Stone, "without
wasting our efforts to remake the596Constitution ab initio, or using the
judicial opinion as a political tract.
The government contract system was Black's bete noire, as it was for
many Southern populists. The system, from the populist perspective,
allowed Northeastern monopolists to gain special privileges and grow fat
at the expense of the public. Because it was so easy for corporations to
exploit the public through the contract system, Black wanted to abolish it
wherever possible and replace it with public enterprise. Starting in the
1920S, for instance, the government had subsidized the aviation industry
through generous air mail contracts. In 1934, Black led an investigation
and discovered that these plums were handed exclusively to the biggest
airlines through "spoils conferences." ' He helped persuade Roosevelt to
make the precipitous move of canceling all the contracts and having the
Army deliver the mail. The Army had neither the know-how nor the
equipment for the job, and the quick transition helped cause sixty-six
accidents and twelve deaths during the three months of the ill-fated
592.

ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 226 (1994) (quoting JOSEPH ALSoP & TURNER

CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938)).

593. On Black in the Senate, see id. at 125-230.
594. Id. at 237.
595. PARRISH, supra note 554, at 276.
596. Id. at 277 (citation omitted).
597. Josephus Daniels and Benjamin Tillman were Black's predecessors in this populist tradition.
On their efforts with respect to armor-plate contracts, see COOLING, supra note 57, at 183-212;
UROFSKY, supra note 28, at 117-51.

598. HAWLEY, supra note 401, at 240.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vo1. 57:93

endeavor. The fiasco proved yet again how hard it was for the
government to take up complex business operations on short notice.
Undeterred, Black in 1935 became a leading opponent of Roosevelt's
demand for merchant marine subsidies, advocating a governmentoperated fleet instead."
The Justice Department appeal in Bethlehem was Black's chance to
confront the hated contract system from the bench. Not surprisingly, he
considered Bethlehem's conduct "outrageous" and voted for certiorari.
As with so many issues, however, Black had his own peculiar ideas about
how best to use the Court to accomplish a goal. Black wanted the Court
to hear the Bethlehem appeal because, as he told Jackson, it would give
him the chance to uphold the decisions below and "to write an opinion
which would show that [Bethlehem's large profit] was simply the usual
thing that happened under these contract systems."6 If a party contracts
carelessly, a judge may enforce the resulting obligation, however harsh,
in order to motivate parties to be more careful in the future. Black's
strategy was to do the same thing to Congress: enforce the contract as a
kind of punishment-a way to attract publicity and spur reform. "As
much as I abhor the [contract] system," he told the other Justices in
conference on December 20, 1941, ruling for Bethlehem was "the best
way to stop it.""' Black hoped "to knock out the contract system and
have the government build its own ships, ' '.. 2 a position so extreme that no
important political figure at that time seriously considered it."
As in the air mail controversy, Black was naively optimistic about
how effective agencies could be when they took over business operations
on short notice. In his opinion, he spoke of the EFC and of Congress as if
these institutions had the ability to seize or create industrial operations at
will, but simply lacked the initiative. The EFC, noted Black, had
statutory power to seize plants or to order them to produce at set prices,
yet it "declined" to use these methods and instead "chose ...to make

purchases through ordinary business bargaining."'' The seizure power,
he believed, "provided the Fleet Corporation with an alternative
bargaining weapon difficult for any company to resist. '"" Even if the
agency were coerced, continued Black, Congress should have foreseen
the coercive circumstances inherent in private wartime procurement and
599.

Id. at 237.

6oo. Jackson, supra note 257, at 998-99.
6oi. Frank Murphy's Notes from Conference, quoted in NEWMAN, supra note 592, at 289. For the
date of the conference, see Murphy's untitled notes from the conference (Dec. 20, 1941) (Supreme
Court Case Files, i94x Term, United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (Nos. 8-9), p. 73, Roll 123, Frank
Murphy Papers, Bentley Historical Library, Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI).
602. Jackson, supra note 257, at 999.
603. Higgs, supra note 21, at 173.
604. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 292 (1942).
605. Id. at 304.
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steered clear of them. "When Congress authorized the procurement of
ships through ordinary commercial negotiations," he insisted, "it must
have known that the purchases could not be made in a market of open
competition." ' The Court should not invalidate a contract because of
the "coercive effect of circumstances which Congress clearly
contem6olated."6 If the Court did otherwise, it would violate Congress'
intent.
Because the duress theory was the product of Jackson's post-New
Deal Justice Department, it had not been in anybody's mind when the
two sides were taking testimony in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
Therefore, as Black rightly pointed out, there was no direct evidence that
Bethlehem's executives, if the government had seized the firm, would
have refused to work in it. 6° On top of that, Radford testified that it was
not the "proper policy" of the EFC to dictate prices to contractors,61o
suggesting that perhaps the EFC lacked the will to exercise the seizure
power even if it seemed feasible. Black scoffed at the EFC for
discounting the seizure option before it had "even... suggested [it] to
Bethlehem. 6 , Further, continued Black, even if the agency did threaten
seizure and even if the Bethlehem executives refused to cooperate, the
agency6,2might still have attempted to seize the firm or give it a production
order. Under Black's rationale, the government could invoke duress
only if it tried to seize the firm and failed. It did not enter his mind that a
reasonable administrator, faced with the doubtfulness of success and the
dire consequences of failure, might conclude that it was too risky to try to
seize the firm and that the option should simply be left off the table. The
government, in Black's view, was obliged to play a game of chicken with
the contractor. Once it got to the edge of the cliff and swerved, then it
could invoke duress.6' 3
6o6.
607.
608.
609.
6io.
61i.

Id.
Id. at 305.
For Black's discussion of the separation-of-powers issue, see id. at 308.
Id. at 303.
Master's Report, supra note 174, at 536.
Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 303.
612. Id.
613. One additional point should be noted regarding Black's treatment of the duress argument. He
stated that "[t]wo basic propositions" underlay the government's duress claim: "(1) The Government's
representatives involuntarily accepted Bethlehem's terms. (2) The circumstances permitted the
Government no other alternative." Id. at 301. Black was misstating the government's claim. In fact, the
government never relied on the first of the two propositions, i.e., that the officers acted
'involuntarily," which proposition Black later said implied a "state of overcome will." Id. In reality,
the Justice Department relied solely on the second proposition, i.e., that the "circumstances
permitted... no other alternative." Id. On the Justice Department's argument, see supra text
accompanying notes 467-473. Black refuted the first proposition with ease. Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at
301-03. This was easy, since the free-will theory was inherently incoherent. However, it seems that the
second proposition, if proved, would have satisfied Black that duress existed. We can assume this in
light of the fact that Black, after rejecting the first proposition, still addressed the second one, stating
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Black's interpretation defied the unanimous fact-findings of the
adjudicators below. The Third Circuit, the District Judge, and the Special
Master each stated that attempting to seize the firm would have defeated
the agency's purpose. Besides, the Nye Committee, which performed the
most complete investigation of the problem, found that the government
had no practical power to give orders to large firms.6 ' Even Bethlehem's
lawyers conceded that the EFC's power to seize the plant was futile
without the cooperation of the company's executives (though they
asserted that the executives would have cooperated, had push come to
shove).6 '5 Jackson, enraged by what he considered Black's naivet6,
responded in private with an anecdote: "I have sat in when the President
himself was considering taking over plants under the strongest kind of
necessity, and I know that the theory that the Government is not under
terrific pressure
to come to the best terms it can get is mere academic
66
nonsense."
Frankfurter, as the only voting member of the Court to have served
in a wartime administration, defied Black on this point. 6,, "Of course the
Government had the power to take over Bethlehem's shipyards,"
Frankfurter admitted, "[b]ut the United States was at war. It needed
ships-and it needed them at once. The shipyards and plants of a
recalcitrant shipbuilder would not produce the necessary tonnage, at
least not in the needed time ....
Congress and the agencies involved
knew their constraints better than did the Court. Using this fact,
Frankfurter turned the tables on Black and accused him of judicial
activism for not taking the political branches at their word when they
judged that they lacked the capacity to act more aggressively: "[W]hen
these contracts were made, none of the parties believed that there was
open to the Government the feasible alternative which now, twenty-five
years later, this Court says was open to it. 61 9 Frankfurter attested that
Black, by using the enforcement of the contract to try to make Congress
change its policy, was overstepping judicial bounds. The choice of how to
meet wartime needs, whether by public enterprise, private contracts, or
that "[i]f the negotiations do not establish duress, the Government finds it in the circumstances
themselves." Id. at 303.
614. Nye Comm. Report, supra note 6x,.at 46.
615. Brief for Respondents 61, Bethlehem, 315 U.S. 289 (Nos. 8 & 9).
616. Letter from Justice Robert H. Jackson to Justice William O. Douglas, supra note 22.
617. During World War I, Frankfurter served on the board that negotiated labor disputes. LIVA
BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER 58-84 (1969). Meanwhile, Byrnes was in Congress. Biographical Directory
of the United States Congress, available at www.senate.gov. The four other future Justices were all in
the Army or training for it. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 91-93
(i974); HOWARD, supra note 399, at 14-15 (on Murphy); NEWMAN, supra note 592, at 48-49 (on Black);
Richard P. Hedlund, Reed, Stanley Forman, in I8 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 278, 278 (John A.

Garratay & Mark C. Carnes eds., 1999).
618. Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 314 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
619. Id. at 315.
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some other means, was a question "of policy for the wisdom and
responsibility of the Congress and the Executive. The very limited scope
of inquiry to which a litigation on a particular transaction is confined is
hardly the basis for judgment on such far-flung issues."6 'o
With respect to the choice of optimal procurement methods,
Frankfurter was surely correct. However, if courts were to find duress,
they would have to set prices, and in war procurement, that task entailed
equally "far-flung" questions. As discussed above, the Justice
Department went outside the judicial comfort zone when it asked the
Court to make a general inquiry into whether Bethlehem's profit was
justified on the basis of efficiency and risk, not merely to judge the profit
against a yardstick of fair market value. Specifically, the Justice
Department argued that Bethlehem's failure to reduce cost or assume
risk meant it deserved no more profit than under a plain CPFF contract.
On such a contract, said the brief, the customary profit by the "practice
in the market place" in World War I had been about ten percent on
cost.6" To support this contention, the attorneys cited some anecdotal
evidence, including Schwab's decision to reduce another contractor's
profit to that level; certain Navy policies, never adopted by the EFC; and
some unrelated EFC contracts with Bethlehem.6" One might reasonably
criticize these citations as too scattered to establish market norms.
Black's response, however, was not so measured or logical. Hell-bent on
denouncing war profits, he went outside the record to cite willy-nilly
numerous wartime profit figures from various industries that exceeded
Bethlehem's twenty-two percent figure, paying no attention to how the
contracts compared to the one at issue in terms of cost reduction,
investment incentives, or assumption of risk.6 3 On the basis of this
mindless fact-gathering, he declared that while Bethlehem's profit was
"high" and might "justly arouse indignation," it was "not grossly in
excess of the standard established by common practice in the field in
which Congress authorized the making of these contracts.624
Frankfurter justly castigated Black for selecting examples without
reference to efficiency, investment, or risk.625 However, in addition to
refuting Black's pseudo-analysis, Frankfurter also cast doubt (perhaps
unintentionally) on the capacity of any judge to set prices competently.
The case record, Frankfurter admitted, shed "little light" on wartime
contracting norms, and if one went outside the record, the evidence
became "confusing and unreliable," since no mere string of examples
620. Id. at 337.
621. Govt. S. Ct. Br., supra note 220, at 75.
622. Id. at 54-57.

623. Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 306-07.
624. Id. at 305 ("high"; "not grossly.
), 308 ("justly arouse indignation").
625. Id. at 332 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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gathered by a judge could possibly "tell the whole story of Government
contracts in the last war.""' In other words, a court had neither the
specialized personnel nor the investigative resources to undertake the
kind of industry-wide analysis that an agency could. Plus, this was only
one among several reasons to doubt courts' proficiency in this area.
There were also the delays and expense of judicial process, not to
mention the reluctance of judges to promulgate prospective rules,
especially numerical ones. Although Frankfurter's hard-nosed
assessment of the government's wartime necessity created a compelling
case for re-pricing of some kind, he failed to answer the objection that
courts, lacking the institutional competence for the task, might do more
harm than good.
V.

THE DECISION AND ITS AFTERMATH

As the moment of decision approached, Black had Murphy,
Douglas, Byrnes, and Reed firmly behind him, making for a 5-I
majority. On February 9, 1942, the Justices walked toward the courtroom
to announce the opinions. Suddenly, however, Douglas revealed that he
was going to dissent, still rejecting the duress theory but accepting the
Burke & James argument that the savings clause required separate
consideration.627 Douglas' embrace of such a logically flimsy argument
seems to indicate his discomfort with the substantive outcome of Black's
decision. Murphy, too, was uncomfortable. When Douglas' last-minute
announcement rendered the majority one vote slimmer, Murphy asked
Stone to postpone the decision so that he could write a concurrence
distancing himself from Black's rhetoric. Bethlehem's profit, "no matter
6
how it [was] dolled up," agonized Murphy privately, was "inordinate.", ,8
He "want[ed] to condemn it.

' 69

Black's statement that profits like

Bethlehem's were "common during the last war," wrote Murphy in his
concurrence, "provides no justification... for such a practice then or
now. ''63° Still, Murphy agreed with Black that the government possessed

"an actual and a potential arsenal of powers adequate to protect its
6
interests in dealings with private persons," so there was no duress. '
Thus, only three Justices joined Black's opinion without reservation
when the Court finally handed it down on February i6.
Needless to say, the Bethlehem decision did not result in the

626. Id. at 332-33.
627. Id. at 341-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting); JOSEPH P. LASH,
FRANKFURTER 330 (1974) (describing Douglas' last-minute decision).
628. HOWARD, supra note 399, at 279 (citation omitted).

629. Id. (citation omitted).
630. Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 310 (Murphy, J., concurring).
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realization of Black's quixotic quest for public enterprise.632 Nor,
however, did it guarantee the ordinary common law security of wartime
contracts, as at least one commentator prematurely declared."' The
United States' declaration of war, combined with new profit scandals,
weakened the pro-business political climate that had motivated Jackson
to press the litigation back in 1940-1941. Six weeks after the decision,
Congressman Francis H. Case, a Republican from South Dakota,
proclaimed to his colleagues that, in light of the Bethlehem ruling, "we
must lock the barn before the horse is taken. 6 4 Accordingly, he
introduced a bill to limit profits on all defense contracts to six percent on
cost. Though re-pricing after performance had obvious merit, Case's set
percentage limit would have tied the hands of the armed services in their
efforts to reward efficiency. In response, the chief of Army procurement
persuaded Congress to institute re-pricing after performance but with
discretion granted to the services to award profits of varying percentages
so as to encourage efficiency and fulfill other goals. Congress
accepted
635
this solution and enshrined it in the Renegotiation Act.
And what about the millions of dollars that the Supreme Court
ordered the government to pay to Bethlehem? Years earlier, before
leaving the Justice Department, Jackson had instructed his colleagues
never to pay the judgment, "even if the courts ultimately affirm the
decision." For its part, Bethlehem did not appear eager to collect, for it
was already reaping huge amounts from World War II contracts. In fact,
the firm voluntarily returned some of the millions it was making."' As for
the judgment itself, Jackson had his way. The government never paid.

632. Higgs, supra note 21, at 173 (stating that a takeover of the munitions industry was never taken
seriously during rearmament for World War II).
633. Kennedy, supra note 23, at 164-65; see also Bethlehem, 315 U.S. at 312 (Murphy, J.,
concurring) ("The possibility that the Government may be relieved of bargains twenty-four years after
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government.").
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